Epictetus on what is in our power: modal versus epistemic conceptions (original) (raw)
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The question of the Freedom of Will in Epictetus
2009
Stoic philosophers had to face the accusation of incoherence, self-contradiction and Paradoxes since ancient times. Plutarch in his Moralia writes against them; Cicero devotes a separate work on stoic paradoxes (Paradoxa stoicorum). Even in contemporary Literature there are still discussions on the possibility of such an incoherence and existence of paradoxes in the stoic theory. At first glance, stoic Cosmology gives the impression to both (paradoxically) accept a kind of Determinism, and at the same time it undoubtedly argues for the moral agent’s freedom of the Will. In pre-stoic or even other contemporary to Stoicism Philosophical Traditions, the definitions that these two terms/concepts are given, fairly accuse as incoherent any Theory that does not set them as “contraries”. Under these types of accusations, the stoic Cosmology and Theory of the Freedom of the Will is often to be included. This phenomenal self-contradiction inside the Principles of Stoicism becomes even more ob...
Necessity, Possibility, and Determinism in Stoic Thought
Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap, 2016
At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a posteriori, a world order according to certain metaphysical principles and natures that god crafts within the constraints of matter. Finally, what is providentially necessary is what occurs according to the chain of fate, but only once it is in process or past. The method of the paper is a close reading of Diogenes Laertius 7.75, adducing broad textual evidence along the way, to show that the Stoic theory of modality embraces Philonian possibility, both that which is capable of being true as a matter of logical consistency, and that which is possible according to the bare fitness of the entity. What differentiates the Stoics from Philo is their additional commitment to possibility as opportunity, resisting the collapse of determinism into necessity.
The Will and its Freedom: Epictetus and Simplicius on what is up to us
The notion of a free will is a notion we have inherited from antiquity. It was first in antiquity that one came to think of human beings as having a free will. But, as with so many other notions we have inherited from antiquity, … we have to ask ourselves whether the notion of a free will has not outlived its usefulness, has not become a burden rather than of any real help in understanding ourselves and what we do." 1 I
Epictetus: Discourses, Fragments, Handbook, newly translated by Robin Hard and commented by Christopher Gill, is the newest English rendering of the famous Stoic. This Oxford World's Classic version is based on the 1925 Oldfather Loeb Greek text and not a revision of any English edition. Overall, Oxford World's Classics' recent English offering of Epictetus' corpus is a tastefully thorough rendition of the Imperial Roman philosopher's contribution to classical culture. This book could appropriately find itself into an undergraduate survey of ancient philosophy, a Roman culture course, or even onto an aspiring graduate student's bookshelf as an introduction to one of the big names of antiquity.
REASON, EDUCATION AND LACK OF FEAR IN EPICTETUS' DISCOURSES
In the present paper, I argue that the Stoic view of the world, based on reason (λόγος) and providence (πρόνοια) – which complement each other – had a massive influence on Epictetus' conception of fear. Thus, fear is generally treated in his works as one of the most common manifestations of errors in logic. Fear without an explicitly named agent, fear of the decay of the body or diseases, of the tyrant or the loss of property and means, as well as fear with respect to family, or friends, and especially regarding one's own death can be reduced to the lack of adequate knowledge that ultimately leads to errors of judgment.
Epicurus, determinism and the security of knowledge
"The article criticises various interpretations of Epicurus's claim that belief in determinism is self-invalidating: - 'The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticise one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity, for he admits that this too happens of necessity.' - especially Ted Honderich's argument that the real force of the Epicurean claim is that if belief acquisition is causally necessitated, we will be excluded from possible facts and inquiries that might have produced new knowledge and might have shown some of what we take to be knowledge to be false. Honderich's argument fails to consider that undetermined inquirers might fail to make discoveries that determined inquirers could not fail to make. Determinism would not, therefore, put us in a worse position as seekers of knowledge than indeterminism."
The Internal / External Distinction in Stoic Modality
In this paper, I shall offer some speculations about the Stoics' conception of modality. The Stoics' definitions of the key modal notions of necessity and possibility (etc.) all involve a distinction between the factors that are internal, and the factors that are external, to the proposition in question – where, crucially, the location of this boundary between what is “internal” and what is “external” can vary from one proposition to another. As I shall argue, given some further assumptions that the Stoics most likely would have accepted, this feature of these definitions leads directly to the failure of the K principle of modal logic. Furthermore, this argument for the failure of the K principle makes it clear that the K principle fails in exactly the cases in which it needs to fail if we are to respond to Diodorus Cronus' Master Argument by rejecting the principle. Very tentatively, I suggest that some Stoics - possibly including the greatest Stoic logician, Chrysippus - may have been aware of this feature of their view.