Time, change and eternity (original) (raw)
Related papers
Three Flawed Distinctions in the Philosophy of Time
Metaphysica, 2007
The distinctions between A-series and B-series, between synchronic and diachronic identity and between perdurance and endurance are basic in the philosophy of time; yet they are flawed. McTaggart’s claim that the B-series is static and that a series has to be changing to be really temporal arises from a misunderstanding of temporal relations and of the task of ontological analysis. The dynamic appearance of the A-series results from the incompleteness of the analysis. “Synchronic identity” is synonymous with “strict identity”, which has nothing to do with simultaneity. “Diachronic Identity” is another designation for persistence of an ordinary thing through time and change. Now, strict self-identity holds independently of whether a thing has a short or a long duration. Hence, diachronic identity is synchronic identity. Lewis’ distinguishes two kinds of ontological analyses of persistence, the perdurance and the endurance analysis. This dichotomy is in several respects not exhaustive. Above all, his definition of “persist” is inadequate being based on the notion of multiple temporal localisation which is apt with interrupted but misplaced with persistent, i.e., temporally continuous objects.
The A-Theory of Time, Temporal Passage, and Comprehensiveness
Synthese, 2022
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view's failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.
Note on Metaphysics of Time and Eternity
Christians typically conceive of God's eternality in one of two ways: either God is in time (temporalism) or he is outside of time (atemporalism). These conceptions paint strikingly different portraits of the divine nature, as well as suggest an array of competing philosophical and theological implications. My aim here is neither to explicate nor critique these positions exhaustively. My focus, rather, is the way in which one's decision regarding the metaphysics of time constrains-entails-one's conception of divine eternality. Specifically, I shall argue that temporalism entails commitment to the so-called dynamic theory of time, and atemporalism entails commitment to the so-called static theory of time. 1 Although my own sympathies are firmly on the side of the A-theorists regarding time (and, given that I take this as being entailed, with the temporalists regarding divine eternality), it is beyond the purposes of this paper to argue for or against either temporalism or atemporalism. My claim is that one's view of time, whichever view that is, commits one either to temporalism or atemporalism.
The paper puts forward a conceptual framework in which the phenomenon of time can be presented and discussed in a proper way. We argue that change is ontologically and epistemologically a more basic phenomenon than time. Time is an abstract entity created by the human mind on the basis of the experience of change. Physical reality is a process of ceaseless becoming and vanishing; time is not a part of that process. Time is the abstract bank in relation to which we measure the intensity and amount of the flow (change) of physical reality. We must differentiate physical reality from abstract entities (language) by means of which we speak about this reality. It is necessary to differentiate a formal description (formulas) from its interpretation: a correct formal description can be interpreted in a logically inconsistent and factually wrong way. We argue that the discourse about the relativity of time joins (mixes) physical reality and language, and gives an inconsistent interpretation of correct formulas. Regarding the future of time, it has been said that physicists are divided between two options: (1) to pin down a "master time", as a measure of change of physical reality, and (2) to proclaim time "out of existence". We argue that both options must be adopted, because time is (1) a measure of change, created by the human mind, (2) and time is an abstract entity that does not exist in physical reality.
Gallagher, S. 1998. The Inordinance of Time
The Inordinance of Time develops an account of the experience of time at the intersection of three approaches: phenomenology, cognitive science, and post-structuralism. Using insights developed in both the phenomenological and cognitive traditions Gallagher explores the inadequacies of the existing models, the limitations imposed by introspective reflection, concepts of intentionality and embodied existence, and the extra-intentional processes that govern the operations of consciousness and memory.
The reflections presented in this paper do not aim at formulating a new theory of time, but they rather try to present a methodical explication of basic terms of our time on the basis of a phenomenologically ascertainable ontological order in the sense of a daily-life ontology of changes. The foundation of temporality on the phenomenology of change does not mean, however, that change is considered the fundamental ontological category. In other words, the following reflections on the nature of time should be understood as part of a substance ontology, which regards states of affairs and changes -or being and becomingas the two aspects of the hylomorphic substance. Following the explication of the basic temporal terms, I will present some considerations regarding the relationship between temporality and freedom, as well as a non-constructive conception of history based on the aspectual reality of time. 2 Whitehead 1979.
The Logic of Being: Realism, Truth, and Time - Appendices
This appendix is a chapter of the manuscript of The Logic of Being that was cut from an earlier version since it represents something of a digression with respect to the main argument of the book. It was originally situated roughly between chapter 6 and chapter 7 of the current version.
From transformations to the notion of time
Qeios, 2024
In this paper I expose an ontological-existential interpretation of time via its unveiling and analysis in an example of scienti c measurement in a chemical transformation. I begin with the search for time in the transformation, and little by little I explain its characteristics and structures. I nally interpret the time involved in the measurement and the usual concept of linear time by means of the Heidegger's concept of temporality (originary time). The paper is an attempt to explain Heidegger's existential ontology to non-specialist thinkers interested in understanding the subject of time from approaches di erent from those of their eld, as may be the case of many contemporary scientists. For this reason, it develops the ideas step by step and in an expository way, but gradually entering the precise and rigorous Heideggerian terminology necessary for the temporal analysis. Finally, it should be noted that this work contains novel interpretations of several of the ideas and expressions of Heidegger's thought.