Decision making in reward and punishment (original) (raw)
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Surface-level differences in the reward and punishment variants, specifically greater longterm decision making in the punishment variant of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) observed in previous studies led to the present comparison of long-term decision making in the two IGT variants (n = 320, male = 160). It was contended that risk aversion triggered by a positive frame of the reward variant and risk seeking triggered by a negative frame of the punishment variant appears as long-term decision making in the two IGT variants. Apart from the frame of the variant as a within-subjects factor (variant type: reward and punishment), the order in which the frame was triggered (order type: reward-punishment or punishment-reward), and the four types of instructions that delineated motivation toward reward from that of punishment (reward, punishment, reward and punishment, and nohint) were hypothesized to have an effect on foresighted decision making in the IGT. As expected, long-term decision making differed across the two IGT variants suggesting that the frame of the variant has an effect on long-term decision making in the IGT (p < 0.001). The order in which a variant was presented, and the type of the instructions that were used both had an effect on long-term decision making in the two IGT variants (p < 0.05). A post hoc test suggested that the instructions that differentiated between reward and punishment resulted in greater foresight than the commonly used IGT instructions that fail to distinguish between reward and punishment. As observed in previous studies, there were more number of participants (60%) who showed greater foresight in the punishment variant than in the reward variant (p < 0.001). The results suggest that foresight in IGT decision making is sensitive to reward and punishment frame in an asymmetric manner, an observation that is aligned with the behavioral decision making framework. Benefits of integrating findings from behavioral studies in decision neuroscience are discussed, and a need to investigate cultural differences in the IGT studies is pointed out.
Affective and cognitive mechanisms of risky decision making
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 2015
The ability to make advantageous decisions under circumstances in which there is a risk of adverse consequences is an important component of adaptive behavior; however, extremes in risk taking (either high or low) can be maladaptive and are characteristic of a number of neuropsychiatric disorders. To better understand the contributions of various affective and cognitive factors to risky decision making, cohorts of male Long-Evans rats were trained in a "Risky Decision making Task" (RDT), in which they made discrete trial choices between a small, "safe" food reward and a large, "risky" food reward accompanied by varying probabilities of footshock. Experiment 1 evaluated the relative contributions of the affective stimuli (i.e., punishment vs. reward) to RDT performance by parametrically varying the magnitudes of the footshock and large reward. Varying the shock magnitude had a significant impact on choice of the large, "risky" reward, such that greater magnitudes were associated with reduced choice of the large reward. In contrast, varying the large, "risky" reward magnitude had minimal influence on reward choice. Experiment 2 compared individual variability in RDT performance with performance in an attentional set shifting task (assessing cognitive flexibility), a delayed response task (assessing working memory), and a delay discounting task (assessing impulsive choice). Rats characterized as risk averse in the RDT made more perseverative errors on the set shifting task than did their risk taking counterparts, whereas RDT performance was not related to working memory abilities or impulsive choice. In addition, rats that showed greater delay discounting (greater impulsive choice) showed corresponding poorer performance in the working memory task. Together, these results suggest that reward-related decision making under risk of punishment is more strongly influenced by the punishment than by the reward, and that risky and impulsive decision making are associated with distinct components of executive function.
Individual differences in decision-making
Personality and Individual Differences, 2005
Behavioral decision-making as measured with a gambling task has been found to be impaired in several pathological conditions such as brain lesions, addiction, and personality disorders. It is not known how individual differences influence performance on behavioral decision-making. The goal of the present study was to examine to what extent performance on behavioral measures of decision-making is predicted by selfreported personality traits of sensitivity for punishment and reward, impulsivity, and decision-making styles. For this goal, performance on the IOWA gambling task was related to the BIS/BAS questionnaire, the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory, and the Adolescent Decision Making Questionnaire in a sample of students (n = 44). The results showed that behavioral decision-making was to some extent predicted by individual differences in sensitivity for reward and self-reported decision-making style. However, behavioral decision-making was not predicted by impulsive personality traits.
2010
Iterated decision making can be studied in laboratory using situations, like the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), in which participants face repeatedly the same decision problem getting feedback after each choice. In the paper we focus on a recurring finding in experiments carried out with the IGT, the frequency of the contingent event effect—i.e., the fact that people consistently prefer options associated with rare losses, independently of their attractiveness, expected value and loss magnitude— that has not yet received a satisfactory explanation. An experiment reveals that the effect relies on simply experiencing rewards and punishments, not being influenced by the net outcome (loss or win) to which they are associated, and a computational model, implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture, corroborates the idea that punishments and losses on one hand, and rewards and wins on the other, play the same functional role in determining the participants’ behavior in IGT.
Cognitive mechanisms of risky choice: Is there an evaluation cost
We contrast two classes of choice processes, those assuming time-consuming comparisons and those where stimuli for each option act independently, competing for expression by cross censorship. The Sequential Choice Model (SCM) belongs in the latter category, and has received empirical support in several procedures involving deterministic alternatives. Here we test this model in risky choices. In two treatments, each with five conditions, European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) faced choices between options with unpredictable outcomes and risk-free alternatives. In the delay treatment the five conditions involved choices between a variable option offering two equiprobable delays to reward and a fixed option with delay differing between conditions. The amount treatment was structurally similar, but amount of reward rather than delay was manipulated. As assumed (and required) by the SCM, latency to respond in no-choice trials reflected each option's richness with respect to the background alternatives, and, crucially, preferences in simultaneous choices were predictable from latencies to each option in forced trials. However, we did not detect reliable differences in response times between forced and choice trials, neither the lengthening expected from evaluation models nor the shortening expected from the SCM.
Deciding with (or without) the Future in Mind: Individual Differences in Decision-Making
Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, 2014
The aim of this study was to examine the influence of propensity to risk taking, impulsivity, and present versus future orientation in decisionmaking under ambiguity. One hundred and four healthy adults were administered the computer versions of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). They then completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) and the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale . Results indicated that high scores on the BIS-11 Non-Planning impulsivity scale, the CFC-14 Immediate scale, and the BART result in poorer performance on the IGT. In addition, the results of regression analysis showed also that the BART total score was the most powerful predictor of performance on the IGT. The study revealed that individuals who are more prone to risk, less likely to plan ahead carefully, and more oriented to the present, rather than to the future, performed worse on the IGT.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2013
Prior research links greater activation of posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) and anterior insula (AI) with decreasing outcome predictability during decision making, as measured by decreasing probability for the more likely outcome out of two or increasing outcome variance. In addition to predictability, much work indicates that the magnitude or stakes of the outcome is also important. Despite the interest in the neural correlates of these decision variables, it is unknown whether pMFC and AI are differentially sensitive to predictability when magnitude is varied. This study examined brain activity during decision making in relation to decreasing outcome predictability for low as compared with high magnitude decisions. For low magnitude decisions, reduced predictability of the outcome was associated with greater activity in pMFC and bilateral AI, replicating prior studies. In contrast, there was no relationship between predictability and brain activity for high magnitude decisions, which tended to elicit greater pMFC and AI activity than low magnitude decisions for more predictable outcomes. These data indicate that the relationship between outcome predictability and pMFC and AI activity during decision making depends on magnitude, and suggest that these regions may be responding to the motivational salience of the decision rather than predictability information per se.
The effect of probability discounting on reward seeking: a three-dimensional perspective
Rats will work for electrical stimulation of the medial forebrain bundle. The rewarding effect arises from the volleys of action potentials fired by the stimulation and subsequent spatio-temporal integration of their post-synpatic impact. The proportion of time allocated to self-stimulation depends on the intensity of the rewarding effect as well as on other key determinants of decision-making, such as subjective opportunity costs and reward probability. We have proposed that a 3D model relating time allocation to the intensity and cost of reward can distinguish manipulations acting prior to the output of the spatio-temporal integrator from those acting at or beyond it. Here, we test this proposition by varying reward probability, a variable that influences the computation of payoff in the 3D model downstream from the output of the integrator. On riskless trials, reward was delivered on every occasion that the rat held down the lever for a cumulative duration called the “price,” whereas on risky trials, reward was delivered with probability 0.75 or 0.50. According to the model, the 3D structure relating time allocation to reward intensity and price is shifted leftward along the price axis by reductions in reward probability; the magnitude of the shift estimates the change in subjective probability. The predictions were borne out: reducing reward probability shifted the 3D structure systematically along the price axis while producing only small, inconsistent displacements along the pulse-frequency axis. The results confirm that the model can accurately distinguish manipulations acting at or beyond the spatio-temporal integrator and strengthen the conclusions of previous studies showing similar shifts following dopaminergic manipulations. Subjective and objective reward probabilities appeared indistinguishable over the range of 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 1.0.
Neurocognitive deficits related to poor decision-making
2000
Using a novel quantitative model of repeated choice behavior, we investigated the cognitive processes of criminal offenders incarcerated for various crimes. Eighty-one criminals, including violent offenders, drug and sex offenders, drivers operating a vehicle while impaired (OWI) and eighteen matched controls were tested. The results were also contrasted to those obtained from neurological patients with focal brain lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex, and from drug abusers. Participants performed the computerized version of the Iowa Gambling Task , and the results were decomposed into specific component processes using the Expectancy Valence model . The findings indicated that whereas all criminal groups tended to select disadvantageously, the cognitive profiles exhibited by different groups were considerably different. Certain subpopulations, most significantly drug and sex offenders, overweighted potential gains compared to losses, similar to chronic cocaine abusers. In contrast, assault/murder criminals tended to make less consistent choices and to focus on immediate outcomes, and in these respects were more similar to patients with orbitofrontal damage. The current cognitive model provides a novel way for building a bridge between cognitive neuroscience and complex human behaviors.