Learning as differentiation of experiential schemas (original) (raw)
Experiential Learnings Revised
Journal of Learning For Development Jl4d, 2015
The proposition is challenged that experience and learning are separate. It is argued that all experience is necessarily learning, and that any object of experience may disclose unlimited learnings in both extent and profundity. The implications of these claims are examined for teaching and learning, for the openness of the academy and for social justice.
1995
Before returning to the implications of all this for education, one more step in the history of epistemology must be discussed. This step is how the German philosopher Kant, in 1787, resolved the rationalist/empiricist debate. Reading Descartes and Hume, Kant saw an impasse. He realized that if we assume that the world is orderly, as both Plato did with his Forms and Aristotle did with his growth model, and if we assume that to gain knowledge of this order, the human mind must in some way find and match that objective order, then there was no way we could ever have knowledge. We would have to be outside our own minds to see if what we thought was right about the world was in act the way the world was. So Kant saw that the basic approe.-h of expecting the mind to match the world was an impossible premise: it made knowledge impossible. He revolutionized the whole field by supposing instead that the source of order is not in the external world but in the human mind. That is, we order our world in the very process of perceiving it. We cannot use what we perceive unless it is ordered according to certain categories, e.g., space, time, and causation. Kant hypothesized that because of the structure of the human mind, we would never receive experience except as already organized by our active, structuring minds. For all we know, the "objective" world may be Hume's "blooming, buzzing confusion" but by the time it is available to us, it is not confused. The point is that any notion of what the objective world is like is of no interest to us and should not be taken as a goal of human knowledge because there is absolutely no way we can get in touch with it. We would have to be gods or at least some consciousness other than humans to see it. The only "objectivity" wr, cai, have is knowing that humans all order experience in some of the basic same ways because our minds have the basic same structure. Hence, according to Kant, I cannot imagine experience outside of time and space, and I can count on your not being able to either. By seeing the mind as the active source of order, rather than some objective unchanging Reality as the order, Kant attempted to solve the problem of certainty. Certainty, Reality, objectivity, etc., all have less rigorous meanings, in a sense. They are reality-for-us, or objectivity-for-us, but that is good enough. Thanks to Kant, Western thought got beyond this epistemological impasse. (There are lots of problems with Kant 's work, but those are other issues.) His theory provides room for both reason and experience to function, and gets us out of the disastrous problem of how to get in touch with that which we want to know. Years later the American, John Dewey (1859-1952) picked up the debate. We can say that he accepted Kant in that the mind is an active, ordering principle, and in that he accepted the world as we experience it rather than seeking some other Reality. Dewey noted that not only theoretical problems followed from the split between Reality and the sensible world, and from the split between theoria and praxis, but problems of immediate human concern arose because of them also. One problem Philosophical Foundations 11. was that the emphasis on the intellectual or cognitive side of man (especially noted in Aristotle) alienated man from his immediate environment, and also from his emotional, affective self. The emphasis of the rationalists is overly cerebral. Dewey noted that the unavoidable concerns of human beings are not with some abstract and unattainable Reality, but with prosperity and adversity, success and failure, achievement and frustration, good and bad. In other words, humans are more concerned with questions of value than questions of Reality, and any adequate epistemological and educational theory ought to be geared toward knowing values, rather than toward theoretical abstractions. Dewey saw that the need to achieve certainty led Western thought to theoretical constructs like those of Plato and Descartes, or to the epistemological impoverishment of Hume. Dewey saw clearly enough to see that the goal of certainty must be rejected as a starting point. Man is first and foremost an active and emotive being, said Dewey, and reflection and concern with knowing is secondary learned behavior. Furthermore, it is learned primarily as a result of uncertain or problematic situations. Therefore, said Dewey, the metaphysical starting point should not be an abstraction, but experience itself: philosophy should investigate life as humans experience it, not as it might be. We find ourselves in continual transaction with the physical, psychological, mental, spiritual world, and philosophy should be a systematic investigation into the nature of this experience. Dewey's systematic investiga-12 Theory of Experiential Education 3. We form a hypothesis for solution, and deduce the consequences of alternative solutions. 4. We test the hypothesis: we confirm or disconfirm. 5. We have knowledge: that which is warranted through inquiry, and it becomes incorporated as background for further inquiry. Hence, "Reality" is not that which matches some abstract objective level of being, but that which gives meaning to inquiry, and that which is repeatedly meaningful in inquiry and experience. This method of inquiry is self-correcting, because if something is incorrect, it will make experience meaningless, not meaningful, and will be found out. And "Truth" is not some abstract, objective reality, but rather "that which works" or "that which explains." Knowledge is primarily instrumental for action, not an end-in-itself. And "Reason" is not an intuitive light which puts men in touch with certainty and truth, but rather, it is a disposition of conduct to foresee consequences of events, and to use what is foreseen in planning and conducting one's affairs. And "Mind" refers to an instrumental method of directing change. For Dewey, the point is to intentionally use experience in its dynamic form to divest experience of its ir definite and unintelligible nature, and to bring about consummations in life. The point is to make experience usable. The difference that Dewey made in metaphysics was to start with the experienced world as reality and not to assume some objective Reality which would require God's vision to see. The difference that follows from this for epistemology is that the knowing tools we have, including pure reason and including empirical data from our senses, are both legitimate tools for knowing our world and functioning intelligently in it. The goal of learning is to know about the world as we experience it, and both theory and practice are components in the scientific method for achieving this knowledge. All of this, which is Dewey's metaphysical and epistemological starting point in experience as felt, rather than as objective, leads to a very clear philosophy of education which is, I think, the foundation of what most people call experiential education. In Dewey's philosophy of education, the goal of education is not the right answer, for that might change. The goal is being able to understand and use our experience, and this is achieved by developing the thought processes with which we examine our experience. In this model, the teacher aids the student in developing an approach to his own experience by structuring the student's experience so that he may move from a challenge to a resolution. The educational process is based on the 20 Philosophical Foundations 13 human experience of movement from difficulty to resolution. After resolution comes reflection on the movement so that what is learned may be generalized and used again. Early in this article, I said that the assumptions of experiential education are more reliable than those underlying more traditional theories. By "more reliable," I meant more helpful in understanding our world, and why I conclude this is by now, I hope, clear. In experiential education, the learner-involved-in-immediate-experience is the object of knowledge, and the activity in, and reflection on, that involvement are the means of knowing. Experiential education attempts to blur the distinction between cognitive and affective learning because experience does not come distinguished this way and is not lived this way. The paradigm of experiential education, which I encountered in a model designed by Laura Joplin, has the following elements: challenge, support, "feedback," and "debrief." Dewey's theory of experience begins with a challenge: the "felt difficulty" which must be resolved. It includes support and "feedback" in that the attempts at resolution either work or don't work; they help in making meaning or they increase confusion. For Dewey, "debriefing" consists of reflection on the nowresolved difficulty, and is the process of integrating what was learned in a way which makes future experiences more intuligible. Experiential educators may or may not be familiar with Dewey, or with Einstein, Heisenberg, Godel, and other thinkers whose hypotheses imply how misconceived is an educational process which aims at objectivity. What they do recognize is that education which teaches tools which can used regardless of whatever is currently called truth is the more lasting accomplishment. The assumptions of this orientation better fit the world as we know it, and would appear to still fit as that changes. In looking at experiential education in this way, I was able to see that it is not unfounded, nor is it anti-intellectual as some critics charge and as some practitioners hope. The philosophy and practice of experiential education are developments which have a heritage, regardless of whether its advocates know, acknowledge, or value it. On the basis of this examination, one is able to see that experiential education "teachers" are subject to a misconception which faced the Sophists even 2,000 years ago: they thought they knew the truth, and that therefore people should...
The Roots and Branches of Experiential Learning.
NSEE Quarterly, 2000
If we look at the range of practices called experiential learning we see everything from farming to conflict resolution; from assessment to youth development; and from practical skill training to theoretical models. All are labelled “experiential learning” - all are presented as part of the experiential learning family. Using the metaphor of a tree I wish to explore the roots and branches of this family. The roots being the underpinning theoretical traditions of experiential learning and the branches being the forms of practice we find ourselves working within. The roots of experiential learning will be examined using some of the traditional philosophical roots of adult education - progressive, humanist and radical. I will highlight the key values of each and their support of experiential learning. The branches will be explored using the “four-village” model proposed by Weil and McGill (1989). We will discern forms of practice emerging from the tree of experiential learning which often differ so much from each other that the practitioners sitting on one branch don’t recognise the other branches as experiential learning at all. Then I will look at the branches as seen through the eyes and work of organisations to show how the practice of experiential learning draws on these roots and branches. Finally I will examine whether the experiential learning tree is healthy and what new branches or sprouts are appearing. I will sound a warning about the need to lop off old wood to stop rot setting in and I will suggest that the roots need ongoing nourishing (fertilising) through new ideas, theories and challenges to old perspectives.
Experience and the Growth of Understanding: A Book Review
Ethiopian Journal of Education, 2018
The book Experience and the Growth of Understanding was written by David W. Hamlyn (1924-2012), who was a professor of philosophy at the University of London at Birkbeck. Organized under 11 chapters, the book presents a critical examination of diverse issues pertinent to experience, understanding, learning, and knowledge. A close look at the124 pages of the book reveals that the author’s work could be put under two general themes. The first general theme, which is discussed in chapters one to four, was concerned with an assessment and critics of the author concerning the major epistemological views. Here he tried to thoroughly investigate great works of scholars with regard to the source of knowledge. In the second general theme, which is presented in the remaining chapters of the book, Hamlyn proposed his own views and suggestions on major issues of experience, and its relationships with understanding, knowledge, and learning. With an intention to ameliorate the “ego-centric view” of both traditional and modern theories of knowledge, Hamlyn explicates his own positions on diverse issues of knowledge and understanding.
Experiential Learning Theory (ELT) provides a holistic model of the learning process and a multilinear model of adult development, both of which are consistent with what we know about how people learn, grow, and develop. The theory is called "Experiential Learning" to emphasize the central role that experience plays in the learning process, an emphasis that distinguishes ELT from other learning theories. The term "experiential" is used therefore to differentiate ELT both from cognitive learning theories, which tend to emphasize cognition over affect, and behavioral learning theories that deny any role for subjective experience in the learning process.
The society demands child and activity centered methods. This paper throws light on one of the learner centered methods i.e. experiential learning. Key Words: Kolb’s Cycle, Learning, Experiential, Conceptualization,
Experiential learning theory: Previous research and new directions
… , learning, and cognitive styles. …, 2001
Experiential Learning Theory (ELT) provides a holistic model of the learning process and a multilinear model of adult development, both of which are consistent with what we know about how people learn, grow, and develop. The theory is called “Experiential Learning” to emphasize the central role that experience plays in the learning process, an emphasis that distinguishes ELT from other learning theories. The term “experiential” is used therefore to differentiate ELT both from cognitive learning theories, which tend to emphasize cognition ...
Experiental Knowledge: Alfred Schutz Should Be There
In a conversation with Professor James March on his papers on experiential knowledge, we pointed out that his bibliographical references do not mention the works of Alfred Schutz. Jim March immediately answered "Yes, Alfred Schutz should be there". Inspired by the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and the interpretative sociology of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) worked on the foundations of sociology from the point of view of personal experience, life stories and the content of our consciousness. Husserl's method was based on the phenomenology of eidetic intuition, which tries to overcome the classical difficulties about the formation and definition of concepts, and on the epoche of natural attitude, related to the critical suspension of beliefs in philosophy and the suspension of doubts in common sense situations. Schutz focussed on the characteristics of the mental constructs, on the justification of interpretative method in social sciences and on the horizons of our life worlds. He did not explicitly work on the concept of learning, but his studies on our mental constructs, experience, knowledge at hand and purposes at hand involve a radical theory of experiential learning, in which all kinds of learning are experiential. The aim of the paper is to make explicit some implications of Schutz's works on learning, or, in other words, to unveil his theory of experiential learning. Pointing out their similarities and differences, it will compare the works of Schutz with the works of James March, which we take as an example of the approaches based on conceptual frames, mathematical models and empirical data, and which focus on management learning. It will also emphasize the problems created in experiential learning by the idea that giving meanings to objects, events and intentional actions is a form of producing knowledge.