AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL REASONING (original) (raw)

Moral reasoning: Hints and allegations

Topics in Cognitive Science, 2010

Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic tendencies toward bias that would otherwise dominate behavior. We argue that little is known about the psychology of moral reasoning and that it may yet prove to be a potent social force.

Chapter 10 Motivated Moral Reasoning

Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 2009

Moral judgments are important, intuitive, and complex. These factors make moral judgment particularly fertile ground for motivated reasoning. This chapter reviews research (both our own and that of others) examining two general pathways by which motivational forces can alter the moral implications of an act: by affecting perceptions of an actor's moral accountability for the act, and by influencing the normative moral principles people rely on to evaluate the morality of the act. We conclude by discussing the implications of research on motivated moral reasoning for both classic and contemporary views of the moral thinker.

Addressing moral problems through practical reasoning

2006

In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems.

Moral Reasoning and the Primacy of the Practical

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

This chapter considers how to locate moral reasoning in terms of the structures that have emerged so far. It does not attempt to write a complete theory of moral thought. Its main purpose is rather to reassure us that moral reasoning—which might seem to be somehow both practical and theoretical at once—can be perfectly well handled using the tools developed in previous chapters. It also considers the question how we are to explain practical reasoning—and practical reasons more generally—by contrast with the explanation of theoretical reasons and reasoning offered in Chapter 4. This leads us to the first appearance of the Primacy of the Practical. The second appearance concerns reasons to intend.

Moral Laws Presidential Lecture.docx

In the following essay, I defend why ethics is a normative science. By normative science, I mean that ethics is like logic in the sense that it actively tries to arrive at knowledge of objective norms that apply to all people at all place and at all times. Moreover, ethicists have a particular expertise about the content in the same way that the law professor or physicist claim in their own respective fields if ethics can be made scientific. In what follows, I explain Edgar Sheffield Brightman’s (1884-1953) model of ethics and evaluate his reasons for thinking why ethics is a normative science.

Moral Reasoning and Moral Progress

The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics, 2026

Can reasoning improve moral judgments and lead to moral progress? Pessimistic answers to this question are often based on caricatures of reasoning, weak scientific evidence, and flawed interpretations of solid evidence. In support of optimism, we discuss three forms of moral reasoning (principle reasoning, consistency reasoning, and social proof) that can spur progressive changes in attitudes and behavior on a variety of issues, such as charitable giving, gay rights, and meat consumption. We conclude that moral reasoning, particularly when embedded in social networks with mutual trust and respect, is integral to moral progress.