Spirit into Matter: Exploring the Myth of Science (original) (raw)

Pondering Imponderables: Occultism in the Mirror of Late Classical Physics

On a souvent caractérisé le fait d' établir une ligne de partage entre la physique « classique » et la physique « moderne » comme une manière de rompre avec une conception mécaniste, matérialiste et réductionniste du monde, pour se tourner vers une autre, ouverte et fondamentalement incertaine. Selon tant des porte-parole de l' ésotérisme moderne que certains « scholars », cette rupture aurait, en outre, rendu la science davantage susceptible d' accueillir favorablement la spéculation ésotérique. Comme d' ordinaire, les choses ont pu se présenter de façon un peu plus complexe. Le présent article, qui repose sur l' historiographie récente des sciences physiques, montre que ce ne fut pas seulement après Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, et al., que des ésotéristes se sont montrés capables d' établir un dialogue serré et semi-convaincant avec la physique de pointe. Contrairement à l' idée reçue, la vision « mécaniste-matérialiste » de la physique du XIXè siècle peut n' avoir pas été aussi fermée à la spéculation métaphysique que sa réputation le laisse entendre. En mettant en particulier l' accent sur le développement de modèles d' éther optique et électro-magnétique, l' article soutient l' idée que la physique représenta, aux plans conceptuel et culturel, une ressource importante pour les ésotéristes à l' apogée de sa période « classique », et il présente un choix de problèmes à propos desquels des penseurs tant scientifiques qu' ésotériques pouvaient converger. Un discours spécifique de la « métaphysique de l' éther » est mis ici en évidence, dont on identifie un aspect cosmologique et un aspect anthropologique. En traitant de cas tirés de l' occultisme et de la recherche psychique, l' article illustre la manière dont la physique classique tardive a constitué, en matière d' innovations doctrinales de l' ésotérisme moderne, un contexte crucial quoique peu exploré.

The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality

Physics Today, 2006

Franklin is a false starting point, and the history of European politics during the 19th century is strewn with men of letters and science. As a historian, I do not find it gratifying to admit to readers of PHYSICS TODAY that my colleague's attempt to make sense of their science has fallen so short. Two more of Chaplin's blurbists, Dudley Herschbach, a Nobel laureate in chemistry, and Lawrence Krauss, a distinguished physicist, judge The First Scientific American to be admirable in concept and execution. The book is full of "verve, insight and wit," according to Herschbach, and, according to Krauss, offers, a "fascinating. .. comprehensive exploration of [Franklin's] scientific side." Herschbach and Krauss's uninformed tolerance is misplaced. The cracks between the cultures of science and history should not be safe havens for work that would not survive in either.

THE SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENCE - or the long path to the union of metaphysics and empiricism

THE SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENCE - or the long path to the union of metaphysics and empiricism, 2018

This book reviews the development of the natural sciences and the picture of reality produced by science from the philosophical conceptions in antique metaphysics to the picture outlined from the mathematical models produced by empirical research in modern physics. Also, the book studies the possibility of a re-evaluation of the picture of reality from a holistic perspective with a closer connection between phil-osophical and empirical aspects.

The Origin of Modern Physical Science: Some Passages from A Theory of Wonder

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy, 2022

The triumph of the Copernican revolution is commonly associated with the introduction of the scientific method, mainly by Galileo. The nature of science presumably depends on the way observation passes judgment on theory. This is how, according to empiricism, the practice of science improves our worldviews. Some historically inclined philosophers of science, most notably Kuhn and Feyerabend, have insisted on paying attention to what Galileo actually said and did. Shockingly, he drives a dagger through the heart of empiricism: observation does not have such priority over theory, because observation itself assumes theory. This is what he argues when dismantling Aristotle's Tower Argument, according to which a stone dropped from a tower falls straight down to the base of the tower. If this is so, the Earth cannot rotate, for it would carry the tower with it, making our observation of the stone's flight wildly different. According to Galileo, to conclude that the stone really falls vertically requires the assumption that the Earth does not movethe theoretical issue in question. Given Galileo's proper understanding of the nature of science, I view Feyerabend's principle of proliferation as the realization that a good strategy for the latter is to elaborate radical alternatives and, on their basis, reconsider what counts as evidence. Moreover, a science produced by human brains should be analyzed on the basis of evolutionary theory and neuroscience. From that perspective, we may be able to defend a sensible notion of relativism. These considerations have led me to the main arguments of my new book, A Theory of Wonder: Evolution, Brain, and the Radical Nature of Science (Philosophy of Science,