Further defence of legal age change: a reply to the critics (original) (raw)

Moral case for legal age change.pdf

Journal of Medical Ethics, 2019

Should a person who feels his legal age does not correspond with his experienced age be allowed to change his legal age? In this paper, I argue that in some cases people should be allowed to change their legal age. Such cases would be when: 1) the person genuinely feels his age differs significantly from his chronological age and 2) the person’s biological age is recognized to be significantly different from his chronological age and 3) age change would likely prevent, stop or reduce ageism, discrimination due to age, he would otherwise face. I also consider some objections against the view that people should be allowed to change their legal age and find them lacking.

Recognizing Younger Citizens: Statutes and Structures in Support of Earlier Adulthood

18 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 161, 2014

I question the way the law regulates adolescents by looking at the interaction between i) pre-Enlightenment norms in which scientific and political notions of human development did not exist for all practical purposes, ii) Enlightenment philosophical and scientific norms of human development, and iii) modern legal norms of human development. Are there ways in which pre-modern holistic notions of being human can contribute to a more rational approach to adolescents by the law? How can the ideology of childhood, which through Enlightenment scientific and political thought, is reified (has the illusion it is real), naturalized (has the illusion it is natural) and legitimized (encoded in the law), be overcome for adolescents? I make four contributions to the discussion of children’s rights: 1. I make an argument that the authority of science is overrated when dealing with children. Science is used by the medical and other professions to justify their authority and competence in certain environments, including the classroom and at the bedside. It is used primarily by physicians, but is used by the other authorities that make decisions on behalf of adolescents: parents, teachers, and, in general, the state. I argue that the life sciences are now both institutionally corrupt and theoretically unsound, and therefore should no longer be a proxy for or token of authority. Decisions about children, especially adolescents, based on the life sciences, or made by life scientists (including physicians) whose authority primarily flows from their social authority as scientists, should be seen as categorically problematic and therefore categorically devalued. 2. I suggest that states and other socio-political entities should recognize committees of adolescents to represent the wishes and needs of adolescents and other children. 3. I suggest that, as a general matter, the legal presumption that adult competence happens only at 18 or 21, with carve out exceptions for some earlier competencies, should be reversed, and that the law should recognize adult competence at 14 (e.g.) with exceptions for some later competencies. And 4. Until more general reforms can be enacted, I join with those who suggest that the general rule for adolescents facing terminal or grave illnesses should be to deem them competent to make their own medical decisions.

Introduction: between law, ageing and ageism

Ageing, Ageism and the Law, 2018

This book is about law, ageing and ageism in Europe. Generally speaking, European countries, as well as the European public media and interest are well aware of the ageing of Europe, the demographic shift it is facing, and the future challenges which are related. Nevertheless, much less attention was given in Europe to the social construction of old age, the prejudices, biases, stigmas and discrimination the older Europeans experience in their daily lives. Moreover, the different European legal systems, for example legislators, judges and lawyers, were mostly unaware of or blind to the fact that older persons have unique legal challenges, and that these challenges are the outcome of the way society treats and constructs old age.

Reflecting on age discrimination in the European Union—the search for clarity and food for thought

ERA Forum, 2009

This article deals with age and discrimination in the European Union. Age is a relative newcomer to the equality table which must be considered in light of current contexts, not least demographic ageing. The Employment Equality Directive (EED) contains three categories of non-application and potential non-application for age which partially set age apart from the other grounds protected therein. Looking at these against broader contexts suggests that some may need to be revisited before long. Early case law from the Court of Justice has given age an undeniable boost in profile. It also reveals the complexities of national employment law containing age restrictions and the challenges of clarifying the meaning of the Directive in the context of age. The outcome of these age discrimination references is always keenly anticipated as they invariably tend to affect a large number of workers. While the future looks promising with the inclusion of age in a proposal for a Directive on equal treatment outside employment, this proposal contains some distinctive clauses for age which will most probably require clarification down the road.

The Prohibition of Age Discrimination in European Law – Evolution and Perspectives*

2018

Instruments explicitly prohibiting age discrimination are a relatively recent phenomenon compared to other suspect grounds in international and European antidiscrimination law. In the domain of employment biographies and employment opportunities, the dominant EU approach has focused on equal treatment of men and women, and gender equality was at the heart of numerous benchmark decisions adopted by the European Court of Justice in order to clarify general legal concepts underlying European equality law. The chapter deals with the legal foundations of the prohibition of age discrimination in employment as a human right issue, and the wide range of exceptions and justifications for age discrimination under European Union law in particular.

Age Discrimination: A 'too young' protected characteristic in Europe?

2016

Age discrimination and the other protected characteristics are legislated, in the EC Treaty, as a numerus clausus of features which, despite the differences, enjoy equal status. Yet, age discrimination, unlike its counterparts, is susceptible to being ‘justified’ in force of the Framework Directive. The obscure and grey waters of law to which age discrimination has been drifting aimlessly for some time, is the subject of this paper, the ultimate purpose of which is, beyond the sociological and anthropological studies, to dissect and unearth the current inconsistencies in the European Union legislation as regards this notion and its interplay with the equality corpus iuris . As a logical outcome, the paper puts forward suggestions for amendments to the current Framework Directive so that its tenor can be aligned to the Treaty where, be this construct ontologically correct or not, there is no suggestion that a ranking of protected characteristics should be adopted. Furthermore and mor...