Why You Are Almost Certainly Guilty of Unstructured Collective Harms (original) (raw)

Contribution to Collective Harms and Responsibility (Ethical Perspectives)

In this paper, I discuss the claim, endorsed by a number of authors, that contributing to a collective harm is the ground for special responsibilities to the victims of that harm. Contributors should, between them, cover the costs of the harms they have inflicted, at least if those harms would otherwise be rights-violating. I raise some doubts about the generality of this principle before moving on to sketch a framework for thinking about liability for the costs of harms in general. This framework uses a contractualist framework to build an account of how to think about liability for costs on the basis of the presumably attractive thought that individual agents should have as much control over their liabilities as is compatible with others having like control. I then use that framework to suggest that liability on the basis of contribution should be restricted to cases where the contributors could have avoided their contribution relatively costlessly, where meeting the liability is not crippling for them, and where such a liability would not have chilling effects, either on them or on third parties. This account of the grounds for contributory liability also has the advantage of avoiding a number of awkward questions about what counts as a contribution by shifting the issue away from often unanswerable questions about the precise causal genesis of some harm or other. Instead, control over conduct which plausibly has some relation to the harm because crucial. On the basis of this account, I then investigate whether a number of uses of the contributory principle. I argue that contributory liability is not appropriate for cases of collective harms committed by coordinated groups in the way that, for example, Iris Marion Young and Thomas Pogge have suggested and that further investigation of how members of such groups may be liable will be needed.

Co-responsibility and Causal Involvement

Philosophia, 2013

In discussions of moral responsibility for collectively produced effects, it is not uncommon to assume that we have to abandon the view that causal involvement is a necessary condition for individual co-responsibility. In general, considerations of cases where there is "a mismatch between the wrong a group commits and the apparent causal contributions for which we can hold individuals responsible" motivate this move. According to Brian Lawson, "solving this problem requires an approach that deemphasizes the importance of causal contributions". Christopher Kutz's theory of complicitious accountability in Complicity from 2000 is probably the most well-known approach of that kind. Standard examples are supposed to illustrate mismatches of three different kinds: an agent may be morally coresponsible for an event to a high degree even if her causal contribution to that event is a) very small, b) imperceptible, or c) non-existent (in overdetermination cases). From such examples, Kutz and others conclude that principles of complicitious accountability cannot include a condition of causal involvement. In the present paper, I defend the causal involvement condition for co-responsibility. These are my lines of argument: First, overdetermination cases can be accommodated within a theory of coresponsibility without giving up the causality condition. Kutz and others oversimplify the relation between counterfactual dependence and causation, and they overlook the possibility that causal relations other than marginal contribution could be morally relevant. Second, harmful effects are sometimes overdetermined by noncollective sets of acts. Over-farming, or the greenhouse effect, might be cases of that kind. In such cases, there need not be any formal organization, any unifying intentions, or any other noncausal criterion of membership available. If we give up the causal condition for coresponsibility it will be impossible to delimit the morally relevant set of acts related to those harms. Since we sometimes find it fair to blame people for such harms, we must question the argument from overdetermination.

Moral Responsibility for Distant Collective Harms

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2015

While it is well recognized that many everyday consumer behaviors, such as purchases of sweatshop goods, come at a cost to the global poor, it has proven difficult to argue that even knowing, repeat contributors are somehow morally complicit in those outcomes. Some recent approaches contend that marginal contributions to distant harms are consequences that consumers straightforwardly should have born in mind, which would make consumers seem reckless or negligent. Critics reasonably reply that the bad luck that my innocent purchase contributes distantly to harm provides insufficient grounds for moral blame; moreover, such distant and seemingly inevitable collective effects are not by themselves obvious reasons for agents to refrain from acting. Granting these criticisms, I argue that the harm that agents do through knowing contributions to distant collective harm actually builds on the morally sparse agential phenomenology of everyday purchases and decisions: contributors who knowingly disregard distant harms, rather than being reckless or negligent about consequences they should have foreseen, very directly perpetuate the moral invisibility and the lack of recognition from which the global poor generally suffer. This provides agents with clearer moral reasons to refrain from knowing participation in unstructured collective harms, and clearer reason to bear them in mind in acting.

Associative Responsibility and the Possibility of Blameworthiness Without Culpability

Social Theory and Practice, 2024

This paper defends the idea that we can sometimes be blameworthy for things simply in virtue of having played a role in bringing them about (that is, even in cases where the fact of our responsibility does not implicate the quality of our will in any way). To defend this claim, I explore how the norms that mediate our responses to accidents are shaped by two important aspects of social life: 1) the opacity of our intentions and 2) the fact that we live in a world in which our lives are inescapably intertwined and our actions are influenced by myriad things beyond our control. Each of these has important revisionary implications for the concepts of blame and responsibility as they have traditionally been understood. While these implications do not require us to give up most of what we have come to know about these concepts, I argue that they shed light on the existence of a distinct and heretofore unexamined kind of moral responsibility that I call associative responsibility. As the paper speculatively concludes, embracing this kind of responsibility has the theoretical virtue of making the concepts of individual and collective responsibility more synonymous.

Inclusive Blameworthiness and the Wrongfulness of Causing Harm

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

This paper takes up the question of whether the consequences of a person’s volitional actions can contribute to their blameworthiness. On the one hand it is intuitively plausible to hold that if D1 volitionally shoots V with the intention of killing V then D1 is blameworthy for V’s death. On the other hand, if the only difference between D1 and D2 is resultant luck, many find it counter-intuitive to hold that D1 is more blameworthy than D2. There are three broad (non-skeptical) strategies for resolving this tension: accept resultant moral luck, deny that one can be morally responsible for outcomes, or accept that outcomes can be within the scope of things one is morally responsible for while denying that they can affect the degree of blameworthiness. This paper aims to defend resultant moral luck against both the scoping and the internalist strategies by drawing on an “inclusive conception” of blameworthiness, according to which how much blame one deserves is a function of two i...

Collective Responsibility and Acting Together

Routledge Handbook on Collective Responsibility, 2019

What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions involved in strategic interaction. We argue, however, that this in itself is not significant. The significant difference is rather volitional: The parties to a shared intention are mutually implicated in each other’s will in a distinct way. Since degree of blameworthiness depends on the quality of will an agent displays in her actions, this explains the higher degree of collective blameworthiness associated with shared intentional wrongdoing.

Responsibility for Wrongdoing Without Blameworthiness: How It Makes Sense and How It Doesn't

Some writers, such as John Fischer and Michael McKenna, have recently claimed that an agent can be morally responsible for a wrong action and yet not be blameworthy for that action. A careful examination of the claim, however, suggests two readings. On one reading, there are further conditions on blameworthiness beyond freely and wittingly doing wrong. On another innocuous reading, there are no such further conditions. Despite Fischer and McKenna's attempts to offer further conditions on blameworthiness in addition to responsibility for wrongdoing, I argue that only the innocuous reading is plausible. Once we distinguish between blame being deserved and blame being all-things-considered appropriate, we need not appeal to further conditions on blameworthiness. This discussion has important upshots regarding how compatibilists respond to certain manipulation arguments and how proponents of derived responsibility respond to criticism that agents are responsible even for outcomes that are not reasonably foreseeable.

Who’s to Blame? - Collective Moral Responsibility and Its Implications for Group Members

As understood here a collective action occurs when members of a collective act in light of a joint commitment to intend as a body to perform some action. Some members may have determined the relevant collective intention having been given the authority to do so by the others, who left such matters in their hands. This implies that insofar as collectives as such can be morally responsible, the responsibility of a given collective has no logical implications for the moral responsibility of one (or more) individual members of the collective.

Collective Omissions and Responsibility

Philosophical Papers, 2008

As Virginia Held, Larry May and Torbjörn Tännsjö have argued, it can be plausible to hold loosely structured sets of individuals morally responsible for failing to act collectively, if this would be needed to prevent some harm. On the other hand it is commonly assumed that (collective) agency is a necessary condition for (collective) responsibility. I show that loosely structured inactive groups sometimes meet this requirement if we employ a weak (but nonetheless non-reductionist) notion of collective agency. This notion can be defended on independent grounds. The resulting position on distribution of responsibility is more restrictive than Held's, May's or Tännsjö's, and I find this consequence intuitively attractive. * I thank Wlodek Rabinowicz and the participants in the higher seminar in Practical Philosophy in Lund, as well as Åsa Andersson, for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.