Chapter 5: Argument from Analogy (original) (raw)
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In this chapter, I inquire into the structure of analogical arguments. I begin by considering several historical meanings of “analogy”, understood as a semantic relation, an act of cognition, and a kind of argument. I proceed then to provide a general characterization of arguments from analogy and identify four essential aspects thereof: the problem situation, the prima facie similarity, the relevant similarity, and the solution. In the remaining part of the chapter I analyze these aspects in more detail.
By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments
The Philosophical Review, 2012
To the extent that the worth of scientific or philosophical efforts can be assessed by the number of productive research avenues they open up, this is definitely an important book. It deserves careful consideration by scientists, mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers. Since it does not fit neatly into any usual category but rather stands athwart many research areas, its reception may depend on precisely who attends to its bold claims. This book aims to answer two questions: "What criteria should we use to evaluate analogical arguments used in science?" and "How can we provide a philosophical justification for those criteria?" (ix). Paul Bartha recognizes that analogies are widely used in all areas of human action-but claims: "We have no substantive normative theory of analogical arguments" (3). He persuasively argues that none of the theoretical approaches to analogical argumentation that previously have been developed is generally applicable. But he holds that the uses of analogies in science and mathematics are "key or 'leading' special cases that provide an excellent basis for a general normative theory" of analogical reasoning (3). This book proposes a systematic theoretical treatment, and a set of evaluation criteria, that (Bartha claims) apply to all varieties of analogical reasoning-both in science and elsewhere. This assertion is not modest, but careful arguments support it well. The claim seems quite plausible. Analogical arguments involve "source" (S) and "target" (T) domains that are similar to each other in certain respects. Positive analogies occur when property P and relation R pertain to domain S , and corresponding property P * and relation R * pertain to T. If the target domain T has feature A * but the source domain S lacks that feature (so that , A applies to S), this constitutes a negative analogy. The question at issue is: Under what conditions (and with what degree of confidence) would it be correct to infer that if S has a feature Q , then T has a corresponding feature Q * ? In favorable cases deductive reasoning may lead to conclusions that are considered correct with a high degree of certainty. In contrast, analogical reasoning at its best leads to results that are 'plausible'-that is "they have some degree of support" (15). Plausibility can be interpreted probabilistically, so that plausible statements are understood to have a rather high probability of being true, and additional relevant evidence may increase that probability. In
Analogical reasoning in public health
2014
Analogical reasoning is a valuable logical resource in a public health context. It is used extensively by public health scientists in risk assessments of new technologies, environmental hazards and infectious diseases. For its part, the public also avails of analogical reasoning when it assesses a range of public health problems. In this article, some of these uses of analogical reasoning in public health are examined. Analogical arguments have courted approval and disapproval in roughly equal measure by a long succession of logicians and philosophers. The logical features of these arguments which make them simultaneously compelling and contemptible are considered. As a form of presumptive reasoning, analogical arguments have a valuable role to play in closing epistemic gaps in knowledge. This heuristic function of these arguments is illustrated through an examination of some uses of analogical reasoning in recent public health crises. Finally, the results of a study of analogical reasoning in 879 members of the public are reported. This study reveals that lay members of the public are able to discern the logical and epistemic conditions under which analogical arguments are rationally warranted in a public health context.
Analogical Arguments: Inferential Structures and Defeasibility Conditions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the structure and the defeasibility conditions of argument from analogy, addressing the issues of determining the nature of the comparison underlying the analogy and the types of inferences justifying the conclusion. In the dialectical tradition, different forms of similarity were distinguished and related to the possible inferences that can be drawn from them. The kinds of similarity can be divided into four categories, depending on whether they represent fundamental semantic features of the terms of the comparison (essential similarities) or non-semantic ones, indicating possible characteristics of the referents (accidental similarities). Such distinct types of similarity characterize different kinds of analogical arguments, all based on a similar general structure, in which a common genus (or rather a generic feature) is abstracted. Depending on the nature of the abstracted common feature, different rules of inference will apply, guaranteeing the attribution of the analogical predicate to the genus and to the primary subject. This analysis of similarity and the relationship thereof with the rules of inference allows a deeper investigation of the defeasibility conditions.
Varieties of Analogical Reasoning
Motivation -The purpose of this article is to reinvigorate debate concerning the nature of analogy and broaden the scope of current conceptions of analogy. Research approach -An analysis of the history of the concept of analogy, case studies on the use of analogy in problemsolving, cognitive research on analogy comprehension, and a naturalistic inquiry into the various functions of analogy. Findings and Implications -Psychological theories and computational models have generally relied on: (a) A single set of ontological concepts (a property called "similarity" and a structuralist categorization of types of semantic relations) (b) A single form category (i.e., the classic four-term analogy), and (c) A single set of morphological distinctions (e.g., verbal versus pictorial analogies). The taxonomy presented here distinguishes functional kinds of analogy, each of which presents an opportunity for research on aspects of reasoning that have been largely unrecognized. Originality/Value -The various functional kinds of analogy will each require their own treatment in macrocognitive theories and computational models. Take away message -The naturalistic investigation of the functions of analogy suggests that analogy is a macrocognitive phenomenon derivative of number of supporting processes, including the apperception of resemblances and distinctions, metaphor, and the balancing of semantic flexibility and inference constraint.
Outstanding Questions about Analogies
2016
In this paper, I cite a number of examples of briefly stated analogies, in which the arguer cites a source case to make a point about a target case. Though they are short and potentially regarded merely as wit or as rhetorical flourishes, I offer reasons for regarding these passages as arguments. I maintain that they should not be reconstructed so as to amount to deductively valid arguments, although our assessment of their merits is largely a priori. In considering the a priori aspects of reasoning about the nature and significance of similarities, it is useful to distinguish between what is a priori and what is deductive. The conclusions of these sorts of arguments should be regarded as defeasible. The paper considers recent work by Marcello Guarini, Lilian Bermejo-Luque, James Freeman, and Douglas Walton.
The Logic of Analogy, 2023
The Logic of Analogy is a study of the valid logical forms of qualitative and quantitative analogical argument, and the rules pertaining to them. It investigates equally valid conflicting arguments, statistics-based arguments and their utility in science, arguments from precedent used in law-making or law-application, and examines subsumption in analogical terms. Included for purposes of illustration is a large section on Talmudic use of analogical reasoning.
Argumentation by analogy as a comparison of argumentative relationships
ISSA Conference Proceedings , 2023
The thesis of this paper is that what characterises argumentation by analogy is that it is based on a comparison of argumentative relationships. I distinguish two types: intraargumentative relationships and interargumentative relationships. By the former I mean the relationship between what is presented as a reason and the claim that reason allegedly support. This is usually marked by expressions such as 'so,' 'therefore,' 'because,' 'consequently,' etc. By interargumentative relationships I mean the relationship between two or more reasons. This is usually marked both by coordinative locutions such as 'in addition,' 'on the other hand,' 'moreover,' etc., and by adversatives expressions such as 'but,' 'although,' 'having said that,' and so on. On the basis of this, two varieties of argumentation by analogy are distinguished: argumentation by parity of reasons and argumentation by parity of weighings.
Analogical Reasoning and Semantic Rules of Inference.
Macagno, F., Walton, D., & Tindale, C. W. (2014). Analogical Reasoning and Semantic Rules of Inference. Revue internationale de philosophie, 270(4), 419-432.
Analogy is represented as a twofold process of abstraction and species-genus inference. This type of analysis can account for essential (i.e. intensional) and accidental similarities. In dialectical analogies, the ones analyzed in the Topics, the abstraction singles out a feature that is part of or related to the meaning of the terms and that is relevant under the respect imposed by the analogical predicate. This process can shed light on the mechanisms underlying reasoning from accidental similarity analysed in the Rhetoric.
A Particularist Approach to Arguments by Analogy
Argumentation , 2023
In this article I defend what I call a 'particularist approach to arguments by analogy.' Particularism is opposed to generalism, which is the thesis that arguments by analogy require a universal principle that covers cases compared and guarantees the conclusion. Particularism rejects this claim and holds that arguments by analogy operate on particular cases. I elaborate on two ideas that support this position. On the one hand, I contend that an analogy can be seen as a parallelism of argumentative relationships, drawing on the distinction between similarity and analogy (Gentner 1983) and on the meta-argumentative account of arguments by analogy (Woods and Hudak 1989). On the other hand, I argue that universal principles are not necessary neither for the analysis nor the evaluation of arguments by analogy (Govier 1989) and that, rather than being a requirement, they can be seen as by-products of good analogies.