Brexit: imperialist Britain faces existential crisis (original) (raw)

Brexit and Remain: A Pox on All Their Houses

A crisis is always good for humour and the English satirical magazine, Private Eye, caught the spirit of uncertainty and the possible tragedy of Brexit – that many of those who voted for it may have intensified their abjection as a result. One spoof comment for The Daily Turkeygraph (sic. A composite of the conservative Daily Mail and Telegraph papers) written by Jeremy Paxo (a reference to the news commentator Jeremy Paxman, also a brand of stuffing mix) was headlined TURKEYS VOTE FOR CHRISTMAS IN REFERENDUM CLIFFHANGER. Another for The Indepandent (sic, The Independent, a liberal/conservative paper) headlined BRITAIN VOTES TO LEAVE FRYING PAN AND JUMP INTO FIRE. Karl Marx might have made much of Brexit and the tragedy and farce of its still unfolding events. Indeed, for many commentators it fits into a global pattern echoing, in some of its key respects, what is happening elsewhere in this era of globalization. In other words Brexit is one act in a global theatre of the absurd that receives enthusiastic applause in some quarters and cries of grim foreboding in others. The characters of its play share qualities with others elsewhere as does its narrative. In combination Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage bear comparison with Donald Trump whose opponent, Hillary Clinton, increasingly parallels the establishment-saving direction of the Tory shape change from David Cameron to Theresa May, perhaps the shadow of Margaret Thatcher in more patronizing and empathetic gloss. The plot line – virtually Shakespearian in proportion as many comment – is of ruling elites (the Establishment) in crisis. The Brexit/Remain fight begins as a struggle for control of the executive machinery of state within bourgeois fractions of the Tory right. This was/is mirrored in similar in-fighting and back-stabbing among bourgeois factions of the Labour Party. The struggles as a whole developed in an effort to win the support of the general population of cross-cutting and opposed class interest, especially of the economically and occupationally vulnerable, most significantly, those in the de-industrialized areas extending from the Midlands into the North of England. This, indeed, echoes in certain broad structural respects, what Marx wrote regarding the events post 1848 leading to Louis Napoleon's dictatorial counter coup in which alliances and commitments, made by elements of the bourgeoisie with the relatively excluded and the exploited (farmers, peasants and urban proletariat) in France at the time, were broken and oppressive forces at the root of the problems extended their sway. The farcical tragedy of Louis Napoleon occurred in the early stages of the formation of the nation state and one kind of democratic parliamentary system in the making. Its flaws were exposed in its bourgeois subversion. Brexit's farcical tragedy and the events reverberating from it are one further instance of the crisis of the nation-state and of its democratic claims at a moment very probably at the end of its cycle and the emergence of new assemblages of the political on the ever transforming or transmutational bed of capital.

The organic crisis of the British state: Putting Brexit in its place

The Brexit vote was a singular event that is one symptom of a continuing organic crisis of the British state and society and a stimulus for further struggles over the future of the United Kingdom and its place in Europe and the wider world. This crisis previously enabled the rise of Thatcherism as a neoliberal and neoconservative project (with New Labour as its left wing) with an authoritarian populist appeal and authoritarian statist tendencies that persisted under the Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition (2010 – 2015). The 2015 election of a Conservative Government, which aimed to revive the Thatcherite project and entrench austerity, was the immediate context for the tragi-comedy of errors played out in the referendum. The ensuing politics and policy issues could promote the disintegration of the UK and, perhaps, the EU without delivering greater political sovereignty or a more secure and non-balkanized place for British economic space in the world market.

Brexit and the Reshaping of British Electoral Politics

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2019

Brexit and the Reshaping of British Electoral Politics In April 2017 Prime Minister Teresa May announced an early general election in the expectation of achieving an increased majority to strengthen her hand in Brexit negotiations, and to provide a mandate for the government's Brexit strategy. The outcome was quite the opposite, with the Conservatives losing their overall majority (despite winning 42.4 per cent of the vote) and relying on a confidence and supply arrangement with the DUP in order to govern. Labour's revival under Jeremy Corbyn, which deprived the Conservatives of their anticipated majority, helped produce the highest two-party share since 1970. Moreover, not only did we see a return to 'two-party politics' , but a restructuring of the basis of this two-party support. To give just two examples: in 2017 Kensington-the most affluent constituency in the country and one of the most cosmopolitan-fell to Labour for the first time ever; while Stoke-on-Trent South, a poor working-class area in a struggling former industrial city, went from Labour to the Conservatives-again for the first time ever. Within two years of the 2015 Election we had seen the political map of Britain redrawn. In this chapter we show that the shock that led to these changes was the outcome of the 2016 referendum on Britain's membership of the EU. The EU referendum resulted in strategic decisions by political parties that brought about substantial changes in the alignment of party voting. Electoral competition between the two main parties, dominated ideologically since the Second World War by concerns relating to redistribution, taxation, and the free market versus social protection, now also focused on the EU, immigration, and liberal-authoritarian values. For the first time in modern history, economic left-right competition between Labour and the Conservatives was accompanied by a commensurate emphasis on a second cultural, or social, dimension of politics. As a consequence of this transition in the links between voters' attitudes and their choice between Labour and the Conservatives, we also saw the rising im portance of two key social bases of politics: education and age. This saw Labour become the party of the younger and more highly educated voter, and Conservatives the party of older voters and those without such qualifications.

Brexit as a Cause and a Consequence of Political Change in the UK

It is difficult to overstate the impact that the 2016 decision by the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) has and will have on the country’s politics and society. The referendum held that year became an opportunity for the crystallisation of various discontents and disaffections—not all of them directly linked to the EU itself—and opened up a substantial rupture within the underlying assumptions of British statecraft. In particular, the self-image of British politics as being driven by pragmatism has hindered—and will continue to hinder—the ability of politicians and society to work a way through these challenges.

Introduction: British Politics in Turbulent Times

The Changing Shape of Politics, 2018

The chapter compares British politics today with the early 1970s. I argue that politics is very different today both because the main political parties are now much less rooted in social class than previously and because of a radical change in the party system in Scotland. The chapter also suggests that in 2017 the Conservatives drew from older, less well-educated voters who voted to leave the European Union, while Labour gained support from younger, better-educated, “remain” voters, bucking the earlier trend whereby Labour drew from the working classes and the Conservatives won the vote of most educated middle class professionals. I suggest that political competition is developing into a struggle between “open” and “closed” political viewpoints rather than one between “left” and “right” in the economic sense. I point to changing patterns of political competition in continental Europe, which also reveals this new trend.

Britain, Brexit and Euroscepticism

Anthropological Journal of European Cultures, 2021

When history books about Brexit are written a key question asked will be ‘how did it happen?’ How did a country renowned for stable governments, pragmatism and diplomacy produce a chaotic outcome so harmful to its economic interests and international standing? This article examines the factors that produced Brexit by analysing its political and historical context, the main campaign groups and their communication strategies. Drawing on the work of Verdery (1999), Maskovsky and Bjork-James (2020) and other anthropologists, I suggest we need to look beyond conventional political science concepts and consider Brexit in terms of ‘enchantment’, ‘angry politics’ and ‘technopopulism’. I conclude that while Brexit provides a window for analysing fault lines in contemporary Britain, it also highlights problems in the EU, its austerity politics and democratic deficit.

A CATHARSIS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE: POST BREXIT

Marmara Journal of European Studies, 26(1), pp143-169, 2018

This paper provides a critical theoretical review of the political factors, which significantly influenced the June 2016 Brexit decision to leave the European Union (EU). This paper also provides a critical investigation of the likely impact of Brexit on certain social, political and economic aspects of the UK landscape. To this end the paper also analyses the effect EU policies on the economy, migration, sovereignty and democracy had on Brexit views. During the 2014 European Parliament elections, the UK Conservative Party haemorrhaged electoral support to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). During the 2016 Brexit Referendum campaign, the ruling elite had an unfounded expectation that UK citizens would vote to remain in the EU. Under the policy vacuum of no change, the political mantra of UKIP became appealing to an increasing majority in the UK. The failure to ensure that UK citizens were informed of the finalised EU-UK Brexit deal before the referendum took place (as indicated in David Cameron's 2013 Bloomberg speech) will prove to be telling. By August 2018, the rationale that a second referendum should be held was overwhelming. The UK population will experience many of the significant elements of the political threats, which were made during 'project fear'. The reality of post Brexit for many UK people will be quite different to the panacea they envisaged.