Metaphor as Levinas's method (original) (raw)

Levinas claims that his descriptions of ethical imperatives or face adopt phenomenological method. However, he also claims that doing so necessarily involves moving beyond phenomenology, because the ethical lies beyond phenomenality. Levinas thus adopts phenomenological method only to subvert it. He does so because the subject matter itself (die Sache selbst) requires such subversion. Levinas then is faithful to what Husserl calls the principle of all principles: ‘To the things themselves.’ I submit that the specific method Levinas employs while subverting phenomenology—although starting from phenomenology—is metaphor. Face is a metaphor (perhaps, the metaphor) of the ethical imperative, but it is more than a metaphor. Face, as presence and the whole being of the Other, including the nape of her neck, the hand or shoulder, the eyes, the look, the solicitation, the nakedness, the frankness or the straightforwardness—the whole ‘flesh and bone,’ as it were, even her footsteps—all these are referred to by the word ‘face.’ Thus, face is a metaphor for the Other. And yet it is more than a metaphor. This is so in two ways. First, face literally means a face of a person, You; and at the same time it also means a speech or a command. As such face must be taken both literally and non-literally. Metaphor, on the other hand, transports from one concept to another in order to predicate something new. It cannot be taken literally, as face demands it to be taken. Face is the imperative. The literal and the non-literal is joined in the thing itself, in the face itself that expresses itself, kath’ hauto. Face is more than a metaphor in yet another sense. It transgresses its phenomenal manifestation. It absolves itself from its manifestations. As the saying, it crosses over the said into the ethical and commands. Face is like an icon in that in its speaking, it crosses and transgresses its phenomenality. It denudes itself, abstracting from forms and figures. Metaphor does not denude itself in abstraction. Unlike icon and metaphor, furthermore, face is direct. It does not create the distance that the icon creates between itself and the architype; or it does not require a detour of transporting one concept to another as in metaphor. Face commands me directly. It does not defer, and forbids deferral. One cannot evade the face. Despite these critical differences, we can still speak of the face as the living icon of the ethical. For face is a concrete and physical manifestation of the ethical, analogous to icon referring to the divine in the concrete and physical. The Other in her vulnerability and nakedness is the concrete and material manifestation (“an exorbitant ultramateriality”) of the ethical. One cannot approach the Other with an empty hand, Levinas insists. Face is the finite locus of the infinity of the Other, requiring concrete, physical, and material response to the infinite degree. The Other in her ultramateriality, in her vulnerability, bears her infinity, like the icon bearing its architype in its unlikeness and distance to the architype. Icon or metaphor in its surplus functions sets the limits to phenomenological method that seeks to exceed the limits of phenomenality. Levinas calls such a methodological limit skepticism, to which face invariably falls prey. A face can be defaced, like a discarded icon or a worn out metaphor. The method can betray the subject matter of the inquiry, as an icon can turn into an idol or decommissioned.