Lockean Memory Theory of Personal Identity: A Critique (original) (raw)

2018, FALSAFA: Journal of Philosophy, ABU Zaria

The problem of memory is an epistemological one and has remained a perennial problem from time immemorial. Consequently, philosophers have struggled for centuries to make conceptual clarification between memory and personal identity without success. However, according to John Locke, one’s personal identity extends only so far as their own consciousness, so long as one is the same self, the same rational being. Hence, he maintains that one has the same personal identity. Thus, given this assertion, it implies that any change in one’s personal identity, automatically implies that the self has changed. As a result, the bond between consciousness and memory in Lockean’s memory theory of personal identity has awakened us from our dogmatic slumber. Therefore, it is in this light that this paper intends to make detailed analysis with a view to pointing out the pitfalls of the Lockean memory theory of personal identity and thereby proffering solution to the problem. Also, this paper depicts that owing to the issue of forgetfulness, Locke’s memory theory cannot be accepted as basis for personal identity. Furthermore, in achieving the above, an analytic method was adopted in order to critically analyze the Lockean memory theory, as a basis for personal identity.