A dinâmica do passado e do futuro (original) (raw)

2016, Estudos Kantianos. Dossiê Kant e Leibniz.

ABSTRACT: The rejection of an exhaustive opposition between realism and antirealism in the determination of personal identity conduces Leibniz, in his critiques to Locke in the New Essays, to criticize both conventionalism and the thesis on the irreality of the past – both of them elements of Locke’s theory. Leibniz attacks the thesis on the irreality of the past not because he adopts an anti-justificationist thesis, antitetical to Locke’s, but, instead, due to the radicalization of his rival’s justificationist thesis. Conventionalism, on its turn, will be proven as false by the fact that the “self ” and the infinite set of its past, present and future perceptions perfectly coincide. In the conclusion of this paper, we will see how some passages of Kant’s Anthropology rend him, contrary to what would initially be supposed , closer to Leibniz than to Locke. KEYWORDS: Leibniz, consciouness, inconscient, Locke, Kant.