Draining the pond: why Singer’s defense of the duty to aid the world’s poor is self-defeating (Philosophical Studies, Vol. 177, No. 7, 2020, pp. 1953-1970.) (original) (raw)
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Giving and Over-Demandingess: A Critical Assessment of Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality"
In his 1971 paper "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" Peter Singer argues that if we can prevent some moral evil without sacrificing anything of ‘comparable moral importance’ we should do it, no matter the material cost. But is this view reasonable to hold? This paper argues that rather than supplying us with a practical ethical principle, Singer’s rejection of the existing moral code supplies us instead with a moral ideal, too exalted and demanding to be attainable.
Remember the Poor: Duties, Dilemmas, and Vocation
God, the Good, and Utilitarianism: Perspectives on Peter Singer, 2014
This volume hopes to renew a conversation that has a long history in the academy, the Church, and the wider world. In addition to various precursors in English and Scottish moral philosophy, theistic engagement with the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill had a profound impact on Anglo-American theology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the 1960sand1970s, Christian ethics focused explicitly on various theories of actand rule-utilitarianism. 1 Ongoing debates about proportionalism in Roman Catholic moral theology trade upon the extent to which proponents of this view adopt a form of consequentialism inconsistent with church doctrine. 2 Today, however, sustained engagement with utilitarianism by theologians typically occurs more indirectly through proxy debates in economics, public policy, political theory, and psychology. Deontological and utilitarian ethics still frame many discussions in normative and applied ethics. Peter Singer's own writings have done much to fund this interest, often provoking polemical charges of immorality and irrationality by philosophers and theologians alike. At the same time, the growing appeal of virtue language in theological circles tends to focus on character and goodness rather than right action. In contrast to previous generations, contemporary Christian ethics has been shaped more by alliances with Kantian contractualism and Aristotelian virtue ethics than utilitarianism. Indeed, despite the appeal of proportionalism or the soft consequentialism of Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism, it is difficult to think of a prominent Christian consequentialist or even explicit treatment of contemporary utilitarian philosophers in recent Christian ethics. It is therefore a welcome
Cosmopolitanism, Global Poverty and Our Ethical Requirements: Singer Revisited
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2010
"A commonly held view is that giving to the poor is superogatory i.e., that while it is a good thing to do, it is not morally wrong for us not to do so. This essay sets out to show that for the affluent in the world giving to the poor is not superogatory but is rather a moral obligation. The paper critiques Singer's famous argument in ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’ and finds that although the argument is a cogent and powerful one, Singer, when trying to apply the argument to how we should act, somewhat skews the argument's real implications. Furthermore, it is argued that a cosmopolitan concern for the global poor is the morally correct response to have, and the author defends this view by examining the proper effect that aspects like geographical distance, nationality, reciprocity, and the nature of the global economic system should have on our moral considerations. In conclusion, it is argued that since the way that each person utilises his/her resources is a reflection of what he/she values, then for many of us in positions of affluence, in order to be moral, much more should be done in order to help those experiencing dire, life-threatening poverty across the globe."
Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality": Three Libertarian Refutations
Studia Humana, 2020
Peter Singer’s famous and influential article is criticised in three main ways that can be considered libertarian, although many non-libertarians could also accept them: 1) the relevant moral principle is more plausibly about upholding an implicit contract rather than globalising a moral intuition that had local evolutionary origins; 2) its principle of the immorality of not stopping bad things is paradoxical, as it overlooks the converse aspect that would be the positive morality of not starting bad things and also thereby conceptually eliminates innocence; and 3) free markets—especially international free trade—have been cogently explained to be the real solution to the global “major evils” of “poverty” and “pollution”, while “overpopulation” does not exist in free-market frameworks; hence charity is a relatively minor alleviant to the problem of insufficiently free markets. There are also various subsidiary arguments throughout.
Global Ethics
The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate a specific critical discussion of Peter Singer's view on philanthropy. This critique of Singer's position takes several forms, and here we focus on only two of these. First of all, it is claimed that philanthropy (based upon the giving up of luxury goods) should be avoided, because it harms the poor. As we shall see this is a view defended by Andrew Kuper. However, philanthropy is also accused of harming the poor by being sub-optimal and standing in the way of the more effective and lasting poverty relief brought about by changes in the political and economic system. This second complaint is defended by, among others, Paul Gomberg, Anthony Langlois and David Schweickart, as well as Kuper. To our knowledge, little systematic work has been done on the presentation and evaluation of theses objections to philanthropy. In what follows, the objections are dealt with in connection with private donations made by individuals, as this is the focus, and target, of the philosophers/scientists we wish to discuss.
Peter Singer´s " Drowning Child Problem " – An Analogy Analysis
The paper focuses on Peter Singer´s "Drowning Child Dilemma" and its 'real-life implications': When do citizens of more affluent states feel responsible ‘enough’ to engage in situations they are not directly surrounded by, and what are the practical implications of these “positive duties”? It works with one of the most pressing examples in the context of contemporary globalization: migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea on their journey to Europe.
International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2013
Peter Singer' s 1971 essay "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" sparked a surge in interest among philosophers in the obligations of the global rich beneficently to assist the global poor. Richard Miller argues that Singer' s account is too demanding and proposes his Principle of Sympathy as an alternative to it. I first argue against Miller' s view and, in particular, his insistence that the value of pursuing worthwhile goals that are close to one' s heart significantly weakens one' s obligation to assist the least well-off. Secondly, I critique Singer' s account and argue for a substantially revised version thereof. The Moderate Principle of Sacrifice (MPS) that I defend includes four revisions to Singer' s account. These revisions allow it adequately to account for nonmoral value; the suffering of donor as well as recipient; serious need rather than just poverty; and the need for a long-term approach to global poverty relief.
Poverty and Humanity: Individual Duties and the Moral Point of View
Duncker & Humblot
It is a fact that millions of people live in severe poverty and die each year from starvation. Forty-six percent of humankind live below the US$2-a-day poverty line, and over 1,214 million people live below the 1−a−daypovertyline.2About18millionextremelypoorpeopledieeachyearfrompoverty−relatedcauses(one−thirdofallhumandeaths).Atthesametime,itisalsoafactthatpovertyisnotunavoidableinaworldwheretheglobalproductionoffoodistwicetheamountthatwouldbenecessarytofeedthetotalpopulation.Thecostoferadicatingextremestarvationislessthan1percentoftheglobalincome,andthecostofprovidinguniversalaccesstobasicsocialservicesandtransferstoalleviateabsolutepovertywouldcost1-a-day poverty line. 2 About 18 million extremely poor people die each year from poverty-related causes (one-third of all human deaths). At the same time, it is also a fact that poverty is not unavoidable in a world where the global production of food is twice the amount that would be necessary to feed the total population. The cost of eradicating extreme starvation is less than 1 percent of the global income, and the cost of providing universal access to basic social services and transfers to alleviate absolute poverty would cost 1−a−daypovertyline.2About18millionextremelypoorpeopledieeachyearfrompoverty−relatedcauses(one−thirdofallhumandeaths).Atthesametime,itisalsoafactthatpovertyisnotunavoidableinaworldwheretheglobalproductionoffoodistwicetheamountthatwouldbenecessarytofeedthetotalpopulation.Thecostoferadicatingextremestarvationislessthan1percentoftheglobalincome,andthecostofprovidinguniversalaccesstobasicsocialservicesandtransferstoalleviateabsolutepovertywouldcost80 billion, less than the wealth of the seven richest men in the world. 3 I guess that for the majority of us these data are devastating. Certainly, statistics about destitution are always moving, and the normal reaction to them is of regret and concern. 4 Nevertheless, the reality is that income differences between the most affluent population and the poorest are actually increasing, rather than diminishing, and that all this is taking place despite our impressive technological progress and the success of human rights discourse in Western democracies. 5 Perhaps what explains our global collective inaction concerning this problem is not mere indifference to others' suffering, but rather the widespread belief that we, people from affluent countries, do not really have a moral duty to help those who are dying of hunger far from us. We may certainly feel compelled to engage in charitable acts, and we do deeply value people making this kind of effort, but the inaction toward the starving population is not perceived as a moral fault. Global-scale problems, we could say, are not a real concern in our common-sense morality because, as Samuel Scheffler emphasizes, common-sense morality and the image of human social life are "defined primarily by small-scale personal relations among independent individual agents." 6 7 Pogge (2002a, 4) correctly points out that "we live in extreme isolation from severe poverty. We do not know people scarred by the experience of losing a child of hunger, diarrhea, or measles, do not know anyone earning less than $10 for a 72-hour web of hard, monotonous labor." 8 Singer (1985, 249; 1993, 230-231). 9 See Singer (1985, 259).