Luiz Carlos Pereira: The Semantics of Falsity and Negation / Response: Falsity, Negation, and Modality (original) (raw)
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Logic, Language, and Knowledge. Essays on Chateaubriand's Logical Forms MEANINGS OF FORM
The expressions 'form', 'structure', 'schema', 'shape', 'pattern', 'figure', 'mold', and related locutions are used in logic both as technical terms and in metaphors. This paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyses uses of these expressions by logicians. No such project has been attempted previously. After establishing general terminology, we present a variant of traditional usage of the expression 'logical form' followed by a discussion of the usage found in the two-volume Chateaubriand book Logical Forms (2001 and 2005)—the most comprehensive work on the subject ever written and in many ways the focus of this paper. Resumo: As expressões 'forma', 'estrutura', 'esquema', 'formato', 'modelo', 'figura', 'molde', e termos relacionados são usados em lógica tanto como termos técnicos quanto como em metáforas. O presente artigo justapõe, diferencia e analisa o uso de...
Meanings of Form. Manuscrito 31(2008), 223–266. P
2008. Meanings of Form. Manuscrito 31, 223–266. P Abstract The expressions ‘form’, ‘structure’, ‘schema’, ‘shape’, ‘pattern’, ‘figure’, ‘mold’, and related locutions are used in logic both as technical terms and in metaphors. This paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyses uses of such expressions by logicians. No similar project has been attempted previously. After establishing general terminology, we present a variant of traditional usage of the expression ‘logical form’ followed by a discussion of the usage found in the two-volume Chateaubriand book Logical Forms (2001 and 2005)—the most comprehensive work on the subject ever written and in many ways the focus of this paper. Key Words: morphology, character, sense, sentence, proposition, form, structure, schema, alternative constituent, type, token ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUENT EXERCISES IN USE OF ‘FORM’. https://www.academia.edu/11784901/New\_formats\_for\_presenting\_and\_generating\_language\_data Q1. Some Christians believe that (Satan * God) appeared to (Eve * Mary) (as * in the form of) a (snake * dove). Q2. Some Christians believe that (Satan * God) came to (Eve * Mary) in the (form * appearance* manifestation) of a (snake * dove). Q3. Some Christians believe that (Christ * God) came to (Christopher * Jacob) in the (form * appearance* manifestation) of a (child * man * traveler * wrestler). Q4. Some Christians believe that (Christ * God) came to (Christopher * Jacob) (as *in the form of) a (child * man * traveler * wrestler). Q5. Some Christians believe that Christ’s (body * blood) is consumed by communicants (as * in the form of) (bread * wine * wafers * grape juice). Q6. (The theophanies * A theophany) (are appearances of gods* is an appearance of a god) in visible form. Q7. (Christophanies * A Christophany) (are appearances * is an appearance) of Christ in visible forms. Q8. Every (even * odd) number (is of* has) the form ( 2n * 2n + 1). Q9. Every number (of* having) the form n(n + 1) (is of* has) the form ( 2n * 2n + 1).
CORCORAN'S TRÉPLICA TO CHATEAUBRIAND ON WHOLISTIC REFERENCE
In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as " 5 + 7 = 12 " , refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, and its relevance to some of Oswaldo Chateaubriand's work are discussed in my 2004 paper " The Principle of Wholistic Reference " in Essays on Chateaubriand's " Logical Forms ". In Chateaubriand's réplica (reply), which is printed with my paper, he raised several important additional issues including the three I focus on in this tréplica (reply to his reply): truth-values, universes of discourse, and formal ontology. This paper is self-contained: it is not necessary to have read the above-mentioned works.
Language and Logic in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
The Nordic Wittgenstein Review, 2013
This paper investigates Wittgenstein’s account of the relation between elementary and molecular propositions (and thus, also, the propositions of logic) in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I start by sketching a natural reading of that relation – which I call the “bipartite reading” – holding that the Tractatus gives an account of elementary propositions, based on the so-called picture theory, and a different account of molecular ones, based on the principle of truth- functionality. I then show that such a reading cannot be attributed to Wittgenstein, because he holds the view that an explanation of logical complexity is already given by a correct account of the (pictorial) nature of elementary propositions;; this is implied in his claim that “an elementary proposition contains all logical constants/operations in itself”. After clarifying Wittgenstein’s notion of an operation from the Notes on Logic to the Tractatus, I finally explain why Wittgenstein claims that an elementary proposition contains all logical operations in itself, and hence why he can be said to provide a unified (and thus not bipartite) account of language and logic.
Manuscrito (0100-6045), 2009
This article discusses some of chateaubriand’s views on the connections between the ideas of formalization and infinity, as presented in chapters XIX and XX of Chateaubriand’s Logical Forms. We basically agree with his criticisms of the standard construal of these connections, a view we named “formal proofs as ultimate provings”, but we suggest an alternative way of picturing that connection based on some ideas of the late Wittgenstein.
Marco Ruffino: Chateaubriand on the Slingshot Arguments / Response: Did the Slingshots Hit the Mark?
Manuscrito, 2004
Abstract Marco Ruffino: The purpose of this paper is to discuss Chateaubriand's criticism of the so-called slingshot arguments, particularly of those versions proposed by Church (1956) and by Gödel (1944). I concentrate on two critical points made by Chateaubriand, and argue that they are not decisive against these versions of the slingshot. I also discuss Chateaubriand's hybrid theory of definite descriptions and argue that, despite its intrinsic interest, it cannot avoid the conclusion of the slingshot. Abstract response: In §§1-2 I argue that Marco misidentifies my main objections to the Church and Gödel slingshot arguments and that his defense of these arguments does not overcome those objections. In §3 I discuss his criticisms of my theory of descriptions in relation to Church’s argument.
2016 Philosophical Investigations "Two forms of exclusion mean two different negations"
Here we compare the logical behaviour of negation in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1921) with Demos’ account of denial (1917). Even if we hold negation as a pure syntactical device, at least in some context, it shall bring a handful of complex semantic information, potentially infinite (e.g. in the ascription of degrees to empirical qualities or of colours to visual points). We advocate then the existence of at least two negations due to the existence of two different and non-reducible kinds of exclusion. The first one is, in some sense, a tractarian and classical one, based on the notion of contradiction, and the second negation is a non-classical one, based on the notion of contrariety.