A Litmus Test For Eruope: EU Mediterranean Politics After the Arab Spring (original) (raw)
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EUROPEAN UNION and THE MEDITERRANEAN: BEFORE and AFTER THE ARAB SPRING
The Mediterranean region is always important for the European Union (EU) as historically and geographically. In 1972, the relationship between EU and the Mediterranean region began to shape under the Global Mediterranean Policy, in 1995 Barcelona Process and in 2007 the Union for the Mediterranean Process. In December 2010, the civil commotion started in Tunisia then spread to the Gulf region. In this context, this study will analyze EU's Mediterranean policy before and after the Arab Spring in two chapters. In the first chapter, how European policies take action toward the Arab World also to the Mediterranean Region and second chapter tries to analyze how Arab Spring has an effect on Mediterranean politics which EU tries to shape and develop since 1972.
EU’s Mediterranean Policy after the Arab Spring
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Journal of Security Strategies, 2019
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The European Union’s Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Revolts: From Crisis to a New Order?
in Lorenzo Fioramonti (ed.), Regions and Crises. New Challenges for Contemporary Regionalisms, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 105-125, ISBN 978-0-230-34878-3, 2012
The revolts sweeping across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 have shaken long-held truths about the region, truths become such through their assiduous repetition by Middle Eastern regimes and the unconditional support conferred on these regimes by the West. True, Middle Eastern regimes had been remarkably resilient, remoulding their authoritarian practices to the prerogatives of a globalized world (Guazzone and Pioppi, 2004; Schlumberger, 2007). True also, despite all their liberal rhetoric, external actors — the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in primis — played a prime role in sustaining these regimes, viewing them as the lesser evil in a region supposedly plagued by religious extremism, but reliable partners in pursuing foreign policy agendas, commercial and energy interests and the management of migratory flows.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the challenges that are emerging from a "changing neighborhood" have opened a new policy window for the EU and called for a policy reassessment regarding the Southern side of the Mediterranean. The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and the "more for more" logic tried to accomplish this by contributing to the definition of a new framework in EU-Mediterranean relations that could go beyond the inconsistencies of the past. At this stage, a fundamental question has emerged: to what extent has the EU undertaken a real "paradigmatic policy change"? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by investigating, through the lens of the policy cycle, the much-praised renewal of the EU approach in light of the Arab uprisings. Assuming that processes matter in shaping outcomes, the policy cycle is adopted to investigate the "black box" of the EU approach in all its phases-from agenda setting to implementation-in order to understand to what extent the new "item" on the EU agenda called for a real policy reassessment. Thus, the paper is divided into two parts. The first one, which considers the Arab uprisings as a watershed in the EU approach, presents a comparative analysis of all the policy phases before and after the events, assessing the elements of continuity and discontinuity with the past. Drawing on these results, the second part proposes suggestions to overcome the policy "incrementalism" that seems to emerge as a constant feature of the EU approach in the area. The Mediterranean entered the EU agenda regularly when specific strategic interests and the fear of new challenges with their related uncertainty made it a priority. The visibility of the problem is, indeed, of high importance for a new policy window to be opened. In the post cold war international context of the early 1990s, the low democratic and economic performance of the Mediterranean countries could no longer be neglected and the need to deal with security concerns, such as migration and Islamic terrorism, directed the EU's attention towards the area (Bicchi, 2007). The EMP emerged from these trends and, with its three baskets committed to promote peace, stability and prosperity, mentioned democracy promotion for the first time with the explicit assent of the Mediterranean nonmembers (Bicchi, 2009). In the early 2000s, the need to "eradicate the root causes of terrorism" (Tocci and Cassarino, 2011), exacerbated by 9/11 events and the EU's enlargement which created new borders and new, close neighbors, made the Mediterranean a high issue on EU agenda again. This time, the priority "not to import instability" (Solana, 2003) became the main policy paradigm eventually reflected in the bilateral and pragmatic approach of the ENP (Panebianco 2008; 2010). Security, stability and strategic concerns, therefore, were the main yardsticks that influenced how the EU perceived and "framed" the "Mediterranean issue". Certainly, the way a policy problem is defined is essential as it reveals the actors' perceptions and their different competing paradigms necessary when framing the issue. The aforementioned dilemma, stability vs. democracy, embodies this competition of different paradigms. The definition of the problem, anyway, is unstable. It can change during the process according to changing standards and perceptions (Dente, 2011). Similarly, if, during the 1990s, the "democracy promotion paradigm" was considered suitable to address the Mediterranean in a manner consistent with the EU normative concerns, the turn of the new century also marked a "stability turn" in the name of the status quo rather than of a change that could be uncertain. The UfM, with its "depoliticizing" (Bicchi, 2011) focus on low politics issues, further contributed to this reframing. All these considerations are clearly evident in the EU decisional processes. Consistent with the idea of the policy cycle as a continuum (Barrett and Fudge 1981), the strategic inputs of the agenda inevitably flow in the decision-making, eventually determining the policy content and outputs. Despite their rhetoric, the EU policy initiatives in the Mediterranean were deeply influenced by Member States' interests gradually trumping any normative goal sponsored by the Communitarian institutions. After all, in the EU "weakly institutionalized supranational decision-making structure" (Forster and Wallace, 1996), any normative discourse supported by Communitarian institutions is constrained by the intergovernmental channels of action prescribed by the Treaties. If the Commission is in charge of the implementation, Member States in the European and ministerial composition of the Council are responsible, respectively, in the provision of guidelines and the endorsement of final policy choices. Consistent with this decision-making structure, the reframing of the "Mediterranean" in terms of stability and strategic concerns shaped the content of the EU initiatives in the region. While the European Council (2004) endorsed the European Security Strategy as a "key framework for policy formulation", the Council of the EU (2007) stressed the EU's clear strategic imperative to foster stability through values merely defined as "rule of law and human rights". Stability, therefore, became the EU policy rationale that affected the policy content in terms of prudent changes, which resulted in small adjustments to the status quo (Lindblom 1959; 1979). Indeed, from the EMP to the ENP to the UfM, the substance remained the same. The new policy frameworks, the shift from regionalism to bilateralism and the principles of differentiation Politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty (Heclo, 1974 quoted in Dente 2011:12). This means that uncertainty entails a fundamental paradox. While it can push for a safer path in name of stability, it can also open a new policy window, paving the way for change. The Arab Spring and the uncertainty of its outcomes, indeed, opened a new policy window for the EU, representing an important opportunity to rethink its MENA policies. Analytically speaking, we could say that the Arab Spring is what Dente (2011) calls the "right moment". The time when actors' goals and perceptions are changed by an external event and there is the need to deal with problems that are "urgent and not to be postponed" (ibid). Similarly, the Arab uprisings now call for a paradigm shift and the need "to do something for the Mediterranean" (Bicchi, 2007). When, in October 2010, Commissioner Füle and High Representative Ashton wondered what ENP vision within a 10-15 year horizon could be, they were far from knowing that the Arab awakening was a "latent time bomb" (Dery, 1997) and that change was at the doorstep. Indeed, the Arab awakening changed that horizon quickly and paved the way for a new policy-making, which was different from merely "muddling through". After all, as suggested by Lustick (1980), the utility of incrementalism is highly reduced when there are thresholds or discontinuities. The Arab Spring is an important discontinuity, an exogenous event that should call for a revision of the status quo, overcoming incrementalism. Is the EU actually seizing "the moment"? A policy cycle analysis of the EU initiatives in the light of the Arab uprisings can address this question. Looking Inside the Black Box after the Arab Spring Despite their visibility, the Arab uprisings entered the EU agenda in a gradual and timid manner. The statement of the High Representative (2011) on the situation in Tunisia, which was released in early January 2010, only a few weeks after Sidi Bouzid revolts, is the first official reaction manifesting concern for the events. While this is a mere condemnation of violence, it was after Ben Ali's departure that the EU recognized "the point of no-return" by affirming the will to "stand side by side with Tunisians" and to support the endeavors to achieve their democratic aspirations 8. The same wait-and-see approach was applied in the case of Egypt. When it became clear that the protests in Tahrir Square were more than an isolated incident, the EU expressed its support to the "legitimate aspirations of the people of Egypt" and called on authorities to proceed with a free and fair election 9. Mubarak's resignation further displayed this cautious mix of spectatorship and actorness (Schumacher, 2011). The crucial presidential decision was merely "welcomed" in a soft-worded statement where the only probable solution for the EU was to remain at the ready "with all its instruments" 10. The events in Libya and Syria entered the EU agenda more rapidly in the wake of the violent repression turning into a civil war. In particular, following Holwett and Ramesh (2003), the Libyan case's entry in the European agenda was marked by both an inside initiation, with French president Sarkozy emerging as a soloist voice in the European chorus and asking for the adoption of sanctions, and an outside initiation in line with the adoption of specific UN Resolutions. However, apart from these cases whose critical consequences could not be neglected, the EU remained a detached observer in other countries, such as Yemen, Algeria or Bahrain, were the protests were silenced. In a similar fashion, the temperate situation in Jordan and Morocco received minor attention, mainly tailored to the top-down processes of reform. Besides these issues, security and migration were other items high on the agenda, displaying the strong link between the European systemic agenda and the domestic ones of its Member States. These multiple issues and the Arab crisis, which was more than a mere one-off event, provided the opportunity for a new approach. Following De Vries (2004), a crisis can be framed as an opportunity or as a threat, as an isolated incident or as a symptom of underlying forces that can open or close a window for reform. After some hesitation, the EU framed the new...
The Mediterranean Region – Great Challenges for the European Union
The Mediterranean Basin has always been an important direction in the foreign policies of many European countries due to the unstable political situation in this region and the belief that threats to the European societies originate from there. Furthermore, because of the economic ties with the region the European Communities were attempting to establish relations with the countries of the region already in the 1960s. The most extensive and at the same time deepest offer of cooperation with the MENA countries was, however, developed by the European Union only in the mid-1990s in the form of the Barcelona Process. It was an offer of a closer economic cooperation, and it was also supposed to contribute to reforming Arab countries along European models. As history has shown, the EU Member States' interest was not in reforms but only in their own security, in limiting the infl ow of immigrants and in ensuring supplies of fuels. To achieve these objectives, the EU was willing to back authoritarian regimes in the MENA countries. The Arab Spring, however, has forced the Union to revise its policy. After a wave of protests and revolutions, the situation in the Mediterranean Basin changed dramatically, becoming even more unstable. The societies of Arab countries have become polarised and fragmented. The civil war raging in Syria and Iraq, the self-proclaimed Islamic State – these are presently the greatest challenges facing the EU, which needs to redefi ne its policy towards the region if it wants to remain a major actor in the international arena.
Introduction: The growing international relevance of Mediterranean politics
The Mediterranean space, defined by a major sea, a large number of littoral countries and to some extent their hinterlands, is at the same time an interface between Europe, Africa and Asia. This brings complex challenges in terms of achieving peace and stability. Recently it has received intense international attention through the internal destructiveness and spill-over from conflicts, primarily those waged in Libya, Syria and, more remotely, Iraq.