Russell on Introspection and Self-Knowledge (original) (raw)
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Russellian Acquaintance Revisited
In Bertrand Russell’s writings during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century there occur two rather different distinctions that involve his much-discussed, technical notion of acquaintance. The first is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the second, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This article examines the nature and philosophical purpose of these two distinctions, while also tracing the evolution of Russell’s notion of acquaintance. It argues that, when he first expressly formulates his Principle of Acquaintance in 1903, Russell’s chief concern is to appeal to the first distinction to argue against a certain tightly restrictive epistemology of understanding that he finds in the writings of William James. By contrast, when in 1911 he begins to place emphasis on the second distinction, his concern is to appeal to it in the course of defending his thesis that we are capable of having perfect knowledge (by acquaintance) of particulars. The defense is necessary because this thesis comes under attack from a certain argument Russell finds in the writings of the Monistic Idealists.
Cambridge Philosophers IX: Bertrand Russell
Philosophy, 1999
This paper attempts to summarise the philosophical career of Bertrand Russell, concentrating in particular on his contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics. It takes as its starting point Russell's conception of philosophy as the search for foundations upon which certain knowledge might be built, a search which Russell, at the end of his career, declared to be fruitless. In pursuing this search, however, Russell was led to develop lines of thought and techniques of analysis that have had a profound and lasting influence on the philosophy of the twentieth century.
Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 519-27., 2017
In Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism, (eds.) Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa, 2015
Psychologism and the development of Russell’s account of propositions
Godden, D. and Griffin, N. (2009). Psychologism and the development of Russell’s account of propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic, 30, 171-186., 2009
This paper examines the development of Russell’s treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell’s thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell’s theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, in responding to a variety of different problems relating to the proposition, chose to resolve these problems in ways that continually made concessions to psychologism.
Three Studies of Russell's Neutral Monism
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 1993
With the exception of Stace's view, all of these opinions have appeared since the publication of My Philosophical Development in 1959, renewing the poignancy of Russell's complaint there that his philosophical theory has been "almost universally misunderstood"
The Tenability of Russell's Early Philosophy
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 1988
WINCHESTER: I'm hoping this will be a very informal session. Our panelists will, of course, feel free to say anything that they feel like, that they want to get off their chests, and then the audience will take it upon themselves to make comments. AYER: I think I'd like the audience to interrupt if they feel like it-if we say anything outrageous or platitudinous, or both. I'll start off by saying a few words. I noticed that early on we had a very well-known, typical Russell quotation, namely, that, where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. But an interesting one that passed unquoted occurs in The Problems of Philosophy, namely that every proposition we can understand must be composed of constituents with which we are acquainted. It seems to me-and this is something I would like my companions to discuss-that this ties Russell very closely to phenomenalism, because he argued as early as The Problems of Philosophy that the only particulars we are acquainted with in addition to our Selves are sense-data; and he excludes Selves by the time he gets to The Analysis of Mind. Otherwise, he allows us to be acquainted with universals. Now if you interpret the theory of definite descriptions in the way that Quine does (and I agree with Quine), Russell should be interpreted as permitting-not only permitting but encouraging-the elimination of singular terms. This means that all the stuffing, as it were, in your statements gets into the predicates, and there's nothing left to be a value of the existentially quantified variable except something that requires no connotation, namely the object of a demonstrative. If that is so, and if the object of demonstratives for Russell can be only sense-data-something he maintained throughout his career right up to Inquiry into Meaning (J.nd Truth-it means that you are only referring to sense-data and to what properties they can have. This leaves you no other alternative but phenomenalism. * In passing two series of proofs of the discussion, the panelisls and "olher voices" nol infrequently revised the wording ascribed to them. The result offered here. while nol a verbatim transcript of the discussion that took place on 24 June 1984, is what each speaker wishes printed. Editorial thanks for assistance with the transcription are extended to