Varieties of necessity (original) (raw)
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I argue that there are three basic kinds of necessity - metaphysical, natural and normative - none of which is definable in terms of the others.
Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality, 2020
This chapter explores Fine’s suggestion that the ethical facts supervene on the natural facts, not as a matter of metaphysical necessity, but rather as a matter of normative necessity. The first part develops an argument against the metaphysical supervenience of the ethical, the main premises of which are ethical non-naturalism and Fine’s essentialist analysis of metaphysical necessity. The second part defends an analysis of normative necessity according to which P is normatively necessary iff P would have been the case no matter how the non-normative facts had been. The last part argues that the basic principles of ethics as the non-naturalist conceives them are indeed normatively necessary in this sense.
Essentialism and Forms of Necessity
CORRADINI, GALVAN (2018). In: T. TAMBASSI (ed.), Studies in the Ontology of E.J. Lowe, Editiones Scholasticae, Germany, 125-157, 2018
The aim of this essay is to deepen our understanding of E.J. Lowe’s essentialism, showing its importance for the characterisation of the modal notion of necessity. In the first section, we make an attempt to outline the basic characteristics of Lowe’s notion of essence. In order to recount Lowe’s theory in a sufficiently complete way, it would be necessary to present the features of his four-category ontology; however, in this first section we will focus in detail only on the concept of instantiation and on the distinction between essential and accidental properties of a substance. This is functional to the defence of an essentialist theory of necessity – a theory to which the second section of this paper is devoted – that is inspired by Lowe’s essentialism but does not fully coincide with it, rather developing it in an autonomous manner. The presentation of this theory serves as a basis for the discussion of some aspects of Lowe’s four-category ontology that are closely connected with his essentialism. That discussion is carried out in the third section, where the complex relations between instantiation, exemplification and characterisation will be addressed.
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Recently, a debate has developed between those who claim that essence can be explained in terms of de re modality (modalists), and those who claim that de re modality can be explained in terms of essence (essentialists). The aim of this paper is to suggest that we should reassess. It is assumed that either necessity is to be accounted for in terms of essence, or that essence is to be accounted for in terms of necessity. I will argue that we should assume neither. I discuss what role these key notions – essence and necessity – can reasonably be thought to contribute to our understanding of the world, and argue that, given these roles, there is no good reason to think that we should give an account of one in terms of the other. I conclude: if we can adequately explain de re modality and essence at all, we should aim to do so separately.
Essence, Necessity, and Definition
Philosophical Studies, 2019
What is it for something to be essential to an item? For some time, it was standard to think that the concept of necessity alone can provide an answer: for something to be essential to an item is for it to be strictly implied by the existence of that item. We now tend to think that this view fails because its analysans is insufficient for its analysandum. In response, some argue that we can supplement the analysis in terms of necessity with a further condition. In this paper I argue that this view is untenable in its current form. I then provide a glimmer of hope to those who think that essence is at least partially analyzable in terms of necessity.
On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012
In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit.
The Inductive Route Towards Necessity
Acta Analytica, 2019
It is generally assumed that relations of necessity cannot be known by induction on experience. In this paper, I propose a notion of situated possibilities, weaker than nomic possibilities, that is compatible with an inductivist epistemology for modalities. I show that assuming this notion, not only can relations of necessity be known by induction on our experience, but such relations cannot be any more underdetermined by experience than universal regularities. This means that any one believing in a universal regularity is as well warranted to believe in the corresponding relation of necessity. We seem to know a great deal about what is possible or not in this world. For example, I know that glass is fragile, and that if I had let a glass vase fall from my window, it would have 1/17 they can make room for modalities, while modal realists can defend their views in an empiricistfriendly way. This, I think, makes both position less uncomfortable. My arguments assume from the start that there are possibilities of the kind considered in nature, and an empiricist might still be reluctant to accept this. Although I will give few reasons to accept them in passing, the purpose of the paper is not to argue for the existence of situated possibilities. However, it defuses one of the main arguments to reject them: their alleged principled unknowability. Note that there has been a resurgence of empiricist epistemology for modalities in recent years. Some authors have argued in favour of the idea that knowledge of metaphysical possibilities is attainable by induction on experience (Roca-Royes, 201 7 ; Hawke, 2011, ch. 4.2.3; Strohminger, 2015). I am sympathetic to these accounts, and mine shares similarities. However it differs in its focus on natural modalities rather than metaphysical ones, which makes it more modest in this respect. It is also more ambitious in other respects, because I aim to show that one can have knowledge not only of possibilities, but of relations of necessity from experience, and that they are as well-justified as universal regularities.
On Explaining Necessity by the Essence of Essence
Inquiry, 2023
There has been much debate recently on the question whether essence can explain modality. Here, I examine two routes to an essentialist account of modality. The first is Hale's argument for the necessity of essence, which I will argue is-notwithstanding recent attempted defences of it-invalid by its very structure. The second is the proposal that it is essential to essential truth that it is necessary. After o ering three possible versions of the view, I will argue that each fails to provide a metaphysical explanation of necessity in terms of essence.
Blockchains & Cultural Padlocks | Towards a Digitally Cooperative Culture: Recommoning Land, Data and Objects, 2021
Reed’s two-part paper examines the social constitution of necessity as a normative and epistemic referent, orienting the uses and abuses of technology within this historical moment designated as the planetary. Reed’s paper is illustrated with a series of diagrams drawn by the artist, adding a further conceptual dimension to the cosmology of concepts and ideas that the writer travels through.