What Kind of Souls Did Proclus Discover? // Platonism and its Legacy. Ed. by J. Finamore and T. Nejeschleba. The Prometheus Trust. 2019. P. 101-120 (original) (raw)

“The Intelligible Gods in the Platonic Theology of Proclus,” Méthexis, Vol. 21, 2008, pp. 131-143.

Méthexis: International Journal for Ancient Philosophy, 2008

The Platonic Theology is the culminating work of Proclus' long career and one of the defining works of late antiquity, but it has had few modern philosophical admirers. The exception, and an important one, is Hegel, who clearly drew inspiration from the Platonic Theology for his Science of Logic, and who draws his admiring account of Proclus in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy largely from his reading of this work. Nevertheless, the Platonic Theology has received far less attention from philosophers than it might have. A key reason for this neglect, I suggest, has been the inability to perceive in the procession of the divine orders as presented in the Platonic Theology a unifying logic akin to that in the Science of Logic. Such is the judgment of Hegel himself, who, despite his overall high praise of Proclus in the Lectures, characterizes the dialectic of the Platonic Theology as "external".

The metaphysical "monistic" approach of the Platonic Timaeus by the Neo-Platonist Proclus

Journal of Ancient Philosophy 14/1 (2020), 116-160.

In this article, we focus on Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (30a.3-6) about how the divine Demiurge intervenes in matter. It is an interesting extract due to the fact that Proclus manages to combine philosophical perspective with theological interpretation and scientific analysis. In the six chapters of the article, we present the theory on dualism established by the representatives of Middle Platonism, we approach the question of the production of the corporeal hypostases, we examine limit and unlimited as productive powers, we explain production in the sense of co-production as well as why matter without qualities is excluded from the entire procedure, and we discuss the principle of the supremacy of the supreme Principle. The most important conclusion drawn according to Proclus, who adopts moderate skepticism, is that, although in his early dialogues Plato tends to dualism, he does this for methodological purposes, for Plato’s views are actually connected with ontological monism.

Hermias on the Vehicle of the Soul Platonic Interpretations: Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies

Platonic Interpretations, 2019

This paper examines Hermias’ doctrine of the vehicle of the soul to determine whether or not it is the same doctrine as that endorsed by Proclus and his teacher Syrianus. It is discovered that Hermias, like Proclus and Syrianus, believes that human beings have three levels of bodies: an immortal, ethereal vehicle, which houses the pinnacles (ἀκρότητες) of the soul’s irrational faculties; a pneumatic vehicle, which has those faculties in a more expansive form (as it were, the pre-existing traces of the faculties); and the corporeal body, in which the irrational faculties are operative. Hermias’ doctrine therefore is that of Proclus and Syrianus, as further evidence from Hermias’ discussion of the bodies of the daemons verifies.

The Platonic Sources of Berthold of Moosburg’s Science of the Soul: Proclus, Nemesius, and Macrobius, in: New Perspectives on the Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. Sources and Doctrines, Roma, Aracne, 2021, 151-201

Alia subinde ex eodem uerbo persuadendi calumnia nascitur, inuenta sane a Platone tractata multim in Gorgia, sed posthac multo inpudentius a quibusdam technicis, obtrectatoribus Hermagorae, frequentata.

The Platonic Soul, from the Early Academy to the First Centuryce

Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 2020

For the modern reader, Timaeus 35a counts among the more abstruse passages in Plato's dialogues. But for ancient Platonists, too, it was considered to be obscure, yet also exerted an enduring fascination and was believed to contain the key to understanding Plato's concept of the soul. It indeed provides a technical description of the composition and nature of the world soul and can therefore be used better to understand the (rational) human soul, which was held to be structured analogously. Plutarch of Chaeronea is the author of an exegetical work dedicated to this passage. 2 Even though it is the oldest extensive treatment to have come down to us, there is strong evidence, as I hope to show, for an older exegetical tradition, going back to debates in the Early Academy. This exegetical tradition may not have been continuous, but there are traces of it even in the Hellenistic era. In this contribution I offer a reconstruction of the tradition preceding Plutarch. 3 Not only will this allow us a better understanding of Plutarch's own project, but it will also shed some light on some relatively unknown chapters in the history of the interpretation of Plato and on some other issues that are better known, but not fully understood, as for instance Xenocrates' and Speusippus' definitions of the soul. As Plutarch reads the passage, Plato specifies four 4 'ingredients' or constituents: (a) 'indivisible and always changeless being' (short: Indivisible Being); (b) '[being] that becomes divisible in the presence of'-or 'around'-bodies' or also 'divisible [being] belonging to bodies' 5 (ἡ περὶ τὰ σώµατα γιγνοµένη µεριστή [οὐσία]-short, but less accurate: 'Divisible Being'); 1 I would like to thank the participants of the Symposium Hellenisticum for their helpful questions and observations, and especially Brad Inwood, David Sedley, James Warren and the anonymous referees for their written remarks, from which I have greatly benefited. I further thank Emidio Spinelli, Francesco Verde, Riccardo Chiaradonna, Thomas Johansen, Eyjólfur Emilsson, and the members of the Centre Léon Robin for their comments. 2 More precisely to the consecutive passages Tim. 35a1-b4 and 35b4-36b5. 3 Some later interpretations are examined in Phillips (2002). 4 See also Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 3.189.

The Soul and the Celestial Afterlife in Greek Philosophy before Plato

The Soul and the Celestial Afterlife in Greek Philosophy before Plato, 2021

One might also want to inquire on what account the soul up in the air is better off and more immortal (ἀθανατωτέρα) than that in living creatures. Aristotle De Anima A 5, 411a11-13 1.1 The Soul and the Celestial Afterlife This study is an investigation into the soul and the celestial afterlife in Greek philosophy before Plato. 1 My main thesis is that the concept of a celestial afterlife did indeed exist before Plato in the philosophical tradition, and I hope to prove it by offering some specifics. At the same time, study of the celestial afterlife throws new light upon different, often competing early Greek philosophical conceptions of the soul, salvation, and immortality. A better grasp of this diversity of views will be my second and related objective. We can begin with a few initial clarifications. In its historic setting, the celestial afterlife seems to presuppose two connected notions. The first is survival of the soul, the notion that some sentient part of us continues to exist after death. The second is the idea that at death this surviving soul goes up, instead of down. Of the two, only the second is new. All souls go to Hades in the Iliad, while Hesiod and the poet of the Odyssey are only slightly more relaxed, allowing a select few to emigrate to Elysium or the Isles of 14 simon trépanier