Is the Religious Left Resurgent? Sociology of Religion 81(2) 131-141. 2020. (original) (raw)
Related papers
This paper begins with a look at the American Religious Right, stemming from its roots in the troubled racial politics of the 1960s and its consolidation and rise to power in the 1970s and 1980s. It will then consider how its repertoire has been largely narrowed to a pair of hot-button social issues – abortion and gay marriage – and critically evaluate the claim as to whether we are living in a “post-Religious Right” world. Secondly, it will assess the possibility for a new liberal coalition, a so-called “Religious Left,” and which social groups might possibly form the basis of such an effort. While understanding that the delicate interface of religion and politics must be treated with care and is a highly subjective matter, it will seek to unite the good intentions of liberal political theory with the driving moral and spiritual fulfillment of religion at its best.
Religion and progressive politics in the United States
Sociology Compass
In recent years, scholars interested in the role of religion in American public life have largely focused on the Christian Right or the role of religion in civic life. Compared to these extensive literatures, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of religion in liberal or progressive politics. These efforts are more widespread and more racially, socioeconomically and religiously diverse than is typically recognized. Moreover, while these actors seek influence within the most visible political realms of elections and policymaking, they also focus on shaping the cultural identities, narratives and discourses that undergird democratic life. This article offers a framework through which to conceptualize the progressive religious field of action, and reviews the growing body of research on the individuals and organizations that comprise this field. It begins by examining the prevalence of progressive religious views and activities among the general public; reviews research on three different types of progressive religious political organizations-national advocacy organizations, social movements, and faith-based community organizations-as well as religious congregations' efforts to spur members to political consciousness and mobilization; and evaluates the place of progressive religion in American political culture. Finally, it points to fruitful areas for future research.
Beyond the God Gap: Mapping Religiopolitical Heterogeneity in the United States
Sociological Forum, 2022
Research has consistently found that the link between religious and political identification and behavior in the United States has grown significantly, as religious populations have increasingly aligned with the political right while secular Americans move toward the political left. Yet, other research cautions that most Americans are not extreme either politically or religiously. In this study I seek to integrate these claims by applying a latent class analysis to religious and political indicators from the 2016 American National Election Study. Results show six distinct profiles of religiopolitical orientation. Two of these profiles partially correspond to a religious conservative vs. secular liberal binary, but differ in key characteristics such as size and style of political engagement, exhibiting a dynamic of what I describe as asymmetric polarization. The remainder of the population exhibits religiopolitical orientations that fit with neither extreme. Instead, they fall into one of four internally coherent groups: 1) Religious but apolitical, 2) religious and political but ideologically diverse, 3) nonreligious and apolitical, and 4) nominally religious but behaviorally disengaged from both domains. Rather than polarization or moderation and incoherence, the relationship between religion and politics in the United States may be usefully described in terms of structured heterogeneity.
America’s 2018 midterm elections provide an opportunity to assess white evangelical Protestants’ counterintuitive embrace of Trump. Reports of the President’s past infidelities, suspicious business deals, and possible electoral collusion with Russia appear to have done little to abate the support of America’s most socially conservative law-and-order voters - white evangelical Protestants. PRRI (Public Religion Research Institute) data demonstrates though Trump never polled above 50 percent favourability with white evangelical-Protestants during the primaries, since his 2016 election the constituency has only grown more ‘Trump-drunk’ with a record 75 percent endorsing the President and his commitment to put ‘America First’. Although America’s Christian right have long-standing Republican inclinations; evangelicals’ self-abasement under Trump remains difficult to understand. White evangelicals have migrated from a Christian movement guilty of overt partisan identification even gullibility for political leverage; to a movement willing to corrupt their faith values and religious tradition for political opportunities. The effect as Gerson notes, (2018) is a faith tradition now riddled with ‘…political tribalism and hatred for political opponents, with little remaining of Christian public witness’. Keller cuts deeper, ‘evangelical’ used to mean those who take the moral high ground, but now it’s nearly synonymous with hypocrite (Keller cited in Gerson, 2018). ‘With an end-justifies-the-means style of politics that would have been unimaginable before [Trump]…’ (Jones cited in Coppins a, 2018) it seems America’s evangelicals are putting politics before God. Subsequently this article reflects on Trump’s priestly rhetoric and evangelical priestly faith, why are they so receptive? Secondly, what have the Christian right tabled or achieved under Trump’s administration? Lastly, how has Trump changed American evangelicalism and the nation?
Is There a Religious Left?: Evidence from the 2006 and 2008 ANES
With the aid of new religiosity items on the ANES we are able to uncover considerable evidence of a “Religious Left” made up of Christians who hold a communitarian view of their faith. Going beyond the conventional “God Gap” perspective that relies on measures of individual piety, our findings demonstrate that communitarian religiosity influences partisanship, policy views, and presidential vote choice.
America’s 2018 midterm elections provide an opportunity to assess white evangelical Protestants’ counterintuitive embrace of Trump. Reports of the President’s past infidelities, suspicious business deals, and possible electoral collusion with Russia appear to have done little to abate the support of America’s most socially conservative law-and-order voters - white evangelical Protestants. PRRI (Public Religion Research Institute) data demonstrates though Trump never polled above 50 percent favourability with white evangelical-Protestants during the primaries, since his 2016 election the constituency has only grown more ‘Trump-drunk’ with a record 75 percent endorsing the President and his commitment to put ‘America First’. Although America’s Christian right have long-standing Republican inclinations; evangelicals’ self-abasement under Trump remains difficult to understand. White evangelicals have migrated from a Christian movement guilty of overt partisan identification even gullibility for political leverage; to a movement willing to corrupt their faith values and religious tradition for political opportunities. The effect as Gerson notes (2018) is a faith tradition now riddled with ‘…political tribalism and hatred for political opponents, with little remaining of Christian public witness’. Keller cuts deeper, ‘evangelical’ used to mean those who take the moral high ground, but now it’s nearly synonymous with hypocrite (Keller cited in Gerson, 2018). ‘With an end-justifies-the-means style of politics that would have been unimaginable before [Trump]…’ (Jones cited in Coppins a, 2018) it seems America’s evangelicals are putting politics before God. Subsequently this article reflects on 4 dimensions of Trump’s win with white evangelicals. Firstly, how Trump and the GOP presented 2016 as the ‘last chance election’, why nostalgia chimed with evangelicals. Secondly it will explore Trump’s priestly rhetoric and white evangelicals priestly faith in him; how does Trump, like his Republican predecessors use religious language to convince values voters he’s shares their concern for America. Thirdly, what has been achieved under Trump, what has his administration given white evangelical-Protestants in return for their votes? Lastly how has putting politics before faith changed America? Will nativism and tribalism consume their faith-tradition, just as it’s dividing the country?