Evidence Against the Simulation Hypothesis (original) (raw)

Constraints, observations, and experiments on the simulation hypothesis

Do we live in a [quantum] simulation? Constraints, observations, and experiments on the simulation hypothesis, 2023

The question "What is real?" can be traced back to the shadows in Plato's cave. Two thousand years later, Rene Descartes lacked knowledge about arguing against an evil´ deceiver feeding us the illusion of sensation. Descartes' epistemological concept later led to various theories of what our sensory experiences actually are. The concept of "illusionism", proposing that even the very conscious experience we have-our qualia-is an illusion, is not only a red-pill scenario found in the 1999 science fiction movie "The Matrix" but is also a philosophical concept promoted by modern tinkers, most prominently by Daniel Dennett. He describes his argument against qualia as materialistic and scientific. Reflection upon a possible simulation and our perceived reality was beautifully visualized in "The Matrix", bringing the old ideas of Descartes to coffee houses around the world. Irish philosopher Bishop Berkeley was the father of what has later been coined as "subjective idealism", basically stating that "what you perceive is real" (e.g., "The Matrix" is real because its population perceives it). Berkeley then argued against Isaac Newton's absolutism of space, time, and motion in 1721, ultimately leading to Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein's respective views. Several neuroscientists have rejected Dennetts' perspective on the illusion of consciousness, and idealism is often dismissed as the notion that people want to pick and choose the tenets of reality. Even Einstein ended his life on a philosophical note, pondering the very foundations of reality. With the advent of quantum technologies based on the control of individual fundamental particles, the question of whether our universe is a simulation isn't just intriguing. Our ever-advancing understanding of fundamental physical processes will likely lead us to build quantum computers utilizing quantum effects for simulating nature quantum-mechanically in all complexity, as famously envisioned by Richard Feynman. Finding an answer to the simulation question will potentially alter our very definition and understanding of life, reshape theories on the evolution and fate of the universe, and impact theology. No direct observations provide evidence in favor or against the simulation hypothesis, and experiments are needed to verify or refute it. In this paper, we outline several constraints on the limits of computability and predictability in/of the universe, which we then use to design experiments allowing for first conclusions as to whether we participate in a simulation chain. We elaborate on how the currently understood laws of physics in both complete and smallscale universe simulations prevent us from making predictions relating to the future states of a universe, as well as how every physically accurate simulation will increase in complexity and exhaust computational resources as global thermodynamic entropy increases. Eventually, in a simulation in which the computer simulating a universe is governed by the same physical laws as the simulation and is smaller than the universe it simulates, the exhaustion of computational resources will halt all simulations down the simulation chain unless an external programmer intervenes or isn't limited by the simulation's physical laws, which we may be able to observe. By creating a simulation chain and observing the evolution of simulation behavior throughout the hierarchy taking stock of statistical relevance, as well as comparing various least complex simulations under computability and predictability constraints, we can gain insight into whether our universe is part of a simulation chain.

Limits to the Simulation Hypothesis

This paper shows that by applying the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, the spatial and temporal resolution of a simulation can be no more than half the resolution of the simulating reality. This has significant implications for not only the values of the observables in the simulation but also its physical laws. This progressive halving of nested simulations coupled with the minimum resolution compatible with the production of a simulation also sets a limit to the nestedness of a lineage of simulations (it is by no means infinite). The limit of nestedness is then used to calculate the probability that we are living in a simulation assuming a single base reality. This will be shown to be significantly lower than popular expectation. A Kardashev-like scale, with three variants, is also developed to gauge the technological advancement of a civilization in relation to the extent to which it can extract information from space and time.

Refutations of the Simulation Argument

2004

Abstract By examining the logical consistency of Nick Bostrom's simulation argument, we find that its conclusions are not fully compatible with its premises, a weak form of the liar's paradox. We also claim that a flaw in the simulation argument is to be found in the misuse of finite probability theory.

The Simulation Argument and Hypothesis in Philosophy

Are we, or might we become, artificial intelligences "living" in a virtual or artificial reality (a 'simulation')? Patrick S. O'Donnell (2022) "There's a new creation story going around. In the beginning, someone booted up a computer. Everything we see around us reflects states of that computer. We are artificial intelligences living in an artificial reality-a 'simulation.' It's a fun idea, and one worth taking seriously, as people increasingly do. But we should very much hope that we're not living in a simulation."-Eric Schwitzgebel in an op-ed in the LA Times. (Schwitzgebel is a well-known philosopher at UC Riverside who has a blog titled The Splintered Mind, where this article is also found, with links and additional material.

Why we are not living in the computer simulation

The International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2022

This is a forthcoming paper to be published on the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. The abstract is as follows: Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are living in one of them is high or at least nonzero. I present arguments to refute the claim that we are or might be in any one of them.

What are Simulations? An Epistemological Approach

Procedia Technology 13 ( 2014 ) 6 – 15 , 2014

Contemporary sciences use a wide and diverse range of computational simulations, including in the areas of aeronautics, chemistry, bioinformatics, social sciences, AI, the physics of elementary particles and most other scientific fields. A simulation is a mathematical model that describes or creates computationally a system process. Simulations are our best cognitive representation of complex reality, that is, our deepest conception of what reality is. In this paper we defend that a simulation is equivalent epistemologically and ontologically with all other types of cognitive models of elements of reality. Therefore, simulations cannot be considered secondary nor weak instruments to approach to the reality analysis.

Simulation Theory: A Preliminary Review

European Journal of Science and Theology, 2018

The so-called simulation hypothesis' claims that there is the possibility that we live in a computer simulation. Nick Bostrom's simulation argument' presents a probabilistic analysis of such possibility. In this article, I discuss both the simulation hypothesis and Bostrom's argument (understood in combination as the simulation theory), focusing on their ontological assumptions. I argue that the simulation theory emphasizes volition and, as such, is a form of voluntarism.

The philosophy of simulation: hot new issues or same old stew?

Synthese

Computer simulations are an exciting tool that plays important roles in many scientific disciplines. This has attracted the attention of a number of philosophers of science. The main tenor in this literature is that computer simulations not only constitute interesting and powerful new science, but that they also raise a host of new philosophical issues. The protagonists in this debate claim no less than that simulations call into question our philosophical understanding of scientific ontology, the epistemology and semantics of models and theories, and the relation between experimentation and theorising, and submit that simulations demand a fundamentally new philosophy of science in many respects. The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate these claims. Our conclusion will be sober. We argue that these claims are overblown and that simulations, far from demanding a new metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and methodology, raise few if any new philosophical problems. The philosop...

ARE YOU LIVING IN A COMPUTER SIMULATION

This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a " posthuman " stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor‐simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed. I. INTRODUCTION Many works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super‐powerful computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears. Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simulations. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine‐grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct). Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones. Therefore, if we don't think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears. That is the basic idea. The rest of this paper will spell it out more carefully.