Democritus and the Ensuing Degeneration of Scientific Atomism: a Suggestion (original) (raw)

The Fourfold Democritus on the Stage of Early Modern Science

Isis, 2000

The renewed success of ancient atomism in the seventeenth century has baffled historians not only because of the lack of empirical evidence in its favor but also because of the exotic heterogeneity of the models that were proposed under its name. This essay argues that one of the more intriguing reasons for the motley appearance of early modern atomism is that Democritus, with whose name this doctrine was most commonly associated, was a figure of similar incoherence. There existed in fact no fewer than four quite different Democriti of Abdera and as many literary traditions: the atomist, the "laughing philosopher," the moralizing anatomist, and the alchemist. Around the year 1600 the doctrines of these literary figures, three of whom had no tangible connection with atomism, began to merge into further hybrid personae, some of whom possessed notable scientific potential. This essay offers the story of how these Democriti contributed to the rise of incompatible "atomisms."

Special Issue on “Crooked Thinking or Straight Talk: Modernizing Epicurean Scientific Philosophy”

Homo Oeconomicus

The extended comments by distinguished philosophers and economists on Ken Binmore's modernization of Epicurean scientific philosophy that are collected in this special issue of Homo Oeconomicus speak for themselves. But except for mentioning it in the title Binmore does not explicitly address the methodological issues raised by pursuing a program of "scientific philosophy". It seems that he deems it sufficient to practise in the book what he preaches in its title. We tend to agree. Yet, many if not most philosophers and scientists regard "scientific philosophy" as an oxymoron.

Democritus – scientific wizard of the 5th century bc

1998

Roughly 2400 years ago, during an era largely characterized by unscientific thought, a school of natural philosophers led by Democritus of Abdera developed a remarkably accurate understanding of our physical world. How could this small group have discovered so much at a time when technology and mathematics were at such a rudimentary level? What if their methods and ideas had

Science, ethics, and ἀνάγκη in Epicurean Thought

Francesca Masi, Pierre-Marie Morel, and Francesco Verde, Epicureanism and Scientific Debates. Epicurean Tradition and Ancient Reception. Volume II: Epistemology and Ethics, (Leuven University Press, 2024), 119-138., 2024

The paper argues that Epicurus rejects the notion that there are any necessary laws in the world given that he denies bi-valence for future contingents, in part because the swerve makes any necessary causal chains impossible at the physical level. Since the swerve has always been in force, no causal chains of necessity have arisen or could ever arise. Lucretius as well argues that there are temporary foedera natura that arise randomly, but these are not necessary nor can they be identified with causal laws. The paper begins by focussing on Ad Men. 133 where an erroneous supplement to the text has led to the notion that some things are by necessity, and argues that this supplement makes no sense in the argumentative context of the passage nor does it correspond it any evidence that we have from elsewhere.

The maladies of enlightenment science

Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics

Science started to acquire its modern sense (as 'natural philosophy') during the Scientific Revolution, from Copernicus to Newton and the Age of Enlightenment, as it gradually freed itself from the shackles of theology and absolutism, from a thousand years of stasis and obscurantism (Russo 1996). Under the influence of Descartes, Leibniz, and others, faith and dogma gave way to rationalism. 'Gradually, theoreticians behind the movement that had begun as a grand attempt to merge God and syllogisms realized that logic did not require the link to the divine' (Schlain 1998). When the Royal Society of London was founded in 1660, it tried to protect itself from intellectual fallacies, from the 'four kinds of illusions which block men's minds'. These illusions, listed by Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum Scientiarum, were (1) the idola tribus (idols of the tribe), perceptual errors due to the limitations of the senses; (2) the idola specus (idols of the cave), personal prejudices; (3) the idola fori (idols of the marketplace) caused by shared language and commerce; and (4) idola theatri (idols of the theatre), i.e. systems of philosophy and proof-whence came the Royal Society's motto 'Nullius in verba' (which means do not take anybody's word for it), and the exclusion of discussions concerning politics and religion, impediments to clear thought, from its conduct. From then until quite recently, science was almost universally regarded as a system which formulates laws to describe information and turn it into knowledge, the systematic study of nature by methodical processes of observation, experiment, measurement and inference which generate that information, and tests of the laws. These procedures are collectively called the scientific method. 'It is the matter-of-fact as against the romantic, the objective as against the subjective, the empirical, the unprejudiced, the ad hoc as against the a priori' (Waddington 1948, p. 61).