Mind Games at the Nuclear Threshold in the Euro-Atlantic Theatre: The Weaponization of Declaratory Policy as a Component of Operational Art (original) (raw)

Policy-oriented conceptualizations of how best to operationalize nuclear deterrence within the Euro-Atlantic theatre, after a hiatus of more than two decades as NATO emphasized out-of-area missions in support of collective-security mandates rather than the Alliance’s traditional territorial-defence focus, have reassumed prominence in official allied declarations of intent and principle as well as in a substantial range of commissioned or sponsored studies and in academic commentary and analysis. By the same token, it can be argued persuasively that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, and their follow-on chain-reaction effects across the politico-military spectrum, have been heavily conditioned by, even structured by, official declarations emanating from Moscow affirming the viability of nuclear weaponry as an integral functioning component of the Russian Federation’s operational capabilities. Further, field deployments of Russian nuclear forces have served to reinforce the credibility of the governmental messaging in this regard. The Paper posits, given these introductory observations, that nuclear equations and calculations are central to the current Euro-Atlantic operational environment. It then proposes an analytical framework that begins by disaggregating the deterrence mechanism into its classical duality of declaratory and action policy. In other words, in the first instance – declaratory policy, what is stated to be doctrinal and thus a guideline to future probable actions under a set, or sets, of given circumstances, and in the latter instance – action policy, what is planned for and designed within operational deployments under that same set, or those same sets, of given circumstances. Action policy includes such non-trivial components of the deterrence matrix as pre-set computerized target-sets, degrees of readiness, component supply-and-replacement logistics and infrastructure, and war-gamed threat-suppression operational planning and design. It can be argued then in turn that the ultimate stakes involved in this declaratory-action duality within nuclear deterrence mechanisms are high indeed and that the descriptor ‘existential’, elsewhere frequently overused in conflict analyses, is most assuredly not out of place. By conceptually disaggregating declaratory from action policy, and vice versa, the Paper highlights the Janus-like characteristics of nuclear-deterrence planning and policies.