Elemental Transformation in Aristotle: Three Dilemmas for the Traditional Account (original) (raw)

Things are the same as their “essences”? Notes on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z-6

Analytica, 2012

I discuss Aristotle’s views in Metaphysics VII.6 (Z.6) on the issue whether each thing is the same as its essence. I propose a deflationary interpretation according to which Z-6 develops a “logical approach” (logikos) in which “sameness” amounts only to coextensiveness between definiendum and definiens with no attention to more specific issues about ontological and explanatory features of definitions

The Unity of the Concept of Matter in Aristotle

The difficulties often attributed to prime matter hold for all hylomorphic accounts of substantial change. If the substratum of substantial change actually persists through the change, then such change is merely another kind of accidental change. If the substratum does not persist, then substantial change is merely creation ex nihilo. Either way matter is an empty concept, explaining nothing. This conclusion follows from Aristotle’s homoeomerity principle, and attempts to evade this conclusion by relaxing the constraints Aristotle imposes on elementhood, generation, and substrata all fail, and even the minimal constraints imposed by the Problem of Material Constitution are enough to generate the dilemma. Aristotle resolves this dilemma in Physics I.9 by postulating pure potentiality-for-substance as the substratum of substantial change. Because the substratum persists, substantial change is not creation ex nihilo, but because it does not persist actually it is not a kind of accidental change. Aristotle uses this approach to solve the Problem of the Mixt and the Problem of Material Constitution without weakening his constraints on elementhood, generation, or substrata. This pure potentiality approach must be carefully distinguished from other ‘traditional’ or ‘prime matter’ views that posit some actuality for the substratum of substantial change, and it is best understood in light of the analogy found at Metaphysics Θ.6. Pure potentiality-for-substance can do the work needed in a substratum for substantial change because Aristotle is able to ground the identity, existence, and characterization of the substratum in the corrupting and generating substances rather than the substratum itself.

The Underlying Argument of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.3

Phronesis, 2014

This paper argues that Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.3 deploys a reductio against the claim that ‘substances underlie by being the subjects of predication’, in order to demonstrate the need for a new explanation of how substances underlie. Z.13 and H.1 corroborate this reading: both allude to an argument originally contained in Z.3, but now lost from our text, that form, matter and compound ‘underlie’ in different ways. This helps explain some of Z’s peculiarities—and it avoids committing Aristotle to self-contradiction about whether matter is substance, a claim denied in the reductio but endorsed elsewhere.

Refining the material substance: Aristotle's program in Metaphysics H1-5

Síntesis. http://intuslegerefilosofia.uai.cl/index.php/intusfilosofia/issue/view/28, 2018

ABSTRACT In Metaph. Z17, Aristotle makes a fresh start (1041a6) in his discussion on substance. Accordingly, the substantial form is principle and cause (1041a6-10, 1041b8), whereas the matter is element (1041b31) of material substances. Besides, Aristotle assumes (probably without justifying in Z17) that material substances are unified wholes (1041b11-12). These are two main theses in Z17 whose apparent absence in the summary of H1 (1042a3-23) has raised doubts among commentators as to the very project of H -a book commonly held to be a bunch of notes on Z. Regarding H’s positive results, commentators mostly focus on the introduction of the modal vocabulary of potentiality and actuality -into which Z’s distinction between matter and form is translated. So they find book’s H proper contribution only in H6’s solution to the problem of unity (1045a23-25, 1045b18-19). As a consequence of this reading, H1-5 remain overshadowed by H6, and therefore they are often neglected. Contrarily to this still predominant trend towards not taking H1- 5 on their own, I will here try to show that these chapters develop a program, in which H6’s conclusion is properly prepared. Stations of this program are H2-3, where Aristotle justifies the priority of form, and then H4-5, where he does the same for the unity of material compounds. So, I aim to show that H1-5 are a centerpiece in the completion and fulfilment of Z17’s theory of material substance. Keywords: form; cause; unity; potentiality; actuality.

Aristotle's essences as subject and actuality

1984

How can a substance be conceived as the cause of its natter? ... 71. 73' ei 'dam is said «9 p(vrö ?".... " 136. 3. Are individual substances identical with their essences? 169 Footnotes 181 Bibliography 213 This notion is not easy to. understand. Part of the reason for this is that material and the laws which govern its behaviovras such are regarded both by us mode of connection, can form a part of the study of natural phenomena unless they can be viewed as necessary ex hypothesi. Aristotle would undoubtedly have been impressed by the development of modern physics, but he need not on this account have been tempted to change his view that substance is the cause of matter.

‘Eleatic Ontology and Aristotle: Introduction’ (Co-authored with Fabian Mie)

Peitho 12 (1): 13-17 , 2021

The introduction summarizes the six new papers collected in Volume 1, Tome 5: Eleatic Ontology and Aristotle. The papers take a fresh look at virtually every aspect of Aristotle’s engagement with Eleaticism. They are particularly concerned with Aristotle’s responses to Parmenidean monism, the Eleatic rejection of change, and Zeno’s paradoxes. The contributions also focus on the ways in which Aristotle developed several of his own theories in metaphysics and natural science partly in reaction to Eleatic puzzles and arguments.

Defining Material Substance: A reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics Z.10-11

Rhizomata, 2022

This paper presents a reading of Metaphysics Z.10-11 according to which both chapters outline two main definienda: forms and material substances or compounds, each of which is governed by its own peculiar constraints. Forms include formal parts alone; furthermore, they are the main definable items and enjoy the strictest possible unity. However, this does not preclude Aristotle from upgrading material compounds (whose essence is stated in hylomorphic terms) to the status of definable items in their own right. Z.10 explains this contention by making the compound's sensible functional matter dependent on its form. This dependence affords the resulting compound an unusually tight form-matter relationship, strong enough to ensure its definability, despite falling short of the highest kind of unity that only forms display.

Focal Dependence, Logical Priority and the Unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics

Kriterion-revista De Filosofia, 2021

A long-standing problem in Aristotelian scholarship concerns the question of how to reconcile Aristotle’s twofold description of metaphysics as ontology (the universal science of being qua being) and theology (the science of the changeless and separate substance). An important attempt to answer this question (advanced first by G. Patzig) consists in saying that the changeless and separate substance is focally prior to (or the focal meaning of) substance and therefore to being in general (since substance is focally prior to being in general). This article aims to refute this kind of approach to the problem of the unity of Aristotle’s metaphysics by arguing that (i) relations of focal meaning entail the logical (definitional) priority of the prior items over the dependent items standing in such relations; (ii) the changeless and separate substance is not logically prior to the other types of substances distinguished by Aristotle; and, therefore, (iii) the changeless and separate subst...

Aristotle's 'So-Called Elements'

Aristotle's use of the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα is usually taken as evidence that he does not really think that the things to which this phrase refers, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, are genuine elements. In this paper I question the linguistic and textual grounds for taking the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα in this way. I offer a detailed examination of the significance of the phrase, and in particular I compare Aristotle's general use of the Greek participle καλούμενος (-η, -ον) in other contexts. I conclude that his use of the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα does not carry ironical or sceptical connotations, and that it ought to be understood as a neutral report of a contemporary opinion that the elements of bodies are fire, air, water, and earth. I leave aside the question as to whether or not Aristotle himself endorses this opinion.