The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in the lab The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in 2 the lab (original) (raw)
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The Effect of Prescriptive Norms and Negative Externalities on Bribery Decisions
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017
Corruption is a welfare issue worldwide, but it is difficult to study because of its secret nature. We here did a lab economic experiment on bribery to study different compliance mechanisms through which people might be deterred from corruption. We focused on two elements of norms which people might respond to: information about the function of the norm (to avoid harm to third parties) and information about the prescriptive content of the norm (rights and duties). We show that information about both negative externalities of bribery and prescriptive norms are effective deterrents, and that bribe offers and acceptances are most discouraged with their synergic interaction. We find that participants followed prescriptive information, even when it was inefficient to do so, and implied choosing against their material self-interest (by rejecting a bribe) and not reciprocating bribe offers. Such compliance regardless of costs to the self and to others suggests a rule-based " mindless" process, like a normative heuristic. We conclude by highlighting the relevance of these findings as behavioral insights in the elaboration of strategies to combat corruption and norm transgressions.
The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in the lab
Rationality and Society, 2019
In most bribery games in the literature, there is no mention of rights and duties associated to participants’ roles. Authors have hitherto relied on loaded frames, negative externalities, and the possibility of sanctions to implicitly signal prescriptive norms. We argue that participants’ interpretation of these factors may not be univocal. In this study, a participant in the role of a common citizen either did or did not acquire the right to obtain a monetary benefit and could offer a bribe to an associated participant in the role of public official. This participant, in turn, had an explicit duty of providing the benefit only if the citizen acquired the right to it. Conditions with/without the acquisition of the right were crossed with the presence/absence of negative externalities associated with transgressions of the official’s duty. One last (fifth) condition mimicked other bribery games in the literature which rely on loaded frames and negative externalities but no information...
Who Doesn't?"-The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption
PloS one, 2015
Corruption poses one of the major societal challenges of our time. Considerable advances have been made in understanding corruption on a macro level, yet the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior remain largely unknown. In order to explain why some people engage in corruption while others do not, we explored the impact of descriptive social norms on corrupt behavior by using a novel behavioral measure of corruption. We conducted three studies to test whether perceived descriptive norms of corruption (i.e. the belief about the prevalence of corruption in a specific context) influence corrupt behavior. The results indicated that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior-both when measured before (Study 1) or after (Study 2) the behavioral measure of corruption. Finally, we adopted an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3). Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants rece...
Social Norms in Corruption: A Bribery Experiment
2019
This paper analyzes social norms in corruption by exploring whether engagement in bribery induces costly third-party punishment. By introducing third-party punishment in a bribery experiment we disentangle social norms from other non-normative motives ̶ such as retaliation, negative reciprocity ̶ maintained merely by parties involved in corruption. We manipulate two main characteristics of bribery: the private benefits gained by corrupt actors, and the negative externality generated by bribery on passive members of society. We find that third parties punish bribers more often than the bribed, but to a lesser extent. Greater private benefits induce third parties to punish more, whereas greater negative externalities have no impact on punishment choices. We unveil the role of emphatic anger as a microdeterminant of third-party punishment. We find gender differences in punishment behavior, with females being more willing to punish the bribed than males, but to a lesser amount.
Bribery as Negotiation: A Decision Making Perspective
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The majority of research in conflict management focuses conflict resolution: the process of reaching a mutually beneficial solution for the negotiating parties. However, in some cases, the negotiation may impart substantial negative externalities onto third parties, so resolving the conflict may not be a socially optimal solution. Bribery is one such example: potential bribe-givers and birbe-takers often have to negotiate on the price, speed and quality of services. The outcome of a "successful" negotiation may be a structurally unsound building, or a driver"s license holder who cannot drive. The current paper examines bribery from a behavioral decision making perspective, zooming in on the economic and moral motivations of the negotiating parties and argues that the assignment of moral responsibility for bribery exchanges may play a significant role in the process.
The Effect of Particularism on Corruption: Theory and Empirical Evidence
This paper investigates the role played by the cultural norms of particularism and universalism for collusive bribery. In our theoret- ical framework, the act of proposing or demanding a bribe violates a commonly held social norm, thus producing a psychological cost. By lowering this psychological cost, particularism increases the prob- ability of o ering or asking for a bribe. We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25 countries from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal e ect on the probability of o ering a bribe, but no e ect on the probability to be asked for a bribe. Overall, our ndings indicate that policies aimed at favoring universalism may provide an e ective tool in the ght against corruption.
2015
This paper investigates the role played by the cultural norms of particularism and universalism for collusive bribery. In our theoretical framework, the act of proposing or demanding a bribe violates a commonly held social norm, thus producing a psychological cost. By lowering this psychological cost, particularism increases the probability of offering or asking for a bribe. We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25 countries from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal effect on the probability of offering a bribe, but no effect on the probability to be asked for a bribe. Overall, our findings indicate that policies aimed at favoring universalism may provide an effective tool in the fight against corruption.
The effect of social norms on bribe offers
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2018
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms and sanctions on bribe offers. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.
The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws
American Business Law Journal, 2012
This article addresses a gap in the common understanding of corruption. The rules regarding corruption at both the macro-and the micro-level are well known, as are the consequences at the macro-level. The consequences at the micro-level, however, particularly for business firms, are not well understood. With respect to rules, at both the macro-and micro-levels the rules are very clear: do not pay bribes. At the macrolevel the consequences are well known: corruption has devastating effects on societies and economies. Although not often referred to in most corruption literature, the consequences at the micro-level can be discussed. This article begins with the direct and indirect costs imposed on firms that pay bribes. Firms that pay bribes spend more time and money dealing with governments, and bear the costs of distortions of internal resources. The article then examines the negative effects of corruption on existing relationships within the firm and potential relationships with parties outside of the firm. Finally, the article examines potential criminal and civil liability that a firm exposes itself to when it pays bribes. The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than benefit the firm.