Rational Intuitionism (original) (raw)
Related papers
2016
Works Read……………………………………………………………………………………...51 to which they satisfy these properties, regardless of a person's psychological framework. The validity of logical axioms, for instance, is not compromised by a person's inaptitude in recognizing that validity. Rather, axioms are intrinsically valid, independent of one's attitude to them. The monistic perception of the world that naturalism embraces creates another perplexing problem with the ethical theory: it does not seem particularly moral. Naturalists argue that people should behave in ways that satisfy certain natural criteria. Yet, it is unclear where this moral imperative comes from. For example, if good is defined as pleasure, it is unclear how the Audi, Robert. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.
Rescuing Ethical Intuitionism from Disagreements [revised version]
In the present thesis my purpose is to investigate whether contemporary intuitionism can rebut recent criticism that builds on the phenomenon of moral disagreement. I argue that it can. In chapter one I specify in what sense do I use the terms ‘intuitionism’ and ‘intuition’. In chapter two I describe the intuitionists’ theories of how intuitions are justified. In chapter three I explain how present-day intuitionists answered some problems coming from disagreement. Having presented the intuitionist theory, I turn to new criticisms in chapter four and five. Firstly, I introduce Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge. He argues that since moral beliefs are often subjects to various defeaters, including being subject to disagreements, moral intuitions cannot enjoy the justification that intuitionists claim they do. I point out that Sinnott-Armstrong’s characterization of intuitionism is misleading. I argue that using a more appropriate characterization and the theories about justification that intuitionists put forward his challenge can be answered satisfactorily, and even without these since it cannot fulfil its own requirements. Secondly, I introduce Roger Crisp’s challenge. He argues that in case of peer disagreement regarding a moral belief the believer who does not suspend that particular belief is in error. I argue in the contrary and show that the one who does suspend belief can just as well be in error. In the concluding chapter I summarize the results of my investigations and point out what kind of significance they ascribe to moral disagreement.
A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism as the Foundation of Knowledge
2016
Scholars claim that there are different sources of knowledge. These sources have come to be thought of as foundations for knowledge. Cognitivists are not united on the foundation of knowledge but they agree that knowledge is possible as against the skeptics. Intuitionism is a cognitive theory which states that knowledge is attainable through the mental faculty of intuition. Our concern in this paper centres on what might be called ethical intuitionism. Although there are variants of this theory, intuitionists believe that there are objective moral facts which are self-evident or known through intuition. In this form, it has been classified as ethical non-naturalism because it does not depend on empirical verification of its principles or truths. We shall argue that there are serious objections to ethical intuitionism. Moreover, we shall show that ethical intuitionism does not take cognizance of important findings in psychology and biology regarding human dispositions which are capab...
This article provides a wide-ranging defense of moral intuitionism. In it I respond to three critics of my book *Intuitionism* (Bloomsbury, 2012): Irfan Khawaja, Moti Mizrahi, and Matthew Pianalto, who attack intuitionism on several fronts. The entire symposium on my book is published in *Reason Papers*, Fall 2015 (available online).
The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions
Philosophy, 2011
Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. I argue that this fact illuminates the epistemology of ethical intuitions.
Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics
Philosophy Compass, 2010
Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
Perceptual Intuitionism without Ethical Perception
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in Perceptual Intuitionism. A significant portion of the literature on the topic has focused on the ethical perception defense, the supposition seeming to be that one must defend Perceptual Intuitionism by showing that one can have ethical experiences which immediately and non-inferentially justify one’s beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. This thesis rejects this thought by proposing an alternative defense of Perceptual Intuitionism which employs the Wittgensteinian concept of criteria and an understanding of principles of prima facie duties as “grammatical propositions”.
Ethical intuitions: What they are, what they are not, and how they justify
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2008
There are ways that ethical intuitions might be, and the various possibilities have epistemic ramifications. This paper criticizes some extant accounts of what ethical intuitions are and how they justify, and it offers an alternative account. Roughly, an ethical intuition that p is a kind of seeming state constituted by a consideration whether p, attended by positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p, and so a reason to believe that p. They are distinguished from other kinds of seemings, such as those which are content driven (e.g., the sensory experience that a stick in water seems bent) and those which are competence driven (e.g., the intellectual seeming that XYZ is not water, or that one of DeMorgan's laws is true). One important conclusion is this: when crafting a positive theory of justification ethical intuitionists have fewer resources than intuitionists in other domains, not because of the subject matter of ethical intuitions, but because of the their structure. A second conclusion is that the seemings featured in substantive ethical intuitions deliver relatively weak justification as compared to other seeming states.