The Jihadist Threat to Europe: From Al Qaeda to the Islamic State (original) (raw)
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Terrorism and Political Violence, 2011
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POLITICAL SUBVERSION OR RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: THE THREAT OF AL -QAEDA IDEOLOGY IN EUROPE
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Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect
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The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe
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This article provides the most thorough overview yet of how jihadis have plotted terrorist attacks in Europe. Drawing on a database of 122 incidents, we review trends in weapon types, attack types and target types in the period 1994-2013. The overall finding is that jihadi terrorism in Europe is becoming more discriminate in its targeting while attack types and weapons are becoming progressively more diverse. The most likely scenarios in the coming three to five years are bomb attacks and armed assaults against sub-national entities, communities and individuals. A majority of the terrorist attacks will be limited in scope, but mass-casualty terrorism cannot be excluded. Foreign fighters from Syria are likely to influence the threat level in Europe, but we do not expect them to alter patterns in modus operandi dramatically.
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2006
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The new European Jihadism and its avatars
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society – J-RaT, 2016
The newEuropean Jihadism and its avatars FarhadKhosrokhavar European Jihadism has evolvedsince it first appeared in the 1990s.Inmany European countries,atthe outset, it tended to be restricted to the disaffected youth from the poor suburbs (France) or poor inner city areas (in the UK),but it rapidly spread to the middle classes,whether Muslims or converts.In2013, with the civil war in Syria, Jihadismunderwentmajor changes.Before that it was restrictedtoafew hundred people,but it has now risen to severalthousand (around 5000 young people have left Europe for Syria and their number would have been much higher had the governments not established controls preventing the departure of adolescents via Tu rkey to Syria). At the same time,adolescents have become numerous and the number of girlsa nd converts has sharply increased. Theaim of the article is to propose an understanding of the mindsetofthese new social actors in the lightofthe internal conditions of European societies.
The modus operandi of jihadi terrorism in Europe by Nesser& Stenersen
This article provides the most thorough overview yet of how jihadis have plotted terrorist attacks in Europe. Drawing on a database of 122 incidents, we review trends in weapon types, attack types and target types in the period 1994-2013. The overall finding is that jihadi terrorism in Europe is becoming more discriminate in its targeting while attack types and weapons are becoming progressively more diverse. The most likely scenarios in the coming three to five years are bomb attacks and armed assaults against sub-national entities, communities and individuals. A majority of the terrorist attacks will be limited in scope, but mass-casualty terrorism cannot be excluded. Foreign fighters from Syria are likely to influence the threat level in Europe, but we do not expect them to alter patterns in modus operandi dramatically.