A new ‘Great Schism'? The theopolitics of communion and canonical territory in the Orthodox Church (original) (raw)
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Russian Analytical Digest, 2019
A rapid and sudden change of religious and political boundaries and identities in connection with the contestation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Ecumenical Patriarchate has remodeled the church schism in Ukraine, but without resolving it. Global Orthodoxy is going to be split into mutually exclusive clusters with two major centers, Moscow and Istanbul. Against the background of the 2019 presidential campaign, this theopolitical conflict in Ukraine could trigger a bloody religious war with far-reaching consequences.
Przegląd Zachodni, Journal of the Institute of Western Affairs in Poznań, Special Issue, 2019
The aim of the article is to analyse the place and importance of the Orthodox Church in the society and political culture of Ukraine after 2013. The new political realities following the Revolu-tion of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas created new challenges for the Or-thodox Church in Ukraine. Particularly important is the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church’s authority over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.At the turn of 2018 and 2019, by a decision of Patriarch Bartholomew I and with the support of the Ukrainian political authorities, a new reality became fact in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (as a metropolis) does not mean that the split has been overcome. There will be two hostile, equal and comparably strong structures in Ukraine, politically backed by Ukraine and Russia, and this will draw those countries into conflicts over their religious structures and the wealth that their communities possess. At this stage, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine will rely primarily on the potential of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, and this fact in turn will hinder the transfer of bishops and priests associated with the Moscow Patriarchate. The rift will be difficult to repair.
Teologia, 2019
This article presents an analysis of the complex interdependencies between the nature of regional confl icts, broader geopolitical projections and their implications for religious institutions in Ukraine, especially for the majority church in the country, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. After a general introduction, the fi rst part analyzes certain Ukrainian and broader Eastern European geopolitical variables with the scope to demonstrate coercive mechanisms aimed to projecting power at regional levels. The fi rst chapter of part I presents some general geopolitical facts related with the Ukrainian confl ict. The second chapter deals with more specifi c geopolitical facts. It presents two examples of how big global actors play with geopolitical complexities. The third chapter presents a recent incident between Russia and Ukraine, which shows that the struggle for controlling the region of the Black Sea is ongoing. The second part deals with the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its immediate ecclesial and geopolitical implications. The fi rst chapter is aimed to provide evidence of interest for the problems we deal with in this article. The second chapter proves the important place and role played by religion in Ukraine. The third chapter explains the “Ukrainian issue” from an ecclesial perspective. The fourth chapter offers a short historical overview of six facts which determine the “Ukrainian issue” today. The fi fth chapter presents the recent events related to the granting of autocephaly to the newly established Ukrainian Orthodox Church which unites together two already existing Orthodox Churches in Ukraine (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church.) Chapter six presents and analyzes the fi rst reactions of some Orthodox Churches to this decision. This article is concluded with some remarks.
The decline of the communist regime in the late 1980s stimulated decentralizing processes within the Russian Orthodox Church; a final result being the emergence of Eastern Christian Churches in independent Ukraine: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Throughout the next two and a half decades the Ukrainian religious landscape has been simultaneously characterized by sharp conflicts and a search for ways of peaceful coexistence between various confessions; ecumenical initiatives, and asserting one’s “canonicity” against the “schismatic” others; attempts by some Churches to act as civil agencies and national institutions; attempts by the state under President Yanukovych to revive a “state” Church following the Russian model; moves towards a Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church and also towards “Russkii mir” (The Russian World). Crucial issues are — the Churches’ search for their place in the post-Soviet Ukrainian realm and their choices of models for coexistence with Ukrainian officialdom and society. In its approach the article provides a general profile of each Church, examines state policies towards religion and the Church in independent Ukraine, and describes a turning point, that being the Revolution of Dignity’s deep influence on the Churches’ perceptions of themselves and their place in Ukrainian life. Key Words: Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Ukrainian society, state-church relations.
‘Greek Catholic’–‘Orthodox’–‘Soviet’: a symbiosis or a conflict of identitites?
Religion, state & society, 2004
At a recent World Council of Churches consultation it was stated that at a fundamental theological level the identity of the Christian church is 'based on Christ' (Thompson, 2002, p. 1). Few will doubt, however, that the church's identity goes beyond this basic theological definition. The reason for this is suggested by the influential nineteenth-century Catholic theologian John Henry Newman, when he stresses that a church is not 'placed in a void, but in the crowded world' and that its outlook must correspond to 'persons and circumstances, and must be thrown into new shapes according to the form of society' in which it functions (Newman, 1974, pp. 131-50). This suggests that the church always faces the necessity of reconciling its religious identity with inescapable 'this-worldly' identities (political, national and social), adopting an attitude towards the secular authorities (political loyalty) and towards national identity and achieving an understanding of its place and role in a society (social identity). The strain amongst these identities becomes especially acute in unfavourable surroundings when the church's religious self is jeopardised, as, for instance, under a regime professing atheist ideas. For a religious person, who becomes the primary locus of tension, the problem reflects itself in a contradiction between one's private and public identities (Cochran, 1990). A significance that attaining a sense of non-controversial identity has for the psychological comfort of an individual as well as for group regulation and functioning implies that choices of certain identities become essential to the preservation of a religious community and institution under such circumstances. The quest for identity on the part of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic (Byzantine-rite) Churches in Soviet Ukraine in the period from the late 1940s to the 1980s was quite complicated. Each faced the difficulty of combining political and social loyalties with its religious identity, given the inherent atheist character of Marxist-Leninist ideology upon which the regime based its legitimacy, coupled with its commitment to reform Soviet society according to the Marxist vision of communism that 'abolishes eternal truths ... abolishes all religion ... instead of constituting them on a new basis' (Marx and Engels, 1957, p. 88). The regime's aspiration for total control, involving the blurring of boundaries between the 'private' and the 'public' and thereby virtually depriving Soviet citizens of the former, made the problem even more intense. The faithful of the Ukrainian *In its original form, this paper was first presented at the postgraduate history conference 'Fresh Perspectives on Conflict and Change' at the
Expanding Religious Borders? The New Influence of Some Old State Churches: The Russian Orthodoxy
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) seeks to support the foreign as well as the interior interests of the Russian people, as defined by the authorities. The Moscow patriarchate is religiously elevating, symbolically representing and historically substantiating the political course of Putin and his inner-circle. But in this respect the ROC effectively does not differ from other religions in the region, such as Lutheranism in the Baltic States. It appeals to large parts of the Russian population to see the ROC in the function of the defender of its ‘canonical territory,’ as well as of the cultural traditions of this religiously united ‘Orthodox world.’ On the other hand, only a small minority actually takes an active role in the religious life of its church. As far as schools are concerned, the vast majority of Russians prefers the teaching of secular values and norms to religious instruction. Essentially, the ROC possesses no power that is anchored in the people, as is the case for an institution like the Roman Catholic Church in Poland; instead it holds only a derived power, dependent on the good will of political leaders. Ultimately, it remains dependent on a ‘de-secularisation from above,’ supported only by the national-conservative elite, who are willing to promote the influence of orthodoxy because it serves their national-political purposes. The difference from other state–church relationships lies in the fact that the humble ROC effectively supports almost all the Moscow Regime’s interior and foreign policy projects, while the self-confident and independent churches in the Western hemisphere frequently assume the role of a public conscience and ethically-motivated opposition with regard to their parliaments’ and political leaders’ decisions. According to these different traditions, the ROC works as mere supporter and ethical reinforcer of Moscow’s politics, not as a moral marker and persistent advocate of universal human rights, as is the case in the Western hemisphere.
Healing the Division of the Orthodox in Ukraine; the Diaspora as a Model for Reconciliation
There is an ancient tradition within Christianity whose worship and culture are distinctly Eastern, Byzantine/Greek, and Orthodox. In Ukraine there are four large Churches that are part of this tradition: the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), the Ukrainian Autocephalist Orthodox Church (UAOC), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP). All of these Churches have the same commitment to salvation through Christ, the same belief in the reality and efficacy of the Holy Mysteries (or Sacraments), the same (or very similar) Rite of Worship, and the same (or very similar) ecclesiology (e.g. “apostolic succession”). Ironically, they also profess the same commitment to fulfilling God's desire that “we all be one as He is one” (St. John 17:22b). This is ironic because none of these groups, despite their common beliefs, culture, and purpose, are in communion with one another. Instead, they have parallel structures and often act more like competitors than brothers in our Lord Jesus Christ. In this paper, I describe the common genesis of these Churches and the five “moments” that led to their division, how their disorder asserted itself in America, how some of these divisions in America have been overcome, and how this reconciliation provides reason for our hope of closer ecclesiastical cooperation and even unity in Ukraine.
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2023
The editors have divided the book into four sections: 1. Orthodoxy Global and Local, 2. Conceptualizations, 3.Ecclesiological issues, and 4.Church, State, and Society. This volume was published just before the Russian Federation undertook a further escalation of its previous invasions of Ukraine. The February 2022 invasion was the most brutal of all and taught us that Putin's desire was to erase Ukraine from all maps and to destroy the concept of "Ukrainian," as to whether culture, nationality, language, or literature existed at all. The fact that the Russian Orthodox Church has provided ecclesiastical and theological cover for the Putin regime's merciless war, has heightened the worldwide conflicts in the Orthodox Church that had been brewing for some time, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. All of this makes the publication of this book most timely. The review gives brief, but helpful, summaries to the chapters.