Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market (original) (raw)

It Takes Two to Proliferate: Nuclear Supply and the Grand Bargain

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

Questions and concerns regarding nuclear proliferation have engaged security scholars for decades. Why do some states proliferate, while others decide not to? What roles do international institutions, norms, and the balancing of power play in such decisions? These questions and many others address proliferation from the demand-side. In this article, we approach proliferation from the opposite angle-the supply-side. Why do nuclear states decide to help nonnuclear states proliferate? Why do these supplier states decide to help these particular recipient states, and not any others? To answer these questions we propose a bargaining theory of nuclear assistance, where relational factors, domestic players, critical bargaining chips, and international constraints interact to explain the success or failure of the nuclear collaboration.

Countering Nuclear Proliferation

2011

The threat of nuclear proliferation is no longer being adequately contained by the original nuclear non-proliferation regime with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its heart. As of 2001, the United States (US) administration has adopted new measures to counteract the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper proposes that the new measures adopted by the US are not effective in ensuring security from nuclear proliferation or protecting against nuclear attack It is argued that the US approach is paradoxically driving nuclear proliferation and increasing the security risk to the US, its measures acting to undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime without replacing it with an improved regime.It is proposed that the nuclear regime for all of its failings is a necessary bedrock for a world where nuclear non-proliferation is a norm. This regime, and the treaty, is reliant on multilateral buy-in. A constructive way forward would be to fix the NPT and then build new mecha...

Nuclear Proliferation and the Central Balance: Structural Scenarios

STRATEGIES XXI: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment, 2022

This paper synthetizes earlier studies and aims to investigate how the nuclear equilibrium between the United States and the Russian Federation may change, because of the process of proliferation. A theoretical perspective combining power transition and rational deterrence theory is used to draw a few scenarios. The main goal is to develop general traits and tendencies, by varying the variable of power distribution and use them to develop a few scenarios.

Nuclear Policy in Equation of Power Balance

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research), 2019

After the end of the Cold War, it was attempted to create the appropriate framework for progress in armaments control and disarmament. Although there have been fundamental changes in international relations and the security environment, efforts and initiatives in the field have proved to be often free from obstacles and disagreements. One reason for this is due to the increase in the number of states involved in the negotiations and, implicitly, the multiplication of political, economic and security interests. The logic of the bipolar world and nuclear deterrence, characteristic of the Cold War, did not take into account the security aspirations of other state actors. Currently, nuclear weapons, although necessitating an internationally sustained dialogue, raise issues that make it difficult to cooperate in this area. Owners cannot be subjected to collective sanction. Theoretically, they have great freedom of action, which can ultimately be restrained only by other nuclear powers. In addition, the idea of an anti-missile shield is increasingly being discussed, but in the absence of bilateral or multilateral agreements limiting the number and location of ballistic interceptors that can be placed by different states.

Nuclear Arms: Proliferation and Mitigation

There are many reasons for proliferation of nuclear weapons that political theorists have determined over the past century. Mitigation, and eventually abolition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) however, is a concept fresh to the international community. On this planet exist enough nuclear warheads to the point where there is more than enough to condemn this planet to destruction ten times over, mostly between United States and Russia. There is resistance from states such as North Korea, and other nations and groups as well, but the reduction of arms is being spearheaded by the United States and Russia, and hopefully joined by the rest of the United Nations subsequently. Unfortunately, nothing is black and white in politics, but our generation"s vision of a nuclear-free world is indeed achievable.

Will Emerging Powers Go Nuclear in An Unpredictable World20200102 88679 19wl0j8

II. International Giresun Security Symposium Proceedings, 2019

The impact of nuclear weapons on security is one of the most controversial topics in security studies. They are considered/presented as illegitimate or inappropriate (if not illegal) instruments of foreign and security policy because they are considered as a threat for the survival of humanity. Therefore, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime has been established with the objective of total elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. However, the success of NPT regime in realizing its objective has been questionable and this failure can be attributed to the fact that it is based on a categorical distinction between haves (Nuclear States that have the right to possess/keep their nuclear arsenal until total elimination achieved) and have-nots (Non-Nuclear States that has given up their right to possess nuclear weapons). The calculus on the possession of nuclear arsenal as an instrument of deterrence is further complicated by the transformations in the geopolitical conditions and new developments in nuclear technology: international system is becoming more conflictual due to shifts its power structure; the legal and political restrictions on use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy are weakening; the number of threshold states capable of producing nuclear weapons is increasing; negative and positive guarantees provided by NPT to non-nuclear states are weakening; the advent of new types of nuclear weapons is increasing the possibility of their use in tactical engagements; and normative-political restrictions on use of nuclear weapons is becoming obsolete. These changes are particularly influential for the emerging powers that are challenging the existing system of relations and established practices with their increasing capabilities and rising profile within the international system. The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the emerging powers with their aspirations to change the existing system of relations/power in international system will/may choose to develop their own nuclear capabilities, at least, as an instrument for a strategy of deterrence.