The Magic of the Generic: A Critique of the Studies on Generic Sentences (original) (raw)

Generic sentences (eg. Birds fly or Cows have four legs) have always posed a challenge to the classical calculi of logical semantics as they do violate truth conditions in the sense that they allow exceptions. A generic cannot be rendered flawed in spite of the fact that there are birds like emu and ostrich who do not fly and there are cows who do not have all the four legs. Hence it is interesting to enquire as in how the generics are computed in human mind. Linguists of various hues have enquired into the semantics of generics. This paper presents a critique of the major theoretical proposals put forth by linguists on the nature of these generics. This article refrains from providing a conclusive answer to the question but provides cues about the salient issues concerning the theorization of the semantics of generic sentences.