How the English East India Company Conquered India (original) (raw)
Related papers
War of 1857: Achievements of Indians in their struggle against British
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities , 2014
The war of 1857 was a great event that influenced the future course of history of sub-continent. The war has been a topic of academic discourse for historians and social scientists across the world. Today it has been more than 150 years and this war still attracts researchers for their study. There are several dimensions of this war, such as the causes of the war, events that took place during the war, the people who supported British and those who fought against British, results and consequences. In terms of results many scholars are of the opinion that this war was a failure for those who initiated it. It is generally believed that the section of population of India who fought this war against British authority were unable to achieve their objectives. The war also resulted in many benefits for Indian however these achievements get overshadowed by the debate about the failure. This research effort highlights the achievements of the war for India and the value of them was also extraordinary.
Geopolitics, 2022
A Provincial Rebellion- Albeit a large one as British Company ruled India had massive provinces in a much more massive country that they OWNED August 2022 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18796.23686 Project: operational strategy Agha H Amin Why the Rebellion was confined to only certain regions of Indo-Pak The primary and the first reason for this is very simple. Indo-Pak subcontinent is not one country but a number of countries which have been ruled for most part of their history by one dynasty or race from Delhi till 1947 and now from Islamabad and Delhi. The states of Pakistan and India came into existence in their present form not because the Hindu rulers at Delhi conquered Bengal or Madras or Bombay but because these areas were conquered a long time ago by the EEIC and then subsequently transferred to the British crown in 1858 and to government of India and Pakistan in 1947. The two countries came into existence primarily not because all the regions of Indo-Pak wanted this to happen but because the British simply confined their freedom of choice to two options either to join "India" or "Pakistan". The fragility of this arrangement was successfully challenged for the first time by the Muslim Bengalis who gave us a new version of "two nation theory" by proving that among the Muslims of India and Pakistan also there were two Muslim nations i.e. "West Pakistan Muslims" and "East Pakistan Muslims"! The success of regional parties in Sindh, Balochistan Madras etc. is a clear proof that both the countries consist of different and distinct nationalities. In symbolic terms this arrangement may be compared to "Sigheh or Muttaa" i.e. a marriage limited to a certain period as practiced in Iran!! The sub-continent had been conquered by the EEIC at different periods spread over a century and different regions viewed the British in a different line. We will study some of the regions and bring out the differences. Bengal. This was a very populous region of India. It was ruled by a Nawab before 1757 who had no connection with the Bengalis by race. His departure from the scene in 1757 hardly made any difference to the common Bengali. Bengal in terms of population was the largest province in India in 1857. The North West provinces (Modern UP) had also been part of the Bengal province till 1836 when it was separated. The Bengali common man was a much exploited and oppressed man. But this exploitation and oppression was done by his own Bengali landlords and revenue collector class both Muslim and Hindu. The British did not change the system in this regard. They, however, brought one major change which made post-1857 Bengal one of the most politically conscious regions of India. This was in terms of educating the people. Bengal was too big a province to worry about what was happening in the rest of India. For example the Santhal uprising had little to do with the EEIC. It was an uprising of the Santhal people against oppression by money lenders and railway contractors 543. This rebellion broke out in 1855 and was suppressed by 1857 and the Bengal Army sepoys played a decisive role in suppressing it. The Hindustani sepoy of the EEIC was almost as much of a foreigner for the Bengali as the European. The Bengalis had nothing in common with the Hindustani Brahman, Rajput or Mussulman sepoy of the Bengal Army. These sepoys were actually viewed in Bengal as mercenary watchdogs of the EEIC. Thus although there were only 2,400 European soldiers in Bengal in 1857 as compared to more than 29,000 Hindustani sepoys 544 the rebellion did not succeed. Many sepoy regiments which rebelled were hunted down by common people led by landlords who supported the European troops in destroying them. There were hardly any Bengali in the Bengal Army and during 1857 the British did not recruit any soldiers here. Later on in early twentieth century Bengal became one of the most anti-British area, where probably the maximum number of British officials were assassinated apart from the tribal area of NWFP. But in 1857 the Bengalis were not aware enough to participate in the rebellion. They had no representation in the army so they could not have taken any part in the rebellion. They had little to share with the northwest provinces and EEIC rule had been established here exactly 100 years ago. In all probability the Bengalis were satisfied with the status quo. The Mughal emperor had no relevance to their problems and the only exposure which they had of the Mahrattas was as dacoits and plunderers who raided West Bengal in the pre-1857 era. The pre-1857 Muslim Persian/Turk Nawabs of Bengal had hardly any sympathy with the ethnic Bengali Muslim and mostly relied on Hindu officials for revenue collection.
The Lucknow Campaign 1857-1858
The Lucknow Campaign 1857-1858, 1998
The Lucknow Campaign 1857-1858 June 1998 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27428.37760 Project: Military History Agha H Amin
Britain and the Indian Uprising, MAM Vol II: Introduction
Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857 -- Volume II: Britain and the Indian Uprising, 2013
DESPITE the enduring myth of a nineteenth century Pax Britannica, British rule in India, and across the Empire, was punctuated by revolts, rebellions, insurrection and instability. So endemic were such challenges to British imperial rule that the events of the so-called 'Indian Mutiny' of 1857 have been described as 'unique only in their scale'. 1 1857 was also unique in another way, as the rebellion and its aftermath embedded itself in the British national consciousness in a way unmatched by previous colonial confrontations. One of the fi rst confl icts to be covered by press reporters in the fi eld, the unfolding of events in India in 1857-1858 caught the popular imagination, provoking both virulent debate and a wealth of historical, literary and artistic productions, at the time and since. 2 The sudden, unexpected eruption of violence, the longevity of the subsequent unrest and the atrocities committed against combatants and civilians on both sides, together with the very real threat posed to British rule in India and the perceived challenge to British honour and prestige as an imperial power, set the uprising of 1857 apart from previous confl icts and left an indelible scar on the national psyche. 1857 represented a seminal moment in British imperial history and in Britain's relationship with and attitudes to India. Bringing about fundamental changes in the structure of British power, with the end of East India Company government and the imposition of Crown rule in India, it also impacted in less quantifi able ways on British attitudes to other races and ideas about the potential equality of man, as well as challenging and revealing the fi ssures within Britain's emerging self-perception and identity as an imperial nation. 3 British colonial rule in India can be dated from their victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and their subsequent acceptance of the diwani, or administrative authority, of Bengal in 1765. Over the next century, from footholds in Bengal, Bombay and Madras, the British expanded their territorial control and infl uence via a combination of treaties, agreements, conquests and annexations, until in xvi Introduction 1857 they directly controlled roughly two-thirds of the subcontinent's land and four-fi fths of its population, exercising indirect infl uence over the remainder. 4 Signifi cantly, however, this vast area was not governed by the British crown or Parliament, but by an independent trading concern, the East India Company, which had taken on the administrative control of India in order to secure it as a trade and revenue resource. Its control of the subcontinent was based on a thinly stretched network of British administrators, offi cials and civil servants and a large mercenary army of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. When, in May 1857, sections of this army began to rebel, fi rst at Meerut and then at cantonments across north and central India, they were quickly joined by signifi cant sections of the civilian population and many Britons found themselves stranded and outnumbered in a hostile land. Some were killed at the hands of the rebels, both individually and at infamous massacres such as those at Delhi and Cawnpore. 5 Others fl ed their homes, losing everything, or were besieged in forts and residencies at Agra, Lucknow and elsewhere. 6 The chapter by Ira Bhattacharya in this volume explores some of the diverse experiences of British men and women of different social backgrounds who found themselves under siege, drawing out from their accounts the details of ordinary life under extraordinary circumstances.
Defence Journal, 2001
Clausewitz states that it is far more difficult to understand strategy than tactics since things move very slowly in strategy and the principal actors are far away from the heat and friction of the battlefield. Thus strategy is a hundred more times difficult to comprehend and conduct than tactics. In this final chapter which sums up all that happened we will endeavour to arrive at a strategic summing up. The first fact that stands out is that the men who dominated the Indo-Pak scene, in the period that we have studied, both soldiers and politicians, were all tacticians, none being a strategist! They, some of whom were great men, were caught in historical currents, which were too strong to be manipulated! On one side was a Jungian situation with deep hatred of communalism firmly ingrained in the unfathomed and mysterious subconscious of the vast bulk of the populace! An irrational albeit substantial hatred that increased with leaps and bounds as ambitious middle and higher classes fought for jobs and legislative council seats! These men were clever in a tactical way, having been to some British University or a Legal Inn and were driven by burning egos to be the successors of the British Viceroys! Initially they borrowed some leafs from Europe's Nationalism and talked about India and India's independence as a country! Politics, however, remained in the drawing rooms of rich businessmen and feudals and chambers of barristers and lawyers till the First World War. The First World War constitutes a watershed in world history! It destroyed five Empires, four i.e the Romanoff, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman totally and one i.e the British who won the war but theirs was a Pyhric victory! They lost the will to retain their empire since the flower of its youth was destroyed on the battlefields of France! This fact was indirectly acknowledged by Alan Brooke the British Warlord once he admitted in writing that Britain lost its best men in the First World War. The First World War aroused great expectations in India and the mild lawyers who dominated the Indian political scene before the war saw far greater opportunities in the near future! If Lenin could mobilize the masses in the name of revolution and Kemal could do it in the name of Turkish Nationalism, why not mobilize the Indian masses too over some slogan! Alas India was only a geographical expression! A mosaic of complicated ethnic groups, castes, religions, sects! Who could be the Indian Lenin or Mustafa Kemal! How to bring a revolution! A Hindu called Gandhi discovered one cheap tactical response! A melodramatic employment of ancient Indian/Hindu slogans and names! This wily man tactically outwitted the outwardly
2012
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of research on the history of the colonial armies in South Asia. In fact, the very concept of the army underwent a change in the eighteenth century, when the East India Company tried to raise its own army battalions based on fixed wages and other financial entitlements. The Company’s troops were no longer under the intermediary military-landed elites, as was in the Mughal period, but were placed under the direct command of European professionals, with a greater deal of expertise in modern war science. The Madras Army, for a fairly long period of time was blessed with encomiums on the part of the colonial bosses for being loyal servants of the company’s administration in South India. However, it would be argued that despite retaining its docility, the Madras army revolted on many occasions in the eighteenth century, which reached a point of fruition during the Vellore Mutiny of 1805–1806. The differences in wages, social prestige, race ...
Military Aspects of the Indian Uprising, MAM Vol IV: Introduction
Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857 -- Volume IV: Military Aspects of the Indian Uprising, 2013
The SAGE Team: Shambhu Sahu, Punita Kaur Mann xvi Gavin Rand and Crispin Bates marginal in recent literature. Despite the fundamentally military origins of the rebellion and counter-insurgency, the histories of those who fought in and commanded the belligerent armies, their motivations, experiences and memories have received less scholarly attention than might have been expected. Similarly, while contemporary responses to the military rebellion have been usefully surveyed to reveal various competing narratives of class, gender, locality and religion, the contours of military life and administration during (and after) 1857 are less clearly defi ned. This absence refl ects a wider neglect of the imperial military within the extant historiography: whilst both South Asian studies and 'the new imperial history' have enjoyed signifi cant expansion in recent years, and questions of empire and military power are frequently invoked in wider discussions of modernity and global history, there are, with notable exceptions, relatively few accounts of the military in British India, unquestionably the preeminent imperial military institution of the colonial period. 5
As the East India Company prepared for its First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42), its officials grew suspicious of a Muslim uprising within British India. They became convinced that itinerant Muslim reformers—mislabeled " Wahhabis " —were inciting princes of India's Deccan region to rebellion. This article describes how the very talk of this " Wahhabi conspiracy " not only triggered the interventionist impulses of the colonial state, but also inspired local intrigues associated with the downfall of two Indo-Afghan princes of the Deccan, Kurnool's Ghulam Rasul Khan and Udayagiri's Abbas Ali Khan. In both cases a preoccupation with the transnational Wahhabi operative masked local and sometimes petty interests, which drove the politics of these smaller regimes. The case studies of Kurnool and Udayagiri illustrate how news of events arising in one region of imperial conflict could " travel " to remote regions of India's Deccan, evolving into conspiracy narratives along the way. The discourse of conspiracy provided a pretext for military action and the annexation of territory. The story being told, however, is not simply about paranoid colonial officers who were all too eager to intervene , but is also about local entrepreneurs who knew how to exploit the situation toward their own ends.