Deep Uncertainties in the Criteria for Physician Aid-in-Dying for Psychiatric Patients (original) (raw)
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This commentary explores the complexities surrounding physician aid in dying (PAD) for psychiatric patients, highlighting the deep uncertainties associated with diagnostic, motivational, and existential factors. The authors critique prior work by Kious and Battin, arguing that due to the nuanced nature of mental illness, establishing objective criteria for suffering and assessing when PAD is appropriate is significantly more challenging than suggested. The commentary emphasizes that the limitations inherent in psychiatric diagnoses, characterized by a reliance on subjective assessments, complicate the decision-making process regarding PAD.
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American Journal of Bioethics , 2019
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The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 2020
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