Reconceptualizing Deterrence: Nudging Toward Rationality in Middle Eastern Rivalries, (Routledge: Global Security Studies, 2013). (original) (raw)
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EDITOR’S PREFACE: Elli Lieberman’s Reconceptualizing Deterrence is a wide- ranging study of deterrence in the Middle East over the past seven decades. For the JCWS, Lieberman’s analysis of how deterrence worked (and did not work) in the Middle East during the Cold War is of particular relevance. We asked three leading experts on conventional and nuclear deterrence— George H. Quester, Patrick M. Morgan, and Jeffrey S. Lantis—to provide short commentaries on this and other aspects of the book. Their commentaries are published here seriatim along with a reply by Lieberman.
The Concept of Deterrence in Arab and Muslim Thought – Executive Summary
2013
prevent Iran from acquiring a military nuclear capability debate in the academic and strategic communities regarding the applicability of modern theories of deterrence to the parties and relationships in that region of the world. The key questions in this context are: how will state and non-state actors in the region attempt to deter each other and external powers (e.g. the United States, Israel), what level of brinkmanship will such deterrence entail, how will these actors receive and interpret corresponding deterrent messages from their adversaries, how do they perceive both the means by which they can deter adversaries and the legitimacy of restraint or relinquishing declared goals in the face of deterrent signals and can we identify precursor components of an nuclear deterrence doctrine that may take shape when these entities acquire a nuclear capability. Deterrence of collective entities (i.e. states individuals) is with cultural overtones. Messages are read through prisms of t...
BALANCE OF POWER IN ARAB-PERSIAN RIVALRY AND THE PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN MIDDLE-EAST
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This article attempts to analyze the new cold war in Middle East (ME) between the Arabs and Persians, assuming Iran to be a critical actor and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as its main contender for regional hegemony. Lately, ME conflicts have shown a great tendency towards intense internationalization, eruption of ethnic conflict, use of non-state actor and an alarming usage of prohibited weapons. Meanwhile, Israel's covert nuclear capability and Iran's insistence to acquire nuclear energy gives legitimacy to Arab's attempts at going nuclear or least be tolerated to invest significantly in conventional weapon pile up as well as attaining nuclear energy for peaceful means. These variables may pose interesting challenges to the balance of power quotient in ME. An overindulgence by either Iran and KSA in balancing each other out may eventually result in nuclear proliferation in ME as a final measure to deter an array of threats for the two states. The article uses Regional Security Complex theory and Game theory to analyze the rationality of going nuclear for either of these two ideological hegemons in Contemporary Middle East.
Self-deterrence: Nuclear weapons and the enduring credibility challenge
In this article I argue that it is much harder to deter and compel non-nuclear states and terrorist groups through the threat of use of nuclear weapons than proponents of nuclear use contend. A counter-proliferation strategy relying on nuclear threat and preventive war has serious limitations and may well be a source of nuclear proliferation rather than non-proliferation. While the fear of a retaliatory attack constrains a nuclear state from using its nuclear weapons against another nuclear state, a nuclear state may not be able to mount and execute a nuclear retaliatory strike against a non-nuclear state or a non-state actor for reasons beyond military calculations. The nuclear state could be restrained by self-imposed reputational concerns arising from moral, legal, and other normative considerations. This form of restraint can be aptly termed ''self-deterrence.'' This article first elaborates the concept of self-deterrence and then explores the core reasons for its prevalence. There may be multiple reasons for self-deterrence, including domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, and leaders' psychology, especially in terms of risk aversion. However, in light of the historical record—especially instances from US nuclear history—reputational considerations appear to be crucial in explaining self-deterrence. These reputational considerations derive largely from three sources: the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, moral restraints, and legal principles regarding the use of nuclear weapons. I conclude by arguing that deterrence theory and policy need to take into account this aspect of self-deterrence along with cultural, psychological , and domestic-level constraints that have been presented as challenges to that theory's premises and applicability.
Lindenstrauss and Berelovich The Concept of Deterrence in Arab and Muslim Thought - Turkey
Like many states, Turkey is still adapting to the post-Cold War era in many respects. As Turkey tries to assess the changing strategic environment, it also responds to developments concerning Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iranian nuclear advances are currently causing tensions in the Middle East and in the Gulf, which are likely to intensify even further into the future. If Iran continues down the nuclear path and other states in the region like Saudi Arabia follow, Turkey may have to face a decision: will it continue with its Cold War and post-Cold War policies of emphasizing its membership in NATO and the alliance's nuclear guarantees? Or will Turkey move toward a much more independent stance? At some point, Turkey may even consider leaving the alliance and developing its own nuclear capabilities. In this paper, we present two scenarios. In the first scenario, Turkey maintains its relations with the West and continues to rely on its own strong conventional capabilities and on US-NATO's nuclear guarantee. In the second scenario, Turkey's internal dynamics, a change in the Turkish threat perception, and the weakening of the US-NATO alliance's assurances causes Turkey to choose to develop independent nuclear capabilities. Both scenarios reflect the doctrine of deterrence by punishment; while in the first scenario Turkey extended deterrence forms a major basis of its strategy, in the second scenario it builds its own nuclear capabilities.
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Prospects for Peace: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East
Nuclear proliferation theory is divided into two camps, pessimists and optimists. 1 Optimists argue the spread of nuclear weapons is a counter-balancing force that creates stability between states. In support of nuclear proliferation, optimists believe that aggressive state behavior is significantly ameliorated when faced with the prospect of a nuclear attack or nuclear annihilation. The presence of nuclear weapons reduces state incentives for either territory or political power, because short-term material gains may be obliterated with a nuclear counterattack. Consequently, regional stability is enhanced by nuclear proliferation, because states are truly faced with prospects for reciprocal eradication, leading to more amenable behavior in finding political solutions to inter-state disputes.
Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16
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What are the sources of stable deterrence? Exploring the conºict between Israel and Hezbollah before and since the 2006 Lebanon War, this article seeks to shed light on this important question. The core argument of the article is that a principal explanation for the decade-long deterrence stability between Israel and Hezbollah is that both actors learned to adopt a deterrence strategy that met the theoretical conditions for deterrence success as laid out in the security studies literature. The article examines the parties' behavior in the lead-up to, and then in the long aftermath of, the 2006 war. And although there are likely multiple explanations for the deterrence stability along the Israeli-Lebanese border from 2006 to 2016, this article concentrates on Israel's and Hezbollah's deliberate efforts to avoid another war. This comparative examination shows that deterrence failed and succeeded as predicted by rational deterrence theory. In addition, given the vast military disparity between Israel and Hezbollah, this case enables scholars to advance their understanding of how relatively weak actors, including violent nonstate actors, can coerce and deter stronger opponents. I argue that to deter a superior opponent, a weak actor needs to convince its adversary of its ability to render its own tactical capabilities strategic and the opponent's strategic capabilities tactical. A weaker actor can thus deter a superior opponent if it can secure the ability to repeatedly hold the latter's assets at risk and minimize its own vulnerability. For the weak actor, reduced vulnerability means a credible and effective residual ability to inºict pain. While such asymmetric deterrence requires a degree of shared knowledge and military capabilities, this case highlights the role of deterrence communication. Deterrence communication does more than reºect the structural elements of capabilities and resolve. It also ampliªes the psychological impact of military capabilities, and thus plays a role in manipulating the perception of threat and shaping assessments. The mainstream policy and media debate on Hezbollah has traditionally