Literature and Moral Vision: Autonomism Reconsidered (original) (raw)
Related papers
Moral-Autonomism: A New Theory on the Relationship of Ethics to Aesthetics
The debate about whether ethics relates to aesthetics, and if so, how, has been of importance for both philosophers and society, with far-reaching effects on several important issues, such as whether ethics affects aesthetic value, what works should be enjoyed, censorship, the ethical effects of art, and the permissibility of pornography. The problem is that the main positions within the debate, Moralism (i.e. ethics can affect aesthetics) and Autonomism (i.e. ethics can not affect aesthetics), seem inadequate and have led to an apparently irresolvable impasse, as both of their apparently mutually-exclusive intuitions seem required for any adequate theory. As this relationship is important, in itself and for these philosophical and social debates to get off the ground, resolving this impasse seems imperative. In this paper I argue that this impasse arises by failing to consider the nature of aesthetics and ethics before positing a theory based solely on intuitions. By understanding these natures first, I argue that a theory that combines both the Moralist and Autonomist intuitions can be plausibly put forward. I do this by showing that aesthetic value is based on subjective and relative taste, and thus what constitutes aesthetic value is as Autonomism claims. Despite this, I argue that ethics often impacts value from outside a domain’s independent evaluative standard, such as occurs with the value of scientific research, and thus perhaps ethics can affect our overall taste (and thus aesthetic value) without being a part of aesthetic value. I argue that this new theory resolves the impasse, captures all intuitions, resolves several problems and avoids others that Moralism and Autonomism encounter, has beneficial social consequences, and enables (and provides insight into) the philosophical and social debates. I conclude that understanding the nature of aesthetics and ethics therefore leads to this more plausible theory within the debate.
Ethics and the Arts: A Critical Review of the New Moralisms
Paul Macneill (ed.) Ethics and the Arts. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, and London: Springer, 2014
This chapter explores the nature of any relationship between ethics and the arts. At one time, the dominant position in the philosophy of art was that there was no relationship. Aesthetics and ethics were seen as autonomous spheres. The various ‘new moralists’ argue that, in some circumstances, there is a relationship. Noël Carroll and Berys Gaut, for example, argue that moral ‘flaws’ in some works of art may detract from the work’s aesthetic value, while others, such as Daniel Jacobson and Matthew Kieran, counter that a morally reprehensible quality in a work may contribute positively to its aesthetic value. Although the polarities are reversed, both of these positions accept that there is—or may be—a relationship between morality and aesthetics. Others however take a less theoretically based view in acknowledging that there may be a relationship in which a moral quality is seen to add to, or detract, from the aesthetic value a work of art, but that this can only be maintained by a critical assessment of a particular work of art and not by rigid application of theory. This chapter sides with those who are resistant to applying prior moral standards in judging art and puts the view that ethics and aesthetics are independent discourses, although they potentially illuminate one another. The chapter also explores whether moral repugnance, in responding to particular works of art, such as any of Michel Houellebecq’s novels, can be indicative of aesthetic merit or deficiency. It is argued however that no one aspect (moral, affective, or cognitive) can be assumed, in advance, to trump another, and the relative weight given to any of these, is itself a part of a reflection on the aesthetic merit of a particular artwork.
The Ethical Criticism of Art: A New Mapping of the Territory
Philosophia, 2007
The goal of this paper is methodological. It offers a comprehensive mapping of the theoretical positions on the ethical criticism of art, correcting omissions and inadequacies in the conceptual framework adopted in the current debate. Three principles are recommended as general guidelines: ethical amenability, basic value pluralism, and relativity to ethical dimension. Hence a taxonomy distinguishing between different versions of autonomism, moralism, and immoralism is established, by reference to criteria that are different from what emerging in the current literature. The mapping is then proved capable of (1) locating the various theories that have been proposed so far and clarifying such theories' real commitments, (2) having the correct relationship with actual art making and art criticism practices, and showing the real weight of the alleged counter-example to a moralist position of a work that succeeds artistically because of its immorality.
Rethinking autonomism: Beauty in a world of moral anarchy
Advocates of the ethical criticism of art claim that works’ ethical defects or merits have an impact on their aesthetic value. Against ethical critics, autonomists claim that moral criteria should not be part of the considerations when evaluating works of art as art. Autonomism refers to the view that an artwork’s aesthetic value is independent from its ethical value. The purpose of this paper is to examine how autonomism has been defended in the contemporary discussion in analytic aesthetics. I present three versions of autonomism: Richard Posner’s radical autonomism, James C. Anderson and Jeffrey T. Dean, and James Harold’s moderate autonomism, and Francisca Pérez Carreño’s robust autonomism. I argue that robust autonomism offers a stronger argument against the ethical critic. However, I point to some difficulties for Pérez Carreño’s account, and conclude by suggesting how further work in autonomism might go around them.
works and arts. Its main aim is to underscore the correlation of art and morality and to analyze, contrast , and interpret the functions, meaning ,sense and applications of art in different time or period. This Article is prepared by reviewing the period and time of English literature related to these issues.
In this chapter, we examine Iris Murdoch’s views about art. We highlight continuities and differences between her views on art and aesthetics, and those of Plato, Kant, and Freud. We argue that Murdoch’s views about art, though traditionally linked to Plato, are more compatible with Kant’s thought than has been acknowledged—though with his ethics rather than his aesthetics. Murdoch shows Plato’s influence in her idea that beauty is the good in a different guise. However, Murdoch shows a more Kantian than Platonic influence in her suggestion that the experience of beauty can be conducive to virtue, and distances herself from Plato in her claim that the enjoyment, as well as the production, of certain kinds of art can be virtuous. We also argue that her view of bad art as self-consoling fantasy is consonant with Freudian thought. Lastly, we question her view of bad art, specifically concerning her identification of bad art as self-consoling fantasy or entertainment, and her separation...