Nature, spirit and second nature: Hegel and McDowell (original) (raw)
Related papers
Nature, Spirit, and Revolution: Situating Hegel's Philosophy of Nature
Comparative and Continental Philosophy, 2016
This paper brings together several anthropological and nature-philosophical themes in Hegel in order to re-examine the place of the philosophy of nature in the Encyclopedia. By taking Hegel’s anthropology as a starting point, I argue that his philosophy of nature has for its subject not nature “as such,” but nature as cognized by Geist, so that the identity of these two natures is only constructed by spirit itself retroactively. I trace the origin of this difference to the revolutionary event that institutes Hegel’s anthropology – which is not a transition from nature to spirit, but a pure break or new beginning, culminating in the creation of the conceptual world of nature as “we” (philosophers of nature) know it. As a result, the philosophy of nature does not precede, but follows from, the anthropology and the philosophy of spirit; the natural foundation is retroactively replaced by the philosopher with the anthropological one.
1.State of the matter and research trends on Hegel's conception of nature; 2. Focus on some issues at stake in the transition from nature to spirit in Hegel's Encyclopaedia 3. Reassessment of the transition-problem: a) The Idea as being and its phenomenological justification; b) negative and positive significance of nature; c) The path of return of nature to spirit: the philosophy of nature's emancipation from externality. Conclusion with a series of systematic remarks
Hegel on Nature and Spirit: Some Systematic Remarks
2012
- Status quaestionis and research trends: a brief survey; 2) Issues at stakes in the transition from Nature to Spirit: a brief historical survey and some introductory remarks; 3) Contribution to the discussion: A. The Idea as being and its phenomenological justification; B. Negativity and positivity of Nature C. The path of return of nature to spirit: the philosophy of nature\u2019s emancipation from externality; 4) The Transition to Spirit; 5) Final systematic remarks on the relation between Nature and Spiri
The Transition from Nature to Spirit in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy
In this paper I show that Hegel's reading of the beginnings of the history of philosophy reflects his philosophical account of the transition from nature to 'spirit,' as that is found in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. I give an account of how Hegel sees the birth of philosophical thought itself as a kind of break from nature. This break from nature is gradual and begins with Thales who, despite giving an account of reality through water, a natural element, is already seen as offering a philosophical principle; water is not merely an empirical, natural entity in Thales' claim. The gradual break from nature continues with Anaxagoras whose philosophical principle becomes mind itself, as well as with the Sophists and their reasons-based explanations. Hegel identifies the real break of 'spirit' with nature in an episode in Plato's Phaedo. However Hegel sees this break of spirit from nature as causing a problem akin to one that John McDowell identifies, namely the difficulty of seeing how the space of reasons relate to nature. I conclude with Hegel's solution to the break between nature and spirit, their unification under the 'Idea,' and so the end of the history of philosophy.
There may be no theme that has a more consistent presence in Hegel's writings than that of overcoming rigid conceptual dichotomies inimical for grasping the dynamic unity of what there is. One of the central dichotomies Hegel struggled with in his own thinking was the one between "nature and spirit". As to posterity, mentioning this dichotomy for an English speaking audience in these terms for a long time either bordered on the incomprehensible or aroused associations of pompous and irresponsible metaphysical adventure. Associations of "spirit" with transcendent theological entities or something ethereal floating around overhead largely blocked even attempts to thematize the question of what for Hegel might have been involved in this dichotomy and its overcoming.
Hegel's Philosophy of Nature of 1805-06; Its Relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit
Cosmos and History: A Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2013
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) was the introduction and first part of the Jena System III; it was to introduce the other parts of his project. Most commentators on Hegel’s Phenomenology, however, do not consider how the Phenomenology relates to the other parts, and some discount Hegel’s understanding and commitment to the natural philosophy of his day. This paper attempts to make the connection between the Phenomenology and the Natural Philosophy of 1805-6 explicit; to show where and how the connections are made; to identify how Hegel uses the natural sciences of his day in creating his system. By showing these relations we should recognize that his concept of Spirit is born within his natural philosophy. It is part of his cosmology.
Second Nature, Critical Theory and Hegel's Phenomenology
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase “second nature” in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures “natural consciousness,” “natural notion,” and “inorganic nature,” in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the “official” version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an “unofficial” version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a “second nature.”
Hegel on Human Ways of Considering Nature
Ethics in Progress, 2024
In this article I aim to show the limits of certain "ways of considering" nature, as well as the intrinsic contradictions in their modus operandi, following Hegel's analysis in the Introductions to the Encyclopaedic Naturphilosophie and the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature. After framing the problem within the broader theme - already explored in Jena - of the relationship between nature and spirit, I will show that both the practical and the theoretical, insofar as they are founded in an original separation between man and nature, result in a subjection of the natural being to man. In order for this to be redeemed from one-sided conduct towards it, it is necessary to access through living intuition a philosophical consideration – both of the living being and of nature as a whole –, the activity of which Hegel understands as a rediscovery of the rationality of nature and its "liberation”.
Hegel’s Naturalism, the Negative and the First Person Standpoint [Special Issue]
Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2019
In this paper I attempt to move the discussion of Hegel's naturalism past what I present as an impasse between the soft naturalist interpretation of Hegel's notion of Geist, in which Geist is continuous with nature, and the opposing claim that Geist is essentially normative and self-legislating. In order to do so I suggest we look to the question of value which underlies this dispute. While soft naturalists seek to make sense of value as arising from material nature, those who support the autonomy thesis propose that value is something inherent to human spiritual activity. Following McDowell's suggestion that value as neither inhering or supervening on nature, but is rather something we have been estranged from and hence something to be recovered, I suggested that we adopt the first person perspective as the starting point for an examination of the relation between nature and value. The first person perspective is to be understood as a position within value which imbues value to what it encounters and hence is a process of the reenchantment of nature. Seeing things from this perspective allows us to place the question of nature as external materiality (which both the soft naturalist and autonomy view seem to share) in its proper context as something which develops as the result of the self-unfolding activity of consciousness as it encounters nature as negativity. Understanding Geist in this way allows us to see value as inherent in nature.