"Since 1898," "Little Boats" and "Sovereignty" (original) (raw)
An “Outlaw Ocean” or “Lawless” Space? Revisiting the High Seas Regime under (and after) UNCLOS 1982
Recent concern over criminality and perceived impunity at sea (including inter alia piracy, IUU fishing, environmental crime) has resulted in a popular image of the high seas as a lawless space. Whilst there is clearly a considerable body of law that actually applies to the high seas under UNCLOS 1982 and elsewhere, if we instead focus on the freedom of the seas (mare liberum) and its regulatory consequences as encoded and perpetuated through UNCLOS, especially through the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction (EFSJ), the imagery of lawlessness has a great deal more resonance. Nevertheless, in this chapter I show how the EFSJ principle is far more limited, both conceptually and practically, than is often presumed. Indeed, despite the evident disincentives to effective enforcement that it arguably creates, it still leaves a great deal of room for proactive legislative and policy measures from port, coastal and flag states alike.
In 1908–1909, maritime commerce, fishing and traffic in the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines almost came to a standstill due to a surge in piracy and coastal raids that challenged US colonial rule in the area. The leader of the outlaws was a renegade subject of the Sultan of Sulu, a Samal named Jikiri. Together with his followers, Jikiri was responsible for the murders of at least 40 people in numerous raids on small trading vessels, pearl fishers, coastal settlements and towns throughout the archipelago. In spite of the concerted efforts of the US Army, the Philippine Constabulary and private bounty hunters, Jikiri was able to avoid defeat for more than one and half years, before he was eventually killed in July 1909. His decision to take to piracy was triggered by the failure of the US authorities to pay compensation for the loss of the traditional claims that many families in the Sulu Archipelago had to the pearl beds of the region, as stipulated by a law on pearl fishing adopted in 1904. The law was in several respects disadvantageous to the native population of Sulu and this – together with the high-handed behaviour of the local officers in charge of the Sulu district from 1906 – fuelled widespread discontent with colonial rule and led several of the leading headmen of Sulu covertly to sympathize with, and protect, Jikiri and his followers. This sponsorship combined with the general reluctance of the population to cooperate with the US military explains why Jikiri was able to defy the vastly superior US forces for so long. American officers at the time tended to attribute the depredations to the allegedly piratical nature of the Sulus, but this article argues that the so-called 'decay theory', first proposed by Raffles a century earlier, is a more appropriate explanation of this surge in piracy.
In 1908–1909, maritime commerce, fishing and traffic in the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines almost came to a standstill due to a surge in piracy and coastal raids that challenged US colonial rule in the area. The leader of the outlaws was a renegade subject of the Sultan of Sulu, a Samal named Jikiri. Together with his followers, Jikiri was responsible for the murders of at least 40 people in numerous raids on small trading vessels, pearl fishers, coastal settlements and towns throughout the archipelago. In spite of the concerted efforts of the US Army, the Philippine Constabulary and private bounty hunters, Jikiri was able to avoid defeat for more than one and half years, before he was eventually killed in July 1909. His decision to take to piracy was triggered by the failure of the US authorities to pay compensation for the loss of the traditional claims that many families in the Sulu Archipelago had to the pearl beds of the region, as stipulated by a law on pearl fishing adopted in 1904. The law was in several respects disadvantageous to the native population of Sulu and this – together with the high-handed behaviour of the local officers in charge of the Sulu district from 1906 – fuelled widespread discontent with colonial rule and led several of the leading headmen of Sulu covertly to sympathize with, and protect, Jikiri and his followers. This sponsorship combined with the general reluctance of the population to cooperate with the US military explains why Jikiri was able to defy the vastly superior US forces for so long. American officers at the time tended to attribute the depredations to the allegedly piratical nature of the Sulus, but this article argues that the so-called 'decay theory', first proposed by Raffles a century earlier, is a more appropriate explanation of this surge in piracy.
Privateering, Colonialism and Empires On the Forgotten Origins of International Order
The Historicity of International Politics, 2023
This chapter discusses the historical practice of privateering, in particular its role in the making and breaking of empires. Focusing on privateering allows us to highlight both the persistence of past institutions and the extent to which the present breaks with the past. Privateering disrupts tidy dichotomies, such as between mediaeval and modern, public and private and state and empire. Today, privateering is most obviously present through its absence. The Treaty of Paris of 1856, which abolished privateering, helped normalizing the idea of a modern state with a monopoly on legitimate violence and the oceans as a global common under the control of benign hegemons. Ambiguities between private and public violence at sea were forgotten, as was the extensive ‘peripheral’ agency, obvious in how privateering was used time and again to oppose the leading powers of the day.
Trinidad and Tobago Review, 1997
This Independence Day, most people will not want to reflect on the triumph of the Nationalist movement as it defeated British Imperialism, but will rather be planning a pleasant day at the beach. Is this a problem? What does it mean? Are we ungrateful? Is Independence anything to celebrate? Reflecting on their own country’s experience, Michael Witter and Omar Davies (1989) have bemoaned that Jamaica is more dependent today than it was at the beginning of Independence. While I agree, I do not find it necessarily lamentable. For this situation is not particular to Jamaica, the Caribbean, or “the South”. It is the condition of the entire contemporary world. And while not all good, it is not all bad either. As Peter Drucker noted in 1986, all countries of the globe have become more dependent on the world economy -- including the United States, England and Japan. Not just our Nation-States, but all Nation-States are crumbling. A story on CNN (which I gladly receive through my cable subscription) related that a child was asked the question, “Do you know why we have a holiday on Independence Day?” The answer was given, “That’s the day we defeated the aliens.” Well. The idea that somehow we in the West Indies are more prone to forgetting our history than others, or that the Third World been spellbound into abandoning patriotism by cunning imperialist overlords is both inadequate and small-town. Our situation of weakened Nation-States and waning National sentiment is not the result of imperialist designs. It is the condition of the contemporary world. And not only is this true of economics. It is true of politics and culture as well. Farewell to age of the Nation and Independence.