The Structure of Essentialist Explanations of Necessity (original) (raw)
Related papers
On Explaining Necessity by the Essence of Essence
Inquiry, 2023
There has been much debate recently on the question whether essence can explain modality. Here, I examine two routes to an essentialist account of modality. The first is Hale's argument for the necessity of essence, which I will argue is-notwithstanding recent attempted defences of it-invalid by its very structure. The second is the proposal that it is essential to essential truth that it is necessary. After o ering three possible versions of the view, I will argue that each fails to provide a metaphysical explanation of necessity in terms of essence.
On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012
In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit.
Why Essentialism Requires Two Senses of Necessity
Ratio, 2006
I set up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality de re, for the essentialist opponent of a 'two senses' view of necessity. I focus specifically on Frank Jackson's two-dimensional account in his From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). I set out the background to Jackson's conception of conceptual analysis and his rejection of a two senses view. I proceed to outline two purportedly objective (as opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. I conclude that since one of these differences must hold and since each requires the adoption of a two senses view of necessity, essentialism is not consistent with the rejection of a two senses view. 1
Essentialism and Forms of Necessity
CORRADINI, GALVAN (2018). In: T. TAMBASSI (ed.), Studies in the Ontology of E.J. Lowe, Editiones Scholasticae, Germany, 125-157, 2018
The aim of this essay is to deepen our understanding of E.J. Lowe’s essentialism, showing its importance for the characterisation of the modal notion of necessity. In the first section, we make an attempt to outline the basic characteristics of Lowe’s notion of essence. In order to recount Lowe’s theory in a sufficiently complete way, it would be necessary to present the features of his four-category ontology; however, in this first section we will focus in detail only on the concept of instantiation and on the distinction between essential and accidental properties of a substance. This is functional to the defence of an essentialist theory of necessity – a theory to which the second section of this paper is devoted – that is inspired by Lowe’s essentialism but does not fully coincide with it, rather developing it in an autonomous manner. The presentation of this theory serves as a basis for the discussion of some aspects of Lowe’s four-category ontology that are closely connected with his essentialism. That discussion is carried out in the third section, where the complex relations between instantiation, exemplification and characterisation will be addressed.
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Recently, a debate has developed between those who claim that essence can be explained in terms of de re modality (modalists), and those who claim that de re modality can be explained in terms of essence (essentialists). The aim of this paper is to suggest that we should reassess. It is assumed that either necessity is to be accounted for in terms of essence, or that essence is to be accounted for in terms of necessity. I will argue that we should assume neither. I discuss what role these key notions – essence and necessity – can reasonably be thought to contribute to our understanding of the world, and argue that, given these roles, there is no good reason to think that we should give an account of one in terms of the other. I conclude: if we can adequately explain de re modality and essence at all, we should aim to do so separately.
Essentiality without Necessity
2016
It is widely accepted that if a property is essential then it is necessary. Against this I present numerous counterexamples from biology and chemistry, which fall into two groups: (I) A property is essential to a genus or species, yet some instances of this genus or species do not have this essential property. (II) A property is essential to a genus, yet some species of this genus do not have this essential property. I discuss and reject four minor objections. Then I discuss in depth whether a distinction between constitutive essence and consequential essence is able to handle these counterexamples. I conclude that this distinction is better put as one between (1) the essence, which is necessary, and (2) the essential properties, which are not formally necessary. An essence of an object X is the substantial universal expressed by its real definition. An object X has a property P essentially iff the property P is explanatory and non-trivial, and P follows from the essence of X.
More on the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
M. Dumitru (ed.), Metaphysics, Modality, and Meaning. Themes from Kit Fine, OUP, 2020
“Essence and Modality” has had a considerable impact on subsequent philosophical thinking about essence and modality. The paper argues that the traditional view that essence reduces to metaphysical modality is wrong. Many have found these arguments convincing and have accordingly abandoned the view. The paper also argues that the reduction goes the other way around, i.e. that it is metaphysical modality which reduces to essence. Twenty years after the publication of “Essence and Modality”, Kit Fine’s reductive view has become widely recognised as one of the main contenders for a reductive account of metaphysical modality. There are several ways in which such a reductive account can be spelled out. In Correia 2012, I raised objections against one natural way of doing so, and developed an alternative account – the “rule-based” account – which relies on a brief suggestion Fine makes in Fine 1995a. The aim of the present chapter is twofold: first, I wish to strengthen the case for the rule-based account by criticising alternative accounts, including some accounts based on other suggestions made by Fine, or inspired by material one can find in his work; and second, I wish to discuss certain objections to the rule-based account and suggest how they can be met.
Essence, Explanation, and Modality
Philosophy
Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or explained by essentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call, Reductive Finean Essentialism and Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale on Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge the presence of a deep standoff between the two views.
Essence, Necessity, and Definition
Philosophical Studies, 2019
What is it for something to be essential to an item? For some time, it was standard to think that the concept of necessity alone can provide an answer: for something to be essential to an item is for it to be strictly implied by the existence of that item. We now tend to think that this view fails because its analysans is insufficient for its analysandum. In response, some argue that we can supplement the analysis in terms of necessity with a further condition. In this paper I argue that this view is untenable in its current form. I then provide a glimmer of hope to those who think that essence is at least partially analyzable in terms of necessity.