Patronage and Clientelism of Chinese Investment in Cambodia (original) (raw)
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Social movements in Cambodia: why they succeed or fail
Journal of International Relations and Development , 2019
In social movements and contentious politics, the factors determining success or failure of a movement remain contested since different scholars tend to argue differently. As a contribution to this debate, this paper draws on two cases representing the relative success and failure of movements targeting the government of Cambodia and foreign joint venture investments to address the communities' grievances. The paper reveals that, while other factors such as strategies, resource mobilisation, networks and corporate behaviour remain necessary to the debate, the variation in outcome is essentially determined by the patron-client network, a political dynamic employed by the neo-patrimonial rulers to cling onto power.
Contention and Corporate Sustainability Practice in the Cambodian Agricultural Sector
Past studies revealed only the different sustainability practices of foreign direct investors in developing countries, while the motives that influenced their sustainability practices remain underexplored. This study investigates how civil society organizations (CSOs) influence the sustainability practices of foreign investors in the Cambodian agricultural sector. It focuses in particular on interactions between civil society and government, drawing new links between existing theoretical debates concerning influencing strategies of civil society on companies, government strategies of regulatory enforcement and the political nexus between the government and corporations. Two cases of foreign joint venture investments (one rubber and one sugar plantation) in the agro-industry were selected for observation. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analysed. This study used a process tracing method to analyse observable causes and outcomes within case causal mechanism processes through which CSOs influence corporate sustainability practices. The causal mechanism refers to CSO mobilisation and the outcome is company sustainability practices. Results revealed that CSOs employed a variety of influencing strategies, incorporating institutional and non-institutional tactics, in an attempt to influence government and foreign joint venture companies. However, these tactics did not necessarily influence foreign joint venture companies to behave in a more sustainable way. Rather, whether or not CSOs were able to influence the government, companies or both, they relied heavily on the political nexus between the government and the two companies in the two cases. For instance, CSOs were more effective in influencing the rubber company to behave more sustainably than CSOs targeting the sugar company. The sustainability assessment unveiled that the rubber company went to great effort to ensure sustainability and long-term investment after facing contention with indigenous communities, whereas the sugar company was more likely to neglect the sophisticated mobilisation approaches of the CSOs. In so doing, the sugar company caused negative outcomes for the communities. The different sustainability practices of the two joint venture companies were determined by the different intensities of the client-patron networks between the foreign companies and government officials. The different intensity of networking tends to induce different capture of government (regulatory) institutions. Strong relationships between the foreign companies and government officials tended to influence government institutions, whilst weak relationships resulted in less influence. While strong network restricts CSOs’ ability to ensure sustainable practices, the weak network avails the CSOs to influence the company to attain better sustainability impacts. In this instance, the rubber company, due to its weak network between the government and local partner, which resulted in weak influence on government institutions, strives to perform well to deal with the concerns of indigenous communities and to ensure sustainable development. Meanwhile, the sugar company, having possessed a strong network between the government and local partner constitutes strong capture of regulatory institution not to enforce sustainability related regulations, resists the CSOs’ strategic influence. In contrast, the strong network of the sugar company tended to suppress the CSOs’ tactics. With these, failure or success of the CSOs to influence the government and the foreign joint venture companies to ensure sustainability in or surrounding the investment area is more often than not mediated and undermined by the political nexus between the government and the foreign joint venture companies. Not only this, corporate relationships with government negate CSO influence. To a certain degree, CSOs’ mobilisation, however, leverages a certain influence not only on the government but also shapes the behaviour of the foreign joint venture companies operating in a host country with lax regulatory enforcement and uncertain business environment.
The political settlement and economic growth in Cambodia (published Working Paper)
Since 1960 many countries have experienced growth accelerations, but few have maintained growth. An adequate theory of growth must explain both how some countries kick-start growth, and how some maintain it over decades. For us, the key is to be found in the relationship between what we call the political settlement and the environment for business. Some political settlements create the possibility of a transition from disorder to order in the deals environment, and this creates a potential for accelerated growth. Of these, a smaller subset manages to maintain order while also permitting an increased openness of the deals environment, so that new firms can enter, innovate, compete, and structurally transform the economy. Over the past 40 years, Cambodia has had one of the world’s most volatile growth experiences. A prolonged economic collapse between 1970 and 1982 was followed by a gradual but unstable recovery up until 1998, while post-1998 saw another growth acceleration and sustained high growth. While growth collapse can be traced to the failure of Prince Sihanouk’s post-independence political settlement, war and the disastrous Khmer Rouge regime, growth acceleration and maintenance has been based on a political settlement which has created a balance between technocrats and rent-seekers within Hun Sen’s dominant coalition. Technocrats are given just enough latitude to support growth industries, while rent-seekers are given the political backing to generate profits, a proportion of which are funnelled to the masses through ruling party patronage projects. Through interviews conducted in four economic sectors, we show that there has been a positive feedback loop between support for competitive export industries, state capacity, and structural transformation. However, there has also been a negative feedback loop from over-reliance on high-rent industries, to insufficiently inclusive growth and political instability. The political settlement that has underpinned growth and stability for the past 15 years is facing a severe challenge.
As a contribution to the growing literature on transnational advocacy networks (TANs) in the global production networks, this paper examines how Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), which have adopted the framework of TANs, influence the sugar industry in Cambodia. Due to ineffective domestic influencing strategies, the CSOs adopted the TANs framework and escalated to the international supply chain movement approach (ISCMA) aiming to influence international stakeholders at each stage of the sugar supply chains in order to leverage boomerang pressure on the sugar producing companies, and the Government of Cambodia. Despite its resourceful networking strategies, ISCMA failed to leverage significant influence on the sugar companies and the Government to achieve their demands. The failure was not due to weak networks, but was in part due to the political nexus between the Government and the sugar companies. This paper suggests that to ensure the effectiveness of CSOs' actions within the TANs framework in the global production networks, one should take into account the power of the Government in relation to local politico-commercial elites.
Strategic Survival of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes The Case of Cambodia 1993-2016.pdf
For many years, scholars have debated the durability of hybrid or authoritarian regimes.23 In their selectorate theory, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow postulate that leaders of a regime survive because of their winning coalitions, known as sets of people who support the rulers to remain in office or power.24 In nondemocratic or hybrid regimes, the winning coalition is a group or a set of people who possess power to keep the leaders in office, and in democratic regimes, is a set of people who select or elect the leaders. Furthermore, Bueno de Mesquita et al. assert that to maintain office tenure by keeping the winning coalition loyal, the ruling parties have to design appropriate policies, especially concerning the distribution of private and public goods, to not only serve vested interests of the winning coalitions, but also to entice all of the electorate or society. In democratic regimes where the winning coalition is large, the regimes distribute public goods; however, in authoritarian or hybrid regimes where the winning coalition is small, the regimes distribute private goods to keep their supporters loyal. Despite being praised by a number of scholars25, Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s conceptualization has raised two puzzles: (i) how regimes generate goods (wealth) to entice the winning coalition; and (ii) how the regimes deal with challengers, especially in hybrid regimes. As a contribution to resolving these puzzles, this paper draws upon evidence from the Cambodian case where a hybrid regime has survived over two decades.
Protests, Regulations, and Environmental Accountability in Cambodia
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2019
In the realm of global environmental governance, accountability has been key to the debate concerning pervasive environmental deterioration. Among the factors underlying this deterioration, a perceived challenge is the lack of clear mechanisms for identifying to whom the actors in environmental governance in general, and in other sectors, for example, hydropower, agricultural land, mining, and infrastructure in particular, are accountable to for their actions. To investigate the challenge of this situation, this article explores the ways in which the protest movements of grassroots communities and non-governmental organizations endeavour to hold government and foreign corporations accountable for the actions they have taken which have contributed to environmental degradation in Cambodia. Drawing on two case studies, this article argues that these protest movements have played an increasing role in requiring environmental accountability from both government and corporations.
The Chinese Economy, 2018
Sino–Khmer relation has been under the spotlight since the South China Sea Arbitration and the second-time failure of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to issue a communique on siding with the arbitration result. The historical development and its trajectory of Sino–Khmer bilateral relations then emerge as the core discourse in understanding Cambodia’s further development. Under China’s One Belt One Road initiative, specifically the Maritime Silk Road, Cambodia has synchronized as China’s most significant regional partner through comprehensive strategic cooperation. The article reviews how Cambodia’s political and economic development have paralleled China’s grand regional economic strategy or seemed an extension of China’s domestic production chain.