On the Cause and Integrity of Goodness According to Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, and Pseudo-Dionysius (original) (raw)

Aquinas’s Theory of Goodness

The Monist

The aim of this essay is to sketch the basic outline of Aquinas’s metaethics and its support for his virtue-based ethics. When Aquinas’s central metaethical thesis is combined with his theological views, especially his understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity, then the theological interpretation of the central metaethical thesis constitutes the basis for a religious ethics that makes God essential to human morality but without tying morality to God’s will. The result is a metaphysically grounded, objective normative virtue ethics which is theological at least in this sense that it is ultimately based in God’s nature.

Aquinas on 'The Good' as the Principal Name of God: An Aristotelian Reading of Dionysius

Analogia, 2023

On a number of occasions, when considering the names that can properly be said of God, Aquinas notably holds that the most proper name is 'He Who Is'. In this way, Aquinas's account of divine naming could be seen to stand in contrast to the Platonic tradition of favoring the name of 'Good' for the first principle since, in that tradition, the Good is beyond being. With that said, it is important to note that Aquinas himself at times speaks in terms similar to the Platonists, observing both that God is beyond being (supra ens) and that the name of 'Good' should, in a respect, be seen as the 'principal name of God' (principale nomen dei), namely, inasmuch as he is a cause. This paper offers clarification on how Aquinas reconciles this claim about 'Good' as the principal name of God with his position that 'He Who Is' is the most proper name of God. Fundamental to this investigation is a consideration of Aquinas's treatment of as he presents them in his commentary The Divine Names of Ps.-Dionysius.

“The Objective Relativity of Goodness: a rapprochement between Peter Geach and Thomas Aquinas.”

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association , 2018

Peter Geach claims in Good and Evil that there can never be “just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so” and thereby denies that goodness can ever be used in a non-relative sense. Although his rejection of absolute goodness might initially seem to be a startling and mistaken departure from the Thomistic understanding, I argue that an examination of Thomas’ texts reveal a strong agreement between them, one grounded in a common rejection of univocal goodness. For both, “good” is relative to the nature of a being. To defend the relativity of goodness, I consider two objections: first, that relativizing goodness leads to subjectivism. Second, that divine goodness is absolute and non-relative. In answering these objections, I show that in both Thomas’ medieval and Geach’s modern account “good” is an analogical perfection relative to a nature. In this way, then, goodness is objectively relative. WINNER: American Catholic Philosophical Association “Young Scholar” Award, 2018.

“Thomas Aquinas and the Modern and Contemporary Debate on Evil”

This article aims to demonstrate that Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics of being, in which evil is considered a privation or lack of perfection introduced only by the creature against God's intention, is a remarkable starting point for solving the main problems involved in the modern and contemporary debate on the problem of evil. It also seeks to prove that Aquinas's position is neither reducible to an 'optimistic theodicy' -such as Leibniz's theodicy-nor to a 'free will defence'.

Being, Goodness and Truth

Proceedings of the Society of Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, 2019

This volume considers the Aristotelian virtue-ethics tradition as it develops in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Part One studies the types of virtues Aquinas believes are held by Christians in a state of grace. Aquinas’s intriguing account is apparently fraught with inconsistencies, which have split contemporary interpreters over not only how to understand Aquinas on this matter, but also as to whether it is even possible to provide a consistent interpretation of his doctrine. This book brings together scholarship that reflects the various sides of the debate. Part Two explores a Thomistic synthesis regarding Aquinas’s account of the good as telos or end that emerges in the seventeenth century, as well as what promise his virtue ethics holds today, arguing that Aquinas’ hylomorphic understanding of human beings as matter-form composites furnishes a robust moral accounting that seems unavailable to alternative, reductive materialist accounts.

Practical Reason and the Intellection of the Good in Saint Thomas Aquinas

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, natural law is "nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law" (ST 1-2.91.2). This simple and elegant definition, typical of Thomas, brings with it many implications that are not easily understood. As we go deeper into Aquinas’s thought, we understand that what at first sight seemed simple turns out to become complex. One example of this is the discernment of the first principles of natural law. How do people actively exercise this power of participating in God’s eternal law? How do we recognize the first principles of natural law in our everyday life? In ST 1-2.94.2 St. Thomas explains the epistemological process according to which we grasp the precepts of the natural law. This text has generated several interpretations which imply different understandings of how the speculative and practical intellect interact. The different views can be generally summarized in three, which we will call here: “derivationism”; “pre-rational inclinationism” and “rational inclinationism”. In this work we intend to present a summary of each of these interpretations and explore some of their consequences, especially with regard to the idea of happiness and the relationship between happiness and particular goods. We will also explain why we consider “rational inclinationism” to be the most accurate interpretation of the text of St. Thomas and how it is more coherent with Aquinas’s general theory of knowledge and moral philosophy.

A Review Of The Four Cardinal Virtue In Thomas Aquinas' Disputed Questions On Virtue

St. Thomas Aquinas' Disputed questions on Virtue is really the best way into his ethics. Hence, it is the cornerstone of his ethics. In Summa Theologiae I-II, Q. 61, Aquinas identified four cardinal virtues. The cardinal virtues are the four principal moral virtues. The English word cardinal comes from the Latin word 'cardo', which means 'hinge'. All other virtues hinge on these four virtues. Just as there are four faculties which contribute to our moral acts, intellect, will, appetite of desire and appetite of aversion, so there must be four virtues to keep these faculties straight --prudence for the mind, justice for the will, temperance for the urge to what is pleasant, and fortitude for the instinct away from what is painful.