Epistemic Objectivity behind Inductive Probability: Beyond Carnap-Popper Controversy on the Problem of Inductive Logic (original) (raw)
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In these pages I offer my solution to the problem of inductive probability of theories. Against the existing expectations in certain areas of the current philosophy of science, I argue that Bayes’s Theorem does not constitute an appropriate tool to assess the probability of theories and that we would do well to banish the question about how likely a certain scientific theory is to be true, or to what extent one theory is more likely true than another. Although I agree with Popper that inductive probability is impossible, I disagree with him in the way Sir Karl presents his argument, as I have showed elsewhere, so my proof is completely different. The argument I present in this paper is based on applying Bayes’s Theorem to specific situations that show its inefficiency both in the case of whether a hypothesis becomes all the more likely true the greater the empirical evidence that supports it, as whether the probability calculus allows to identify a given hypothesis from a set of hypotheses incompatible with each other as the most likely true.
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Philosophy of Science, 1997
Attempts to utilize the probability calculus to prove or disprove various inductive or inductive skeptical theses are, I believe, highly problematic. Inductivism and inductive skepticism are substantive (logically consistent) philosophical positions that do not allow of merely formal proofs or disproofs. Often the problems with particular alleged formal proofs of inductive or inductive sceptical theses turn on subtle technical considerations. In the following I highlight such considerations in pointing out the flaws of two proofs, one an alleged proof of an inductive sceptical conclusion due to Karl Popper, the other an alleged proof of an inductivist thesis originally due to Harold Jeffreys and later advocated by John Earman. Surprisingly, in examining Popper's argument it is shown that certain apparently weak premises, often embraced by both inductivists and deductivists, lend themselves to inductive conclusions. However, it is argued, those premises are still philosophically substantive and not amenable to a purely formal demonstration. The lesson to be learnt here is twofold. First, we need to be very careful in determining which formal theses entail, and which are entailed by, inductive skepticism and inductivism. Second, we need to take great care in laying out and examining the assumptions presumed in formal arguments directed for and against such formal theses.
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Philosophy Compass, 2011
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