The Church, the Nation, and the State: The Serbian Orthodox Church After Communism (original) (raw)
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Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of 5 October 2000
Politics and Religion, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1, issue 2 , 2008
This study tackles the place and role of the Orthodox Church in Serbian society, state, and political life after October 5, 2000. Owing to its present “symphony” with the state, the church now offers a new ideological framework and value-system for state institutions such as the armed forces and public education. This new role of the church is particularly emphasized in the current legislation. One could probably refer to the “etatization” of the Serbian Church, with some negative consequences for non-traditional religious communities. The relations with the Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox churches have also been discussed in this context. In post-Milošević Serbia, religious rights and freedoms have been considerably extended, but there is still a great deal of arbitrariness, even completely partial interpretations of the church-state relations. In the concluding section, this article deals with the church's traditionalist perception of society as narod (the people), with some recommendations as for the possible cooperation between the church and civil society in Serbia.
Journal for The Study of Religions and Ideologies, 2018
With the aim of exploring in detail Serbia’s modern nation-building, this paper reveals and examines three stages in the relationship between the state and the Church. Their interaction was first observed in the late-1980s, when the Church leadership began to interfere in the state affairs, offering religious solutions to a wide range of national issues. Following the collapse of Serbian society during the 1990s, the Church has become an ideology supplement to the state-driven national project. As such, the Church was embraced by the state authorities, and after the fall of Milosevic in 2000, nationalism continued to exponentially increase in Serbia. Following the assassination of the Prime Minister Zoran Đinđic in 2003, the Church emerged as the key factor of nation building, thus substituting the disoriented state structures. A significant part of our conclusions are based on primary quantitative sources.
2020
The paper deals with the question of the dynamics of relations between the political power elite, the LGBT population and the Serbian Orthodox Church in the overall context of the Europeanization of Serbia. An insight is provided into the mechanism(s) through which the political elite in Serbia reproduces its dominant position. Serbian society is depicted as a captured one, and this is illustrated by empirical findings from a survey and in-depth interviews. This is followed by a focus on the political elite’s instrumentalization of the issue of sexual freedom in obtaining international support for maintenance of power through “tactical Europeanization”. After this the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church vis-a-vis the state and its alleged support for LGBT issues is considered. The Church seems to have “realized” that being silent on the LGBT issue is more profitable in a symbolic, as well as, in a material sense.
Serbian Orthodox Church: Between Traditionalism and Fundamentalism
Fundamentalism in the Modern World (vol. 1: Fundamentalism, Politics and History: The State, Globalization and Political Ideologies), ed. by Ulrika Mårtensson et al, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011
This chapter deals with the recent oscillations within the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) between traditionalism and fundamentalism. After the political changes in Serbia that took place in the aftermath of October 2000, SOC has assumed much more prominent political and religious roles in the Serbian society. The new “symphony” with the state has enabled the church to exert an unprecedented symbolical and normative influence, offering a new framework of ideology and values for the state institutions and public education system. This political and ideological shift, sometimes labeled as the process of clericalization, is very conservative in its character. On the one hand, it is founded on a vague concept of svetosavlje, the ideology of the leading SOC theologians since the mid-20th century. The projection of a golden medieval past, the “Kosovo testament” (cult of martyrdom), and the myth of St Sava - the greatest Serbian saint, resemble, to a certain extent, Sunni Salafism and the Shiite cult of Ali and the myth of Karbala, i.e. the historical defeat that turned into a “heavenly triumph”. On the other hand, the recent experience with the wars of the 1990s, an international isolation and the delayed process of accession to the EU, gave rise to a specific “Masada complex” and a self-righteous attitude with occasional messianic and eschatological overtones and ethno-nationalist references to territory and people (especially in the context of the Kosovo problem). Monoculturalism (accompanied by an “organic” view of the state, church and society) and the opposition to secularism, civil society, enlightenment, ecumenism and religious and social pluralism, are only some of the elements of this new religious-political agenda of SOC. The para-clerical organizations acting under the auspice of the SOC, and supported by its Information Service, openly advocate the formation of an “Orthodox public opinion.” Moreover, the program of de-secularization of the Serbian society has recently been announced from a high position in the church hierarchy. It seems as if this new political agenda has been based on religion, but its true aims are trans-religious: they tackle the future course of development of the Serbian society and hinder the process of democratization and accession to the EU. Such a shift to a monistic, archaic, “testamentary” pattern was probably best exemplified by the Draft of the National Program of the Serbian Youth for the 21st Century, proposed and adopted in 2004. Typologically, this recourse to traditionalism and conservatism within the SOC - largely embraced by the highest state officials and embedded in a joint religious-political concept of “conciliar unity” or sabornost – might also be observed in the context of religious fundamentalism. What we have in mind here, in the first place, are the following features: 1. The return to the fundamental principles, to the origin, or something that has been corrupted in the course of time. The SOC representatives, for example, often express their fear from the destruction of the “true faith” through their open resistance to secularization of the modern (Western) world. Instead of initiating a dialogue with that world, the SOC opts for an official condemnation of secularization. 2. Exclusiveness in interpretation: fundamentalism is against hermeneutic pluralism, because it leads, as it were, to cognitive and value relativism. Instead, fundamentalism prefers the dualistic, Manichean rhetoric (Us-Them, God-Satan, Friends-Foes). An essential feature of fundamentalism is its resistance to pluralism in interpretation, whereas its hermeneutic monism leads to sectarian exclusiveness. The rigid adherence to only one interpretation of a phenomenon may eventually turn a hermeneutic problem into a serious political or even military issue. Concerning the SOC, one could refer to its fear of re-interpretation of Christianity and ultimate “demise” of Orthodoxy in its encounter with the more pluralistic and ecumenical discourse and dialogue. 3. Resistance to (Western) secularization and the rejection of a secular world-view. The Enlightenment poses a special “threat” to any fundamentalism. Taking into account that the two greatest Serbian theologians, Nikolaj Velimirović and Justin Popović, held an unreservedly anti-Western position in their works, it would be worthwhile to explore the current stance of the Serbian theologians regarding Europe, European Union and the West in general, seen as the historical, political and religious-metaphysical Other. 4. Fundamentalism is often a product of the political, social and economic crisis, or a response to a crisis situation. In Serbia, such conditions were created after the assassination of the former PM Zoran Djindjić and the subsequent suspension of the reform and transition of the Serbian society. The SOC public discourse in this latest period has ranged from the scandalous speech at Djindjić’s funeral, to the direct public defense of the persons indicted of war crimes (in some clerical circles they are still glorified as patriots and heroes). 5. In an ideological sense, the fundamentalist ideas are directed against science and secular public education, although in practical terms fundamentalism often takes advantage of modern science and technology. Apart from the introduction of the confessional, denominational religious education in public schools in 2001, I will refer to some more recent tendencies of the SOC School of Theology to interfere with the plans and programs of other schools within the University of Belgrade. 6. The spirit of ecumenism, dialogue and tolerance is alien to fundamentalism and often its greatest opponent. One may include here the SOC reservation towards initiating a more productive dialogue and reconciliation with other religious communities in the Balkans within various ecumenical organizations and initiatives. Besides the general literature on fundamentalism, religion and globalization (e.g. Marty-Appleby, B. Parekh, O. Roy, P. Beyer, A. Meddeb, K. Kienzler, T. H. Eriksen et al.), the more specific sources for this study include the public statements of the SOC clergy, the theological works of Nikolaj Velimirovic, as well as the Orthodox youth organizations’ documents, their periodicals and internet presentations. The supporting documents also include the Law on the Churches and Religious Communities (2006), the statements of the Serbian Minister of Religious Affairs and statements of other conservative politicians. Keywords: Serbian Orthodox Church, ethno-nationalism, ideology, de-secularization, traditionalism, conservatism, sabornost, myth, testament, martyrdom, crisis, instrumentalism, civil society, public sphere
Istraživanja/Journal of Historical Researches, vol. 55, 2020, pp. 254-278, 2020
In this paper we will consider how, from the beginning to the end of the 1980s, the Serbian Orthodox Church gradually abandoned its restricted mode of public action and moved from an enclave form, with occasional elements of counterpublics, to a dominant public sphere. This process was the result of a complex set of phenomena that often overlapped. Pressure from authorities on religious communities and believers started to decline at the time despite restrictive legislation regarding public appearances by religious officials still being in force. This was followed by a pronounced deatheization of younger parts of the population and an expansion of various forms of secular religiosity (popular culture, sports), including hybrid types of postmodern spirituality within Yugoslav society. In such circumstances, religious communities were encouraged to expand the scope of their public activities, so they found new forms of communication and networking, both among believers and in various social circles. Our aim is to point to forms of public action cultivated at the time by the Church and the stages it underwent in its participation in the public sphere. Additionally, the factors that influenced a change in the Church's public and social position in the late 1980s will be discussed, along with the consequences caused in different areas of its functioning.