A measure of the measure of measuring (original) (raw)
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On Meaning and Measuring: A philosophical and historical View
Ágora, 2015
El objetivo de este trabajo es reconsiderar el punto de vista defendido por los pensadores que se pueden adscribir al famoso 'Círculo de Viena' sobre el significado y, especialmente, sobre los enunciados asignificativos. Para ello, procedemos usando la típica forma científica, heredera de la tradición del Círculo, de medir empíricamente los conceptos adquiridos. Además, proporcionamos algunas notas históricas, así como algunas reflexiones sobre el pensamiento de Karl Menger sobre la carencia de una geometría adecuada para el micromundo.
The Irony of Measurement by Subjective Estimations
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2002
In 1948 S. S. Stevens, in his famous Science article, proposed a theory of measurement that radically differed from the dominate theory of the time. The dominate theory held that all strong forms of scientific measurementfor example, those that yielded ratio scales-had to be based on an observable ordering and an observable commutative and associative operation. Stevens proposed different criteria and introduced his method of magnitude estimation. Stevens as well as measurement theorists considered his method to be radically different from those based on commutative and associative operations. Although his method was controversial, it became a standard tool in the behavioral sciences. This article argues that Stevens' method, together with implicit assumptions he made about the scales of measurement it generated, is from a mathematical perspective the same as the measurement process based on commutative and associative operations. The article also provides a theory of qualitative numbers and shows an interesting relationship between qualitative numbers and Stevens' method.
Social Science Information, 2019
In modern science, we usually associate value with a numerical determination-such as, for instance, the value of the Planck constant. However, once we examine value as a co-original facet of measure, we are led to distinguish-with Spinoza-what we could call the natura naturans of measure from what we understand by measurement as its natura naturata. First, I discuss the tensions and the connections between the extensive side of measures (molis, magnitude) and their intensive side (virtus, worth) to provide a preliminary map for plotting the relations between measures and the social-moral-technical environments where they are performed. The second part of the text presents the articles in this special issue, highlighting how they tackle the social ecology of measures drawing from distinct theoretical lineages. Keywords extensive/intensive measurement, magnitude/worth, measures-as-monsters, value-measure environments, unit of measure Résumé Le regard scientifique moderne tend à associer la notion de 'grandeur' à une détermination numérique-telle que, par exemple, 'la grandeur de la constante de Planck'. Néanmoins, à partir du moment où nous concevons la valeur comme l'une des facettes originelles de la mesure, nous sommes amenés à distinguer-avec Spinoza-ce que nous pouvons
Social Science Information
What is normally reconstructed as the early history of the social sciences is better seen as two quite separate lines of practices: one dealing with observations of matters of state and policy, called political arithmetic or statistics and increasingly resorting to enumerating and counting occurrences; the other one trying to develop concepts to understand what was seen as a radically new social configuration after the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Throughout the nineteenth century, there was rather little connection between the two. 1 Except that there was a problem: those who emphasised conceptualisation could never be quite sure in how far their concepts referred to the changing society; and those who observed, in turn, could not be sure what social phenomenon exactly it was that they were enumerating and counting. The bridge between the two lines, one might say, is measurement in the broad sense of the term, namely the elaboration of features of a social phenomenon such that those features could be made subject to systematic observation and comparison over time as well as with co-temporaneous social phenomena. Some connection between the two lines was established during the period that came to be referred to as the era of classical sociology, but in Émile Durkheim's approach much more than in those of Max Weber or Georg Simmel, for instance. During the period between the two world wars, the tenuous connection got almost entirely lost again in Europe where social philosophy and empirical social research flourished in separation. In the USA, in contrast, the development of quantitative research techniques was widely debated among academic sociologists, with a view to their impact on the discipline. Already in 1932, Floyd N. House addressed a section meeting of the American Sociological Society reflecting upon 'measurement in sociology' and, among others, referring to John Dewey's view that the scientific method tends to 'substitute data for objects' (House, 1934). In 1953, Samuel A. Stouffer returned to the theme under the same title, now in the form of a Presidential Address to the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society. Thus, the issue is certainly not new and has long been recognised. However, the conditions under which it needs to be addressed undergo changes. Tentatively, we propose the following periodization of the more recent approaches. 2 After the Second World War, quantitative research methods became dominant in the US social sciences, and the latter, in turn, became the guiding model throughout the West and even beyond. But such hegemony also generated resistance, one particular expression of which was the 'dispute over positivism' in the West German social sciences (documented in Adorno et al., 1969). More than a debate, this and related occurrences in other settings were indeed disputes, led by antagonists from rather well-defined standpoints and with little intellectual movement in the process. As a result, rather 859468S SI0010.
doi:10.1006/jmps.2002.1429 The Irony of Measurement by Subjective Estimations
2013
measurement that radically differed from the dominate theory of the time. The dominate theory held that all strong forms of scientific measurement— for example, those that yielded ratio scales—had to be based on an observable ordering and an observable commutative and associative operation. Stevens proposed different criteria and introduced his method of magnitude estimation. Stevens as well as measurement theorists considered his method to be radically different from those based on commutative and associative operations. Although his method was controversial, it became a standard tool in the behavioral sciences. This article argues that Stevens ’ method, together with implicit assumptions he made about the scales of measurement it generated, is from a mathematical perspective the same as the measurement process based on commutative and associative operations. The article also provides a theory of qualitative numbers and shows an interesting relationship
Quantification is neither necessary nor sufficient for measurement
Being an infrastructural, widespread activity, measurement is laden with stereotypes. Some of these concern the role of measurement in the relation between quality and quantity. In particular, it is sometimes argued or assumed that quantification is necessary for measurement; it is also sometimes argued or assumed that quantification is sufficient for or synonymous with measurement. To assess the validity of these positions the concepts of measurement and quantitative evaluation should be independently defined and their relationship analyzed. We contend that the defining characteristic of measurement should be the structure of the process, not a feature of its results. Under this perspective, quantitative evaluation is neither sufficient nor necessary for measurement.
Quantities, Quantification, and the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Measurement
Although measurement has been an important component of human activities for millennia, it remains remarkably difficult to provide a fully satisfactory definition of the concept. In part this is due to the fact that measurement is a diverse and dynamic human activity, and takes shape in a wide variety of ways depending on the nature of the subject matter, application, and context. If a definition of measurement is to pay respect to this basic fact, it cannot be so narrowly construed as to apply to only one area of scientific activity (e.g., physics); on the other hand, the definition cannot be so permissive as to trivialize the concept to the point that measurement is not recognizably superior to, for instance, guesses or statements of opinion. One issue at the heart of this tension is the relationship between the concepts of measurement , quantity, and quantification. In particular, it is sometimes argued or assumed either that quantification is a necessary condition for measurement, or that quantification is simply synonymous with measurement. To assess the validity of these positions, the concepts of measurement, quantity, and quantification should be independently defined and their relationships analyzed. In this paper we conduct such an analysis, from both historical and philosophical perspectives, and present the case that quantification is neither necessary nor sufficient for measurement. We conclude by considering how the conceptual separation of measurement and quantification serves to promote more productive and shared understandings of measurement across disciplines.
Issues of measure and value are emerging as central in current debates concerning the capacity of social science and cognate disciplines to engage contemporary social and cultural life. Debates on the restructuring of time, scale, number, pattern and sequence, for example, as well as those on the changing character and properties of data, evidence and the empirical, point to a need for a re–evaluation of the conventions, devices and practices of measure and value in the social sciences and humanities. Do we need new forms of measure? And what do different forms of measure do? This Sociological Review monograph addresses these and related questions to place issues of measure and value at the core of contemporary social science debate.
On the philosophical foundations of psychological measurement
Measurement has played a central role in the development of the physical sciences and engineering, and is considered by many to be a privileged method for acquiring information about the world. It is thus unsurprising that the psychological sciences have also attempted to develop methods for measurement. However, it is not clear how the ways in which psychological scientists understand measurement accord with how the concept is understood in other scientific disciplines, or by the professional and general publics. In part this may be due to the ways in which several distinct strands of thinking about scientific inquiry (and measurement in particular) have influenced the work of psychological scientists over roughly the past hundred years. Given that such influences are often not studied or even acknowledged, many psychological scientists may be unaware of the resulting tensions in their conceptual vocabulary, and of the gaps between the nature of their claims on psychological measurement and the substantiation for those claims. The aim of this paper is to overview the major philosophical influences on thinking about psychological measurement, and to note the pitfalls of some of the extreme positions that have emerged. We hope that such an overview may help facilitate greater clarity concerning the semantics of measurement claims made by psychological scientists.