Transitions from authoritarian rule following the Arab uprisings: A matter of variables (original) (raw)
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Human rights and Islam. Constitutional Debates in Egypt and Tunisia
2013
Drulák, P. (ed): Non-western Reflection on Politics. Peter Lang, 2013 For a long time, attitudes towards politics in the Arab world were covered up by a lack of freedom of expression, distorted by post-colonial authoritarianisms and held captive by the struggle between authoritarianism and Islamist grass-root opposition. It was hard to avoid the preliminary conclusion of Islamic ex-ceptionalism, that is, a different conception of political authority in Islam. It is commonly accepted that the political outlook of Islamists has limitations concerning the universality of citizen and human rights. Until the uprisings of the Arab Spring, the debates on the political particularism of Muslim societies were largely based on limited empirical material from authoritarian contexts and thus remained of limited interest. The recent political processes that unfold in the wake of the popular Arab uprisings help those debates to evolve. The political change in Northern Africa made the question whether Islam is compatible with democracy obsolete and posed a more pertinent question: whether Islamism is. It also made Islamism more palpable as a subject of inquiry. Since the electoral victories of the Egyp-tian Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Tunisian Nahda in 2011, Islamists are directly involved in electoral politics and moreover, in the drafting of constitutions. Will political participation force Islamists to evolve towards a democratic political standard like that which is generally accepted in the West, or does the specific ideological background of Islamism give them a radically different attitude towards politics? Do Islamists have an original view of politics that is incompatible with or serve as an alternative to a modern democratic system? Observations from those processes allow for the drawing of the first conclusions about the Islamist conception of democratic politics in relation to both political ideology and political practice. The following chapter will outline (I) the paradoxical background of democ-ratisation in Tunisia and Egypt, and (II) observations from the constitutional processes in Egypt and Tunisia.
LAW & JUSTICE REVIEW, 2019
People of the Arab World, who had to lead their lives under authoritarian governments for remarkably long years until the Arab Spring, failed to obtain any concrete response to their democratic demands and quests. The civil commotions commencing in the year 2010 spread over the whole Arab territories and led to overthrowing of the leaders in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, which hallmarked the signals of a new approaching era. The given democratisation movements have proved to be unsuccessful owing to the facts that the people of the Arab World lacked experience in the regime of democracy, and that the countries with particular goals on the said territory were irritated by the Islamic awakening, and that the new authorities taking over the governments might make use of the natural resources and strategic regions against the interests of the western states and that Israel's security in the region might be jeopardised. As a result of protracted endeavours in Tunisia, such a constitution that bears nothing less than those of western liberal democracies has been drafted and adopted through public reconciliation, and afterwards, political and constitutional reforms have been carried out decisively. As for Egypt, the constitution drafted in 2012 was a significant stride towards democratisation and acquisition of rights and freedom, which nevertheless was suspended by the coup in 2013. Even though many improvements brought about by the Constitution of 2012 have been preserved in the Constitution of 2014 which embodies the martial democracy, the way of its adoption was not inclusive of whole public and the Parliament is deprived of effective opposition, because of which the constitutional developments remain solely on the paper.
Egypt's New Constitution: The Islamist Difference
Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal, 2013
The paper discusses the distributional impact of the rules of the new Egyptian constitution (2012). It specifically addresses the way such rules, substantive and (potentially) procedural, can influence Egyptian law's identity and the underlying relations between the state and individuals and among individuals themselves that such identity implies.
ABSTRACT: The revolutions that took place in North Africa and the Middle East in 2010-2011, subsumed to the Arab Spring have different results/effects depending on country-specific characteristics and factors. Depending on the historical legacy, the evolution of institutions in each state, the involving of national and international players etc. we can find a wide range of outcomes of the Arab Spring. If Tunisia is now considerd the successful example of the transition to democracy, in Egypt the military returned to its dedicated role - "savior of the people" and the establishment of another authoritarian regime. Although during the revolutions of 2011 there were no slogans and no religious claims, however, the Arab Spring has meant a "revival of Islam." In all MENA countries where dictators feared opposition forces with Islamic doctrine, these partiesor movements were banned before the revolutions of 2010-2011, as it was the case of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Immediately after the revolutions of 2011, parties with Islamist ideology asserted themselves on the political scene in Tunisia - such as En Nahda - and in Egypt - Freedom and Justice Party which has strong links to the Muslim Brotherhood. They succeeded, through democratic means, to gain political power, then they were removed from governance either because of new elections - the case of En Nahda din Tunisia - either because of "the new revolution" or "coup" as they were called the events of June-July 2013 in Egypt. In 2014 Egypt and Tunisia have adopted the new Constitutions and formulated options regarding the relation "secular-Islamic" in the functioning of societies. This paper aims to highlight the extent to which internal political actors in Tunisia and Egypt asserted their options for a secular or an Islamic State, from 2011 to the present. KEYWORDS: Arab Spring, secular State, Islamic State, power, political Islam.
CONSTITUTIONAL REBIRTH: TUNISIA AND EGYPT RECONSTRUCT THEMSELVES
In early 2011, after dramatic national uprisings, Tunisia and Egypt each embarked on a process of reconstructing their political systems. Tunisia and Egypt have distinctive political features, and the paths they have followed have not been identical. But there are still some striking common elements in the transition process for both countries: the basic political structures of the state have remained intact despite political upheaval; the transition process is fairly rapid; the political scene is rapidly becoming populated with a wide variety of political forces; those forces have gravitated between a consensual approach and sharp competition; a political gulf between Islamist and non-Islamist forces has emerged; and the process, for all its problems and occasional bouts of violence, has remained relatively peaceful. And there is another remarkable commonality as well: in both countries the centerpiece of the transition has been the process of writing a new constitution. Indeed, the centrality of writing a new constitution has been a striking feature of political life since the old regimes tottered, so much so that it is now taken for granted—while there is vigorous debate about all questions connected with the constitution (how it should be written; who should write it; when it should be written; what should go in it), there is virtually no dissent from the view that constitutional redesign is among the most critical political tasks for both nations. This is surprising for three reasons. First, both countries have a rich experience with constitution drafting and constitutional texts— going back to the nineteenth century—but for more than half a century, the constitution has been a tool of authoritarian rulers seeking to institutionalize and justify their regimes. Yet rather than concluding that constitutional texts are discredited documents or merely flimsy paper platitudes, Tunisians and Egyptians have embraced them as essential to creating a just and responsive political order. Tunisia's discredited and disbanded ruling party had " constitution " in its name; the fallen Egyptian regime recently shoved through constitutional amendments designed to solidify its position, but in neither country did " constitution " become a dirty word.
Obstacles to Democracy after the New Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian and Egyptian Cases
The obstacles to democracy in Tunisia and Egypt following the revolutions that overthrew the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes can be divided into two distinct categories. The first category is structural, and includes the historical background of these two societies in terms of religious, economic, and geo-political structures. The second is tied to the revolutionary conjuncture itself, with each society facing a unique situation after the uprising began-in particular, the peculiar features of the activists, the strength or weakness of the civil society, the role of political institutions, and the ability of the revolutionary actors to articulate their demands in the political arena.
The Tunisian Ennahdha Party in transition from " Islamic Democracy " to " Democratic Islam "
For the first time, three Islamist parties took power in the southern shore of the Mediterranean in 2012. The so called Arab spring seems to have given a big opportunity for Islamists to come back to the political scene in different countries around the Arab region. As a consequence, the subject of political Islam and Democracy gained again saliency in the media. The overall image that emerges from the “Arab spring” is negative. But, amazingly enough, the Tunisian Ennahdha Party played a key role in the success of the Tunisian Democratic transition. That is why it is very interesting to take a closer look at the evolution of Ennahdha within the Tunisian Democratic transition. In this paper, in which we rely not only on written sources but also on interviews conducted personally with prominent political actors in the Tunisian scene, we hold that while traditional Islamism is not compatible with Democracy, at the same it is not static. Political Islam is changing and could get democratised in a liberal political environment. The result of the study is that the relationship between Democracy and political Islam depends on the degree of freedom in each country. In dictatorships, the Islamists intend to Islamise Democracy according to the Nativistic paradigm and use it as a weapon against anti-Islamist dictators. But in democracies, the Islamists intend to democratise Islam to adapt themselves to the new political environment. From this perspective, the Ennahdha Party experience in the Tunisian Democratic transition can serve as an example in other Arab countries where the political transition seems to be in a standoff such as in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria.
Islamic Law and Constitution-Making: The Authoritarian Temptation and the Arab Spring
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
The political dynamics that have characterized post-Mubarak Egypt have often been understood to be a battle between "religious" forces, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters, and "secularist" forces, represented by a diverse group of civil society actors. Opposition of this latter group to the "religious" politics of the Muslim Brotherhood is therefore understood to be the primary cause of the events that led to the July 3, 2013 military coup that overthrew Egypt's only freely elected President, Mohammed Morsi. Without denying the salience of a religious-secularist divide in Egypt, this narrative of post-Mubarak politics fails to appreciate the importance of intra-Muslim religious division regarding the proper place of Islam in the Egyptian political order, and its relationship to the state. This paper argues that traditionalist Egyptian religious scholars have a normative commitment to political authoritarianism that is tied to their understanding that the only proper modes of religious instruction is through adherence to a tradition of learning, and a conception of religion as something that exists outside of, but ultimately, is responsible for directing the state through the cooperation of the pious autocrat. The Muslim Brotherhood, and their supporters, on the other hand, view religious authority as a kind of resource that any person can acquire with sufficient diligence, and accordingly, can be incorporated within a democratic polity by cultivating a religiouslyminded citizenry. I trace the normative resources for both positions in the Sunni tradition and then illustrate why those debates can cast light on the important political differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Azhar, even though they may be in agreement on a broad array of substantive questions.
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution (2014)
2014
After two years and four drafts, Tunisia’s new constitution was finally approved on January 26, 2014 – the first constitution freely created by a democratic assembly in the Arab world. During the drafting process, many questions were raised about the Islamist Ennahda party's role in writing the new constitution. Did Ennahda and its supporters pursue an aggressive Islamist agenda on matters such as sharia, blasphemy and gender equality? If not, what debates and divisions within the party allowed it to make the necessary compromises and concessions that helped shape the final document? In a new Analysis Paper by the Brookings Doha Center, Monica L. Marks calls for a more nuanced understanding of Ennahda and how it has operated in the Tunisian political scene. Drawing on extensive field research and interviews with Tunisian political figures and activists, Marks argues that Ennahda should be understood as a party of evolving positions and internal debate, rather than an Islamist monolith unwilling to give ground on key issues. While not absolving Ennahda of its mistakes and missteps since the revolution, Marks calls on Tunisian actors and the international community to understand the vulnerabilities and challenges that the party, along with the rest of Tunisia’s political actors, faces in working to shape Tunisia’s future.