Nemec, Somānanda on the Meaningfulness of Language (original) (raw)
Related papers
Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 39, issue 4-5, Special issue on 14th World Sanskrit Conference, pp. 571–587, 2011.
In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevance to the ontological issues between Brahmin realism about universals and Buddhist nominalism (or conceptualism). It is true that Kumārila makes efforts to secure the real existence of a generic property (jāti) denoted by a word by criticizing Dignāga, who declares that the real world consists of absolutely unique individuals (svalaks : an : a). The present paper, however, concentrates on the linguistic approaches Dignāga and Kumārila adopt to deny or to prove the existence of universals. It turns out that in spite of adopting contrasting approaches they equally distinguish between the semantic denotation of a word and its pragmatic reference to a thing in the physical world. From a purely semantic viewpoint, Dignāga considers the exclusion (apoha) of others by a word as the result of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse. Among the three characteristics Dignāga held must be met by universals, Kumārila attaches special importance to their entire inherence in each individual (pratyekaparisamāpti / pratyekasamavāya). This is because he pragmatically pays attention to the use of a word in the discourse given in a particular context (prakaran : a) by analyzing a sentence into a topic and a comment.
TRANSLATION Part 1 [0 Introduction] [Jayanta:] Surely Bhaṭṭa [Kumārila] has [already] rained down an immense shower of criticisms on to the [Buddhist] view that apoha is the meaning of a word. 3 i [1 The Support of Apoha] For to explain further: This thing called apoha is taught [by you Buddhists] to be an exclusion, [i.e.] an absence. 4 Now an absence cannot be known as something 3 The whole of the rest of Part 1 is a summary, with some small changes of details, of a few of the arguments in the apoha chapter of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. Our understanding of that chapter has been shaped by the translation of it being prepared by John Taber and Kei Kataoka. 4 Dignāga did not, to our knowledge, explicitly assert that apoha is an absence (abhāva). He was interpreted that way, though, by Siṃhasūri (Nyāyāgmānusāriṇī 733,17-18, cited and translated by PIND 2009: 268, note 451): nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhanadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedāḥ . 'Nor does the fact that particulars are infinite lead to the problem that [words] would be incapable of denoting. Why? Because [exclusion] is not divided. For exclusion of other referents (arthāntarāpoha) is not divided among the particulars, because it is non-existence (abhāva); and this [exclusion] alone -not the particulars -is denoted by a word.' What Dignāga does state is that apoha is adravya (insubstantial, not really existent): avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt, adravyatvāc ca (Pramāṇasamuccayavrṛtti ad 5:36c, PIND 2009: A14). 'And the fault that [apoha] is not [capable of functioning as] a universal, which might [be thought to] follow from it not being 4 independent, in the way that pots and the like [can be perceived as independent things]. 5 Therefore, this [apoha] must be grasped as being supported by something else. 6 And what this support is of the [apoha] needs to be considered.
Some remarks on a problem in Madhyamaka philosophy of language
This paper attempts to dissolve an apparent difficulty arising in the philosophy of language as discussed by the Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka school. On the one hand Madhyamaka seems to be claiming that every entity is fundamentally linguistic in nature, on the other hand it also asserts that language does not exist. I argue that the difficulty is to be dissolved by distinguishing two different senses of language appealed to by the Mādhyamikas. They argue that one specific understanding of language is deficient (and that therefore language thus understood does not exist), but this is not the same sense of language according to which everything is linguistic in nature. The apparent contradiction is thereby resolved.
Religions, 2024
The semantic internalist–externalist debate is one of the central themes in contemporary philosophy. The present paper aims to explore the dispute between Śāntarakṣita and his opponents over the meaning of words (śabdārtha) in the śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter from the perspective of the internalist–externalist debate in semantics. The present paper consists of three main parts. In the first part, I will elucidate the internalist character of Śāntarakṣita’s apoha theory and the externalist characters of his opponents’ theories. The second part will be an examination of an Indian Externalist Argument against Śāntarakṣita’s apoha presented in the chapter. In the third part, I will explore how Śāntarakṣita attempts to refute this argument by resorting to the Dharmakīrtian notion of adhyavasāya (false ascertainment). Additionally, to emphasize a contemporary approach, I will offer and highlight the intercultural interpretations of these Indian externalist and internalist arguments.
This paper engages with Johaness Bronkhorst's recognition of a "correspondence principle" as an underlying assumption of Nāgārjuna's thought. Bronkhorst believes that this assumption was shared by most Indian thinkers of Nāgārjuna's day, and that it stimulated a broad and fascinating attempt to cope with Nāgārjuna's arguments so that the principle of correspondence may be maintained in light of his forceful critique of reality. For Bronkhorst, the principle refers to the relation between the words of a sentence and the realities they are meant to convey. While I accept this basic intuition of correspondence, this paper argues that a finer understanding of the principle can be offered. In light of a set of verses from Nāgārjuna's Śūnyatāsaptati (45-57), it is maintained that for Nāgārjuna, the deeper level of correspondence involves a structural identity he envisions between understanding and reality. Here Nāgārjuna claims that in order for things to exist, a conceptual definition of their nature must be available; in order for there to be a real world and reliable knowledge, a svabhāva of things must be perceived and accounted for. Svabhāva is thus reflected as a knowable essence. Thus, Nāgārjuna's arguments attacks the accountability of both concepts and things, a position which leaves us with nothing more than mistaken forms of understanding as the reality of the empty. This markedly metaphysical approach is next analyzed in light of the debate Nāgārjuna conducts with a Nyāya interlocutor in his Vigrahavyāvartanī. The correspondence principle is here used to highlight the metaphysical aspect of the debate and to point out the ontological vision of Nāgārjuna's theory of emptiness. In the analysis of the Vigrahavyāvartanī it becomes clear that the discussion revolves around a foundational metaphysical deliberation regarding the reality or unreality of svabhāva. In this dispute, Nāgārjuna fails to answer the most crucial point raised by his opponent-what is that he defines as empty?
Volume-VII, Issue-III The concept of 'Meaning'-A study based on Vakyapadiya
Pratidhwani, the echo, 2019
'What is meaning'? This is a topic of interest for linguists, philosophers, Computational linguists and those who deal with NLP, Artificial Intelligence etc. How does a Natural language convey efficiently the ideas from speaker to listener? This topic is studied here, based on the discussions available in Vakyapadiya, an ancient Sanskrit text. In modern linguistics 'word meanings' are analyzed often and the most famous theories are 'Referential theory, Ideational theory and truth-value theory. A very significant theory suggested by Vakyapadiya in this regard is the 'Akhandavakya sidhanta'-the sentence is the unit of language, and sentential meaning happens as a flash of understanding in the mind.
Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2018
To what degree is ordinary conscious experience shaped and mediated by linguistic and conceptual factors? How does this mediation influence human functioning? This article attempts to reconstruct impressive, but unsystematically presented early Buddhist ideas regarding these matters. It takes as its starting point the paradoxical statement in the Rohitassa Sutta concerning the world found in the body endowed with apperception (sasaññimhi) and mind (samanake). The first part of the article examines the early Buddhist concept of apperception (saññā). Particular attention is given to its connection with language, and to the way it contributes to arising of the notion of Self (attā) as " being " (satto), speaker (vado) and experiencer (vedeyyo). In order better to make sense of these ideas, the article employs a cross-cultural interdisciplinary approach, drawing from what appear to be analogous ideas in Western philosophy of language and cognitive science. The article also discusses the relation of the five khandha-s to the individual who takes them to be " Self " and the issues of agency and subjectivity. The early Buddhist ideas explored in this article constitute a conceptual framework necessary for making sense of several key meditative and soteriological concepts. Detailed discussion of these concepts will be taken up in a future paper.