Türk Dış Politikasında Tez Canlılık Sorunu (original) (raw)

2019, Ortadoğu Etütleri - Middle Eastern Studies

IMPETUOSITY PROBLEM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY “Impetuosity” is a term used for hasty people who act with their feelings rather than logic. Although some people are more likely to have this characteristic, it is possible for any person to be restless under the influence of various factors. In general, it is probable that the person who acts restlessly supposes to make a quick and sensible decision, but there is a miscalculation in his or her logic. Factors such as an inability to correctly interpret human relationships, being reactive, and believing quickly can be effective in the emergence of this feature. States are, from time to time, impetuous in their foreign policies as well. Therefore, impetuosity stands out as an exceptional case against the assumption that states behave rationally in international relations, which is a generally accepted thinking by many of the approaches in the discipline of International Relations. Nevertheless, impetuosity can often be experienced in the foreign policies of several states. For instance, it is highly probable that states that show an emotional and impulsive reaction to international developments, respond to a threat directed against them immoderately, cannot accurately interpret the message of friendship from another state, and adopt a policy even without calculating the motives of their interlocutors. As can be understood from these examples, the potential of showing a sign of impetuosity is higher for states that cannot read international relations correctly, the diplomatic tradition of which is not mature enough or the foreign bureaucracy of which have problems. In this research, Turkey’s impetuous decisions can be evidently seen in its foreign policy steps, especially towards the Middle East, which since the early Cold War years are problematized. As a country with a state tradition and, thus, diplomatic tradition from far in the past, Turkey’s impetuous attitude resulted from the fact that it pursued Western-oriented policies. Due to the Soviet threat that it felt very closely in the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey approached the U.S. and Western countries, struggled to be a part of the NATO alliance, and these are very rational steps. However, assigning meanings to this alliance on the ground of the Western identity as a result of the modernization process led Turkey to misinterpret the international system and the motives its interlocutors had and acted with. The Turkish perception that the Soviet policies constituted major threats to Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and the Balkans in the 1950s and the role Turkey assumed in the region as if it was the representative of the West prompted Turkey to show signs of impetuosity in some of its steps. The concrete examples of this very phenomenon may be observed in Turkey’s efforts to convince the Arab countries to join the Baghdad Pact during its establishment, its inability to grasp which motives Yugoslavia and Greece adopted in their approach to the Balkan Pact, the crisis Turkey experienced with the Soviet Union over Syria in 1957, and eventually in its unfortunate attitude towards the Algerian issue in order to act on the basis of the Western alliance during the UN voting. The proofs of impetuosity in these examples should be noted to have yielded negative results in the short and the long terms. Therefore, it is possible to argue that being restless in international relations leads to unexpected results. Becoming a chronic habit in Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s, the impetuosity continued in the later years of the Cold War and even manifested itself with various examples in the 1990s and 2000s. However, it has been observed that Turkish diplomacy learned lessons from its past mistakes. For example, to recognize the Syrian regime in 1961 was seen to be a result of being restless and Turkey became more cautious in its future steps of recognition towards other countries. As seen in the examples of the TRNC and Kosovo, Turkey used the rapid recognition as a strategic move in the following years and acted more carefully regarding the recognition of others (such as considering the Russian factor in recognition of the Turkic Republics leaving the Soviet Union). However, some examples of impetuosity stemming from the fact that Western orientation has been effective in Turkish foreign policy for a long time can be seen even in the 2010s. However, moving away from the Cold War mentality in the diplomatic sense, today we can say that Turkey has freed itself from at least being a state showing signs of chronic impetuosity. An attempt is also made to explain the foreign policy moves that seem to be restless but cannot be put into this category, this being done here through examples from Turkish foreign policy. Although the effects of the Westernoriented policies towards the European Community during the Cold War years, acting not in line with the international community during the 1974 Cyprus peace operation, and leading to the perception that Turkey acted emotionally in that case came into question, it has been explained that these issues cannot be explained through impetuosity. For, even though the European Community policies may be considered within the scope of the Western orientation, they are the products of Turkey’s foreign policy to benefit from the balances between the great powers. Likewise, the Cyprus issue was also a matter of being a party as a guarantor state since 1959 and has remained an extremely sensitive issue due both to Turkey’s historical and cultural ties to the island. Indeed, Northern Cyprus is a Turkish state and this is the most legitimate justification for Turkey to use the area for its drilling operations in the Mediterranean. The most prominent example, which seems to be a move that is emotional and impulsive and was taken without questioning the rationality thereof and is thought at first sight as an example of impetuosity, was undoubtedly the “One Minute” outburst of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at Davos Summit in 2009. Nevertheless, this movement was seen to be a justifiable reaction, it stood out as a result of emotion, and it situated Turkey in the position of being a country that acts independently in the international arena and articulates the feelings of other countries, as well as making Turkey encounter some unexpected consequences. In this research, considering that the axis shift discussions in which the Western-oriented foreign policy, seen as the responsible factor for the restless character of the Turkish foreign policy, is approached having taken place after this outburst, it is necessary to consider the “One Minute” outburst as foreign policy move away from the impetuosity.