NATO's Push into the Caucasus: Geopolitical Flashpoints and Limits for Expansion (original) (raw)

MAINTAINING THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: RUSSIA'S GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS IN GEORGIA

Sõjateadlane (Estonian Journal of Military Studies), 2018

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been fuelling frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus region in order to promote instability and force security dilemmas as part of its geopolitical strategy in the former Soviet republics , geared towards maintaining its control over the post-Soviet space. Throughout the post-Cold War period, Russia has been actively involved in stirring up conflicts in the South Caucasus, sustaining interstate tensions and unsolvable security dilemmas by supporting Armenia against Azerbaijan, and the secessionist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia against Georgia, resulting in diminished regional cooperation and curtailing Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia's geopolitical strategy often follows the principles of the Eurasianist ideology that has identified Russia as an alternative power to the West. Owing to that, Russia's geostrategic ambitions in the South Caucasus regard the region as a critical battlefield in the status conflict between Russia and the West, with Russia actively pursuing these strategic ambitions by keeping the region in a constant state of destabilization through interstate security dilemmas and frozen conflicts.

The South Caucasus: A playground between NATO and Russia?

In this article, the challenges and prospects of cooperation between the South Caucasus countries and NATO have been analyzed. The geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the region for both NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia particularly) and reciprocal expectations of further cooperation with the Alliance have been considered. The regional state of affairs in the South Caucasus has been analyzed and the possible impacts of Russian influence on forging closer relations with NATO have been examined. The security environment after the Russo-Georgian war and its repercussions for the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation have been illustrated. NATO's vested interest in the region to contribute to a European security system for the foreseeable future was brought to the fore. The reasons for the Alliance's reluctance to actively engage in the region are examined. The recommendations are intended to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region, without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow, and to eradicate the so-called "frozen conflicts" in order to maintain security and prosperity for the South Caucasus region as a whole.

The war in the South Caucasus through Russia-NATO relations

For Russia, the former Soviet Union’s territories are part of its sphere of influence. Russian officials warn that any location of a military bloc near its borders is considered as a threat to its national security. As Georgia and Ukraine advance in their aspiration for NATO membership, Russia takes measures to strengthen its geopolitical positions by weakening neighbors’ territorial integrity. The article aims to rethink the war in Georgia from the perspective of Russia-NATO relations.

Russia’s view of Georgia: a NATO proxy yet again?

NUPI policy brief, 2020

After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted

Georgia on the way to NATO after the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008

Obrana a strategie (Defence and Strategy), 2009

Georgia is one of the countries that have long been seeking NATO membership. The article deals with history of NATO - Georgian relations, analyses the motives of this country for its accession to NATO and finds an answer to the question of whether these motives are similar to the accession motives of Central European, Baltic and Balkan countries. In addition, the article gives account of the way the chances of Georgia for its entry into NATO have been assessed by the Georgian political establishment against the background of the changes on the international political scene that have taken place over the last two years, especially the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in summer 2008 and the coming of Obama's administration into the White House.

Regional security in the South Caucasus: the role of Nato

Central Asia-Caucasus …, 2004

Unresolved security issues in the South Caucasus have a direct and negative impact on the security interests of NATO and the U.S. They impede access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, threaten the security of needed energy resources as well as access to friendly allies in the Wider Middle East, and create an environment of instability that Russia can both exploit and perpetuate. Unresolved security issues there exercise a decisive and adverse effect on democratic reform, market-based development, and overall prosperity across the South Caucasus. Continuing shortfalls in these areas threaten to turn the region into a haven for transnational organized crime and even terrorism. This paper argues that the national security interests of NATO and its members in the South Caucasus, especially concerning the war on terrorism, NATO's obligations in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and the role of the Alliance in the Wider Middle East, have grown to such a degree that its interests would be significantly affected negatively by instability and unrest in the South Caucasus. The individual and collective interests of NATO members therefore suggest that a larger role of the Alliance in strengthening the security of the South Caucasus is warranted. This paper does not propose the inclusion of South Caucasus countries as NATO members, which is unlikely under any circumstances for many years. But it nonetheless considers NATO to be the sine qua non for security in the South Caucasus. It argues that the most promising, and indeed sole, means of redressing the "security deficit" in the South C aucasus is through the gradual extension of the widest possible range of NATO programs into the area. In short, it shifts the focus from the question of "To Be or Not To Be?" with respect to NATO membership to one of how to select, develop, and compound NATO programs that will, together and increasingly over time, transform the regional security picture overall. By this point the region will also have evolved to a point at, or near, the doorstep of both NATO and the EU. This paper therefore suggests that NATO, in its June 2004 Istanbul summit, asserts that the security of the countries of the South Caucasus is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Specific NATO initiatives holding the most promise for enhancing South Caucasus security include the following: Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO vi vi 1) Exploring the possibility of creating a special format for NATO's dialogue with the three nations of the South Caucasus, on the model of those set up for Ukraine and Russia; 2) Exploring the possibility of creating a NATO Defense College in the South Caucasus, similar in concept to that of the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) and building on its experience. 3) Greatly enhancing the number of regional officers receiving training through PfP in order to foster a cadre of officers benefiting from contact with Western militaries that, in turn, are able to share their knowledge and expertise with colleagues; 4) Raising the profile of the region in NATO's own hierarchy by appointing a political/military specialist as an advisor to the Secretary-General on the region; creating a "Security Working Group" under NATO in order to optimize security assistance efforts; and prioritizing the development of expertise amongst NATO's planning staffs on the IPAPs of the regional states. While this paper proposes an a la carte approach to NATO involvement as most promising to the interests of South Caucasus countries, it asserts that such an approach is impossible without a focused and strategic approach to the South Caucasus as a whole on the part of NATO. Central to such an approach is that the definition of NATO and U.S. interests and goals must be carried out initially without regard for Russian responses. Russia itself is in flux and its policies a half decade hence may differ from those of today, especially as they relate to former Soviet territories. If NATO and the U.S. demonstrate that their policies in the South Caucasus are compatible with Russia's legitimate security concerns (as opposed to political aspirations), and can even be supportive of them, it enhances the possibility that Russians not committed to zerosum thinking may gain influence in Moscow. Clarity by NATO in defining its own strategy, directness in articulating it, and flexibility in its execution are the hallmarks of any future success. The point of conjunction between U.S. and Russian long-term interests in the South Caucasus, and also those of Turkey and Iran, is the strengthening of sovereignties there, the progress of reform, and the development of sustainable modern economies that take advantage of regional complementarities. The policies set forth in this paper advance these objectives by creating a web of relationships and structures that strengthen the essential prerequisite: regional security. As such, they are not directed against anyone.

Russia Out NATO In: Georgia’s Perspective on Regional Peace and Security in the South Caucasus

Bilge Strateji, 2021

Georgia is a small country in an insecure region where military escalation has become a common feature of regional politics. At the same time, it is strategically important for both the West and Russia, which is one of the key causes of instability. The aim of this study is to analyse Georgia's security perspective on regional security in the South Caucasus, which is suggested to be intertwined with its national security perspective. Insecurity and conflict, according to Georgia's security perception, lead to increased Russian interference in the region, which itself is one of the causes of the region's persistent instability. Thus, stability in the South Caucasus is one of Georgia's top priorities in terms of security, which is reflected in Georgia's National Security Concept (NSC) adopted in 2011, and the 2012 Resolution of Basic Directions of Georgia's Foreign Policy. Following Georgia's NSC, this study examines the relationship between Georgia's security expectations and regional geopolitical realities and finds that, although Georgia's current security perception, based on the 2011 NSC, has met national and regional security needs so far, adaptation of the security policy to new circumstances, where Georgia could serve as a connection between the West and the East rather than choosing between them, is required.

NATO and the South Caucasus: Realities and Perspectives of Multi-speed Relations

Russkii Vopros, 2019

Nearly 27 years have passed since the establishment of relations between NATO and the three South Caucasus republics. However, over the years those relations passed different and difficult ways of development. Despite the fact that NATO cooperation with 3 countries started almost at the same time and in similar conditions, achievements of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are different. This paper reviews the development and the current state of the mutual relations. It also analysis problems and perspectives of relations between the Alliance and the three South Caucasus states.