The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology (ToC) (original) (raw)
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Phenomenology, Psychology, and the World: Towards a Manifesto
In his 1935 Vienna Lecture, Husserl wrote: "The European nations are sick; Europe itself…is in crisis," and he asked why there is no medicine for sick nations. Today, the crisis, defined as a loss of the meaning of a genuine humanity, encompasses all nations. All persons are under the threat of loss of the socius, the lived intersubjective communion of human beings with one another. Husserl's antidote was the reconstitution of the lifeworld through transcendental phenomenology or, equivalently, transcendental psychology. What is needed is a synthesis of transcendental psychology, including psychoanalysis, with the theory of sociogenesis found in the writings of Frantz Fanon. As Fanon saw, oppression in all its forms both generates and is generated by dread of loss of the socius. This paper calls for the issuance of a manifesto that challenges phenomenologists to dedicate ourselves to the phenomenological investigation of the interrelatedness of psychogenesis and sociogenesis in the production of oppression. This may lead to the discovery of means of eliminating oppression from human life.
Perspectives on Phenomenological Psychology
2022
Husserlian ideas impacted not only all the great innovations of the 20th century, but also several countries and languages. The same happened with Latin America, heir of productions in Spanish and Portuguese , and in particular with Brazil, which received Phenomenology from Psychology, Philosophy and Law, from the 1930s to the 1940s . The language barrier often hides the active and dense phenomenological production in Brazil, notably in Philosophy and Psychology. In this regard, in recent years, Brazil has been the stage of a set of International Phenomenology Congresses – started in 2017 – which culminated, in 2019, in the largest Congress of this nature in Latin America, with more than 800 participants, which demonstrates not only the growing interest in Phenomenology, as the diversity of themes and works. All this served as motivation for the elaboration of this volume, pointing out contributions from authors from several Brazilian institutions. In this book, we present contributions from authors in Philosophy and Psychology, with readings by authors such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; as well as a setting – historical and conceptual – of phenomenological thought in Brazil. We hope, with this, to be contributing to the expansion of the dialogue with readers of the English language, and presenting a small example of the diversity of phenomenological reflections on Brazilian soil.
Philosophical Psychology, 2024
Those who turn to phenomenological psychopathology as an answer to problems in psychiatric healthcare may find a philosophical tradition rooted in the early-mid 20th century that has done little to adapt to modern ideas in psychiatric healthcare and psychiatric research. The Renewing Phenomenological Psychopathology project, funded by the Wellcome Trust and led by Professor Matthew Broome and Professor Giovanni Stanghellini, calls for reflection, revitalization and reconstruction of this discipline, diversifying global scholarship and working with lived experience scholars, so that it can pave new paths in psychiatric understanding. The contributions of the current special issue aim to breathe new life into a vital method in psychopathology and to chart its future trajectory
Phenomenology: Methods, historical development, and applications in psychology
2015
A scientific procedure in the broad sense, phenomenology is a wedding of rationality and observation. It is methodical, systematic, critical, self-correcting, and progressive in its development and scope. The goal and subject matter of this method are to understand what has been called "consciousness" or "lived experience," and in doing so phenomenology seeks to freshly clarify and shed light on the very meaning of these words. Such nondualistic terms as "Dasein" (being-in-the-world) or "human existence," which emphasize the world, have been considered preferable given some contexts, aims, and findings of these investigations. Phenomenology is not a doctrine or fixed body of knowledge, but a core method of investigation that may be flexibly adapted and remains open to new findings, terminology, and modification of practices. The antithesis of dogma, its knowledge claims, concepts, and language are informed and shaped by concrete evidence gathered in research. Such investigations have led to the abandonment of some established concepts and to the development of new ones. Edmund Husserl identified, programmatically articulated, and named "phenomenological" procedures for use in the full spectrum of scholarly disciplines. Husserl's phenomenological, philosophical investigations underwent many extensions and revisions in his career. Over the last hundred years, Husserl's followers have produced a vast, variegated body of knowledge in 53 countries, in over 40 disciplines including philosophy, theology, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, linguistics, law, architecture, literary criticism, musicology, and art history (Embree 2010). The phenomenological method has been modified for specific subject matters, problems, and goals. This chapter delineates the core of this method, some of its history, and applications relevant to psychology with a critical assessment of its limits and future.
The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology. Edited by Sebastian Luft, Soren Overgaard Published September 29th 2011 by Routledge – 720 pages, 2011
On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology
The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology, 2019
“On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology” provides a framework for the phenomenological study of mental disorders. The framework relies on a distinction between (ontological) existentials and (ontic) modes. Existentials are the categorial structures of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, selfhood, and affective situatedness. Modes are the particular, concrete phenomena that belong to these categorial structures, with each existential having its own set of modes. In the first section, we articulate this distinction by drawing primarily on the work of Martin Heidegger—especially his study of the ontological structure of affective situatedness (Befindlichkeit) and its particular, ontic modes, which he calls moods (Stimmungen). In the second section, we draw on a study of grief to demonstrate how this framework can be used when conducting phenomenological interviews and analyses. In the concluding section, we explain how this framework can be guide phenomenological studies across a broad range of existential structures.
At the Confluence of Phenomenology and Non-Phenomenology: Maurice Blondel and Emmanuel Falque
2020
The capacity, or incapacity, of Husserlian method to fulfill its own inspiration has been well shown, whether it be in the 'return to the things themselves,' in attaining for philosophy the status of 'rigorous science,' or in delivering a means for a methodical description of personal subjectivity with the phenomenological reduction; in any case, it would appear that by now Husserlian phenomenology has come near the point of reaching a state of full philosophical consciousness. Critiques against Husserlian method have been well cast throughout the development of the phenomenological tradition, certainly for Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, and Jean Luc-Marion in terms of the "theological turn" but also for Maurice Merleau-Ponty in terms of the "barbarian principle," where he asserts that "the ultimate task of phenomenology as philosophy of consciousness is to understand its relationship to non-phenomenology." 1 In the end, these challenges to Husserl's phenomenological method have led to a certain confluence perhaps best understood in terms of how "non-phenomenology" must finds its place within phenomenology; and at this precise convergence we may situate both Maurice Blondel and Emmanuel Falque within the phenomenological tradition. The recognition of a gap between the realm of phenomenality proper to phenomenology and that of another realm absent to any direct phenomenolization is brought to expression by Falque in his book Nothing to it (2020), where he claims that psychoanalysis can help in overcoming this divide by way of the so-called "backlash of psychoanalysis upon phenomenology." 2 The backlash of Freudian psychoanalysis upon phenomenology materializes in two ways, first by challenging the a priori of phenomenolization in phenomenological method, and then secondly by reconciling the method of phenomenology with "this never interrogated a priori of manifestation and its possible signification." 3 What this confluence ultimately leads to is the development of a "phenomenology of force," centered on the Freudian Id, the powers of the will, and the realm of instincts and of drives, as all of these appear in such a way that challenges the traditional paradigm of manifestation as it has been typically construed within the