Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market (original) (raw)

Abstract

The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.

Key takeaways

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  1. The nuclear market's competition among suppliers facilitates proliferation, allowing buyers to manipulate terms.
  2. Great powers' ability to limit nuclear proliferation diminishes as global power shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity.
  3. Seven NWS emerged from 1945 to 1974 due to intense supplier competition; only three since then.
  4. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) effectively curbed proliferation by regulating ENR transfers after 1975.
  5. Future proliferation risks increase with rising tensions among great powers like the US, China, and Russia.

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FAQs

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What pathways do states use to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities?add

The paper identifies six primary pathways to nuclear weapons acquisition: indigenous development, multinational cooperation, nuclear trade, illicit smuggling, capturing enemy facilities, and utilizing civilian nuclear programs managed by international organizations.

How does the competition among suppliers affect nuclear proliferation?add

The study shows that increased supplier competition facilitates proliferation by allowing buyers to leverage better prices, technologies, and terms of use, thereby easing access to nuclear materials.

When did the number of nuclear weapon states peak, according to the analysis?add

The analysis predicts that the number of nuclear weapons states peaked in the early Cold War, with seven states acquiring nuclear weapons between 1945 and 1974.

What role do thwarters play in the nuclear market?add

Thwarters, typically great powers, attempt to curb proliferation by regulating supplier behavior and establishing cartels, which can restrict the sale of sensitive nuclear technologies.

What impact does the shift to multipolarity have on nuclear proliferation?add

The transition to multipolarity may weaken regulatory efforts by thwarters, potentially leading to increased proliferation as cooperation among great powers diminishes.