Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture (original) (raw)

Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights

Current Legal Problems, 2012

Two important trends are discernible in the contemporary philosophy of human rights. According to foundationalism, human rights have importantly distinctive normative grounds as compared with other moral norms. An extreme version of foundationalism claims that human interests do not figure among the grounds of human rights; a more moderate version restricts the human interests that can ground human rights to a subset of that general class, eg basic needs or our interest in freedom. According to functionalism, it belongs to the essence of human rights that they play a certain political role or combination of such roles, eg operating as benchmarks for the legitimacy of states or triggers for intervention against states that violate them. This article presents a view of human rights that opposes both the foundationalist and the functionalist trends. Against foundationalism, it is argued that a plurality of normative values ground human rights; these values include not only the equal moral status of all human beings but also potentially all universal human interests. Against functionalism, it is argued that human rights are moral standards-moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their humanity-that may perform a plurality of political functions, but that none of these functions is definitive of their nature as human rights. The ensuing, doubly pluralistic, account of human rights is one that, it is claimed, both makes best sense of the contemporary human rights culture and reveals the strong continuities between that culture and the natural rights tradition.

The construction of human rights

Manchester University Press eBooks, 2010

The construction of human rights: dominant approaches 19 T he idea of human rights covers a complex and fragmentary terrain. As R. J. Vincent comments near the beginning of his work on human rights in international relations, 'human rights' is a readily used term that has become a 'staple of world politics', the meaning of which is by no means self-evident (1986: 7). After glossing the term as the 'idea that humans have rights' (1986: 7)-a deceptively simple approach-Vincent notes that this is a profoundly contested territory, philosophically as well as politically. This is not surprising, as notions of human rights draw indirectly or directly on some of our most deeply embedded presumptions and reference-points-for those of us in liberal democracies, particularly those cosmologies concerning the nature of the person and of political community. Questions about and concepts of the human as individual, of what is right, the state, justice, freedom, equality, and so on, flicker like a constellation of stars just off the edge of our fields of analysis-fading in and out, holding much, promising or claimed as anchorage, yet elusive and obscure. For many, the assertion of human rights has become a kind of repository of secular virtue-a declaration of the sacred in the absence of the divine. In the Western liberal democracies, human rights are claimed as political home or as a principal 'instrument of struggle' by the libertarian right, by liberals of various persuasions, by socialists who feel the traditional socialist agenda has been overtaken by events and by 'post-liberal democrats'. To declare in a debate that the matter at hand involves rights can be to 'trump' discussion, drawing the limits beyond which exchange may not go, in a way that Ronald Dworkin (1977, 1984) probably did not intend. The language of rights thus carries great power while being potentially deeply divided against itself. The purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to some of the orders of thought that dominate human rights promotion and shape the meaning of this powerful, complex and in some ways contradictory tool of rights and 'rights talk'. In particular, I want to underline the limitations of these orders of thought, the narrowness of some of their central categories and the disfiguring M. Anne Brown-9781526121110

The Philosophy of Human Rights

The course explores cutting-edge research on the history, nature, content, and justification of human rights. We begin by examining the origins of human rights, and current debates about how this bears on the way in which we should conceive of human rights. We then explore methodological issues in theorizing about human rights, and turn to core contemporary debates in the philosophy of human rights, concerning orthodox and political conceptions of human rights; the relationship between their status as moral and legal norms; the significance of the fact that human rights are rights; and the nature of human dignity, to which the major human rights declarations appeal. We also examine critical perspectives on the human rights movement.

Philosophical dimensions of human rights : some contemporary views

2012

List of contributors.- Acknowledgments.- Introduction Claudio Corradetti.- PART I Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Human Rights.- Chapter I Human Rights in History and Contemporary Practice: Source Materials for Philosophy Jeffrey Flynn.- Chapter II Philosophy and Human Rights: Contemporary Perspectives David Reidy.- Chapter III Reconsidering Realism on Rights William E. Scheuerman.- PART II The Validit-(ies) of Human Rights.- Chapter IV The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights Jurgen Habermas.- Chapter V The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification. A Reflexive Approach Rainer Forst.- Chapter VI Social Harm, Political Judgment, and the Pragmatics of Justification Albena Azmanova.- Chapter VII "It All Depends": The Universal and the Contingent in Human Rights Wojciech Sadurski.- Chapter VIII Tiny Sparks of Contingency. On the Aesthetics of Human Rights Giovanna Borradori.- Chapter IX The Idea of a Charter o...

The Origins and Framing of Human Rights

Discussions on human rights tend to be misleading because they lend themselves to taken for granted assumptions: all people are human, so, of course, everybody has human rights. Such assumptions project human rights as natural or even God given. Human rights are obvious because they are assumed to be natural and imply that human rights have always been in existence. If this supposedly obvious truism was an internalised consciousness among all people, the ongoing violations of human rights would not occur. In a sense, it could be argued that it is precisely the taken for granted assumptions about human rights that allow for human rights violations to continue. Notwithstanding, when violations, anomalies or stark aberrations of human rights occur, public awareness of the ongoing violations of human rights is raised. It is, thus, important to theoretically interrogate such taken for granted assumptions about human rights in order to substantially inform understandings and hopefully prevent further violations of human rights. At the same time, though, considerations of human rights also tend to be located within the discourses of legal theory, and political, moral and ethical philosophy, as will be shown in this chapter. In these ways, it is argued; human rights become perceived as related to matters of the law, and more about abstract and complex ideas about the nature and purposes of human life and forms of human development through political systems of government, rather than being about the daily and personal experiences of ordinary people. Whilst, human rights are matters of the law, tied integrally to political systems of government and deeply implicated in moral, political and ethical philosophy, human rights are also matters of the conditions of people's lives. Human rights are also about the ways in which people, on a daily basis, experience their humanity and their worlds.

Human Rights: Moral or Political?

Oxford University Press, 2018

Human rights have a rich life in the world around us. Political rhetoric pays tribute to them, or scorns them. Citizens and activists strive for them. The law enshrines them. And they live inside us too. For many of us, human rights form part of how we understand the world and what must (or must not) be done within it. The ubiquity of human rights raises questions for the philosopher. If we want to understand these rights, where do we look? As a set of moral norms, it is tempting to think they can be grasped strictly from the armchair, say, by appeal to moral intuition. But what, if anything, can that kind of inquiry tell us about the human rights of contemporary politics, law, and civil society ― that is, human rights as we ordinarily know them? This volume brings together a distinguished, interdisciplinary group of scholars to address philosophical questions raised by the many facets of human rights: moral, legal, political, and historical. Its original chapters, each accompanied by a critical commentary, explore topics including: the purpose and methods of a philosophical theory of human rights; the "Orthodox-Political" debate; the relevance of history to philosophy; the relationship between human rights morality and law; and the value of political critiques of human rights. --- A rich collection of focussed dialogues ― a provocative gift for teaching ― in which the lively ferment over human rights in recent years is deepened, often by becoming refreshingly interdisciplinary, and exciting new formulations are proposed by a diverse range of leading scholars. (Henry Shue, author of Basic Rights (1996)) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be the single most influential document of the twentieth century, but is also one of the most controversial. In Human Rights: Moral or Political? Adam Etinson has brought together more than 30 leading legal, political, historical and philosophical commentators on human rights to discuss one anothers claims. The authors range from those who see human rights as successors to natural rights, so as providing universal moral standards, to those who see human rights as positive legal and political instruments that are changing the international order... this collection is seriously and usefully critical not only on these fundamental issues, but also on knotty questions about specific rights, about principles of legal interpretation and about the limits of juridification. (Onora O'Neill, author of Justice Across Boundaries: Whose Obligations? (2016) and winner of the 2017 Berggruen Prize) This is an impressive collection of essays by outstanding human rights scholars from a variety of disciplines. It is certain to make a lasting impact on contemporary thinking about human rights. Taking off from the current debate on the proper status of human rights as "orthodox" or "political," the essays in this volume not only move this important debate forward but also enable a genuine dialogue across disciplines on fundamental philosophical, political and legal questions surrounding human rights and human rights practice. The collection thus excellently represents the depth and scope of engagement across disciplinary boundaries that understanding human rights in all their complexity requires. It will be mandatory reading for anyone interested in the past, present and future of human rights. (Cristina Lafont, author of Global Governance and Human Rights (2012)) Those of us whose work is focused on 'applied' human rights in law, politics, or ethics may nevertheless experience a need for fundamental reflection on the 'big' philosophical questions regarding human rights. Such craving can now be satisfied with a single book. With no less than 30 chapters and an unseen concentration of stars of the philosophical and other firmaments, it can also be read as a sample book, introducing readers to different ways of philosophical rights reasoning. The majority of the chapters engage in discussions at a very abstract or general level. While this may be off-putting to the practical-minded, it also guarantees relevance across the entire field of human rights scholarship, regardless of disciplines, jurisdictions and thematic specialisations. (Eva Brems, Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Gent)

The Concept of Rights in Contemporary Human Rights Discourse

Ratio Juris, 2010

In a variety of disciplines, there exists a consensus that human rights are individual claim rights that all human beings possess simply as a consequence of being human. That consensus seems to me to obscure the real character of the concept and hinder the progress of discussion. I contend that rather than thinking of human rights in the first instance as "claim rights" possessed by individuals, we should regard human rights as higher order norms that articulate standards of legitimacy for sociopolitical and legal institutions. Not the least of our difficulties when we think about rights is that, despite their ubiquity in our discourse, it is unclear just what a right is. (Weinreb 1992, 281) * I would like to thank Ana Vrdoljak, Gianluigi Palombella, and Nicholas White for helpful criticisms and comments. 1 As has become clear to me from our conversations, Palombella 2000 argues for an account of fundamental rights that is very similar to my account of human rights.

'Human Rights do not exist': thinking about and beyond the existence of human rights

Australian Journal of Human Rights, 2023

This article examines the critical positions taken by two prominent figures of the twentieth-century philosophical tradition, Panajotis Kondylis and Gilles Deleuze, regarding the existence of human rights. In their ways, both thinkers identify a problem with the (non)existence of human rights, particularly with human rights' invocation of universal or eternal values. According to Deleuze, this all-encompassing, universalist language of human rights promotes a problematic way of thinking that 'thinks' in abstraction. For Kondylis, human rights do not exist, as their universalist claims are a matter of political exploitation and/or conceptual confusion. By focusing on the interplay between nonexistence and 'sham' or 'abstract existence', this article aims to critically examine our ways of thinking, in terms of human rights or beyond them, and how such a problematisation may pave the way for further discussions regarding the (non)place of human rights in our contemporary and future state of affairs.

Reconstructing Human Rights: A Pragmatic and Pluralist Inquiry in Global Ethics

2016

'Now architect, now archaeologist, now a man whose hand is in the past. Somebody is made to face the changes; somebody is built to last. What do you know, still living so young? Tomorrow is no burden; time can be overcome.' -The Constantines, "Time Can Be Overcome" I am a human being. You are a human being. We are human. These simple propositions have become ethical claims of the highest order. They express expectations of recognition, concern and equality. Those expectations take social form as rights: rights that protect us from torture, from arbitrary imprisonment, from hunger and deprivation, which entitle us to standing within our communities, participation in politics, productive work, engagement in cultural life, privacy sufficient to live without undue interference and many other protections and privileges. In promising these protections and privileges human rights redefine political relationships by altering how we see ourselves and how we share our lives with others. Human rights are a transformative political idea, although one that many of us now take for granted. Yet, if we take the ethical value of human rights seriously then we need to recognise the profound claims they make along with the radical social changes they demand. Human rights assert that everyone (whether alone or in community with others) counts for something; that we are owed respect and voice whomever we are, irrespective of existing hierarchies of protection and privilege; and they assert that political authority is only legitimate when everyone counts. These profound claims force us to reconsider the known coordinates of social justice and in doing so upsets the given order. Human rights are disruptive.

THE MODERN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE: A construction that jeopardizes its own values and effectiveness

ANAIS SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 2017: Perspectivas das relações entre direito e sociedade em um sistema Social Global, 2017

In a world of political and economic instabilities, the role of human rights discourse should be seen as neutral, solid and coherent towards the preservation of the individuals' life and dignity. However, this article aims to promote a debate about the modern interpretation of what emerged as the man's natural law, and today is the foundation of a transnational and highly complex structure: the international humanitarian system. Through a critical literature review, this work combined arguments proposed by Habermas and Arendt, with the morphological structures of the state, rights of the man and sovereignty, and the Kantian view of cosmopolitanism. This article's main objective is to highlight discrepancies between the theory and practice of human rights discourse, demonstrating the dilemma of duality that abases this system's effectiveness. Yet, the present work found and sustains that human rights discourse may fail where it aims to universalise and promote civil rights as inherently human rights, which ultimately disregard sovereignty, people's self-determination and, in numerous cases, contributes to the destabilisation of institutions and international relations.