Foreign Mercenaries, Irregulars and ‘Volunteers’: NonRussians in Russia’s Wars (original) (raw)

Executive Summary  The outbreak of instability in southeastern Ukraine witnessed Russia’s increasing reliance on ethnically non-Russian people. Among these, the most important groups included ethnic Serbs (this group primarily participated in hostilities in Donbas); Eastern Slavs (Ukrainians and Belarusians, whose participation, especially the former, went well beyond the postSoviet area, such as serving in Syria and Sudan); Muslims and other non-Russian nationalities of the Russian Federation (as well as non-Muslim populations of the South Caucasus), and Western Europeans (primarily French, Spaniards and Italian nationals).  In relying on ethnically non-Russian people for (para)military functions, Russia de facto resumed policies implemented or maintained by previous political regimes (the Soviets and to a greater extent, Tsarist Russia), signifying continuity and tradition in its approach.  Different groups of non-Russian peoples employed after 2014 have performed different functions, ranging from information-propaganda (primarily ascribed to fighters coming from the European Union) as a means to demonstrate to the Western world the “righteousness” of the Russian cause in Ukraine, to (para)military (a.k.a. mercenary) functions. As such, non-Russian mercenaries and “volunteers” in Russia’s shadow wars have served as both a tool of “soft power” and an actual instrument of “hard power” politics.  The employment of non-Russian fighters fulfilled Moscow’s foreign policy objectives. The involvement of foreign fighters—whom the Russian side presented as “volunteers” concerned about “the fate of Russian speakers in Ukraine”—played into Moscow’s narrative that Russia is ready to stand up for its compatriots abroad.  The involvement of non-Russian fighters in various shadow conflicts also assisted Moscow domestically, in strengthening certain minority groups’ (such as Chechens, Buryats and Kalmyks) loyalty or connection to the Russian state.  In the future (with Russia expanding its outreach to other regions outside the former Soviet space), the share and scope of involvement of non-Russian people in conflicts/zones of instability on behalf of Moscow can be expected to grow. One specific area of concern is the Balkan region. Evidence for this could already be seen in Moscow’s role in the unsuccessful coup in Montenegro (2016), the active participation of Serbian mercenaries in the Donbas conflict, as well as the training of Serbian youth by members of Russian private military company E.N.O.T. Considering this trend, pro-Russian and Moscowbacked forces in the Balkans may increasingly seek to destabilize the region with the help of irregular militarized forces.  When seeking to involve foreign militants (especially from Western Europe), Russia primarily appeals to radical forces (utilizing ideologies of xenophobia and ultraconservatism). The actual impact of this approach on Europe has been relatively limited to date. However, it represents a potentially dangerous long-term trend, given the rise of nationalism and political extremism in many EU countries.