China's Rise and Balance of Power Politics (original) (raw)
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Stosunki Międzynarodowe, 2022
Strategic competition and rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations in the past decade. Central to this growing strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing is the tug of war between the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the role of China's 'peaceful rise/ peaceful development' strategy and assertive nationalism characteristic of Chinese foreign policymaking in creating an atmosphere of tension and misunderstanding between Beijing and Washington have been largely overlooked. This paper, therefore, seeks to understand the relationship between the rise and fall of China's 'peaceful rise/peaceful development' concept, the emerging prominence of assertive nationalism in China's foreign policy making and a deteriorating US-China relations with deepening strategic mistrust between the two major powers through a comparativehistorical analysis of China's BRI and the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy. Rather than demonstrating China's commitment to its 'peaceful rise/ peaceful development' to the world, this paper argues that Beijing's offensive to defend China's national interests in a confrontational manner is an indication that an increasingly confident Chinese leadership no longer feels the need for reassuring the world that China's 'rise' is peaceful and non-threatening in nature. This could embolden Beijing to defy (if not explicitly challenge) the 'rules-based international order' upheld/ defended by Washington, thereby spelling the end of China's 'peaceful rise/peaceful development' strategy.
Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers - China and India
2011
This chapter overviews the themes and conclusions of the volume, examining the causes behind the rise of China and India, the implications for the U.S., and the responses of other Asian states. main argument: China and India will likely sustain high levels of economic growth for some time due to favorable factor endowments, sensible national policies, and the benefits of late integration into the liberal international order maintained by U.S. power. Although the global dominance of Asia's rising giants is not inevitable, given that they both face significant domestic challenges, other Asian states are integrating economically with China especially, and at the same time are seeking ways to preserve their own security and autonomy against China's economic, political, and military ambitions. While India is far from becoming the central strategic focus of Asia, its internally powered rise foreshadows greater future possibilities and its democratic system makes it an attractive partner for other states seeking to counterbalance China's growing might. policy implications: • Whereas the U.S. tolerated relative decline during the first wave of Asian ascendance due to alliances with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, the rise of China and India requires policymakers to grapple with managing the dilemma of sustaining economic interdependence that generates overall growth but produces new geopolitical rivals to U.S. primacy. • The U.S. and India share a strategic affinity that neither can easily replicate with China. However, unlike the dependency developing between the U.S. and China, engagement with India has not yet produced a relationship deep enough that its failure would cost both sides dearly. • The U.S. cannot presume that the extant international order will pacify a rising power such as China. Instead, the U.S. must seek to rebuild its strength and reinvigorate the Asian alliance system.
The Sino-Indian Rivalry and Balance-of-power Theory: Explaining India's Underbalancing
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2024
Balance-of-power theory has been challenged as insufficient for explaining state behaviour. Powerful anomalies for the theory exist, especially among states confronting intense rivalry and war. One such anomaly is underbalancing in the Sino-Indian rivalry by the Indian side up until 2017. Today India is still engaged in limited hard balancing, relying on asymmetrical arms build-up and strategic partnership with the United States and Japan that are not equal to military alignment. This article argues that India has occasionally engaged in hard balancing, relying on arms build-up and limited alliance formation, but in general, there has been a serious effort not to resort to intense hard balancing by forming military alliances or symmetrical arms build-up. This calls for an explanation. The core argument I make is that the type of balancing is intimately related to the type of rivalry states have. The China-India rivalry has yet to become an intense existential variety compared to the India-Pakistan rivalry where existential security and protection of national identity are of major concern. Indian elite's perceptions of the non-existential character of the Chinese threat and their reading of the Chinese strategy towards India have been the primary factors in explaining India's balancing response. In the latter, active hard balancing has been occurring both internally and externally, whereas the former is characterised by a combination of limited hard balancing, soft-balancing and diplomatic engagement, components of a hedging strategy. The hard balancing has picked up momentum since 2017 in response to a more assertive strategy of the Xi Jinping regime as the Chinese government has ratcheted up military activity on the India-China border. The general implication is that rivals who do not fear existential threats need not engage in intense hard balancing. Perceptions of the threat level play a bigger role in what kind of balancing behaviour occurs in international politics than acknowledged in standard theories on balance of power, especially of the automatic balancing variety.
Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations
Strategic competition and rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations in the past decade. Central to this growing strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing is the tug of war between the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the role of China’s ‘peaceful rise/ peaceful development’ strategy and assertive nationalism characteristic of Chinese foreign policymaking in creating an atmosphere of tension and misunderstanding between Beijing and Washington have been largely overlooked. This paper, therefore, seeks to understand the relationship between the rise and fall of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ concept, the emerging prominence of assertive nationalism in China’s foreign policy making and a deteriorating US-China relations with deepening strategic mistrust between the two major powers through a comparative-historical analysis of China’s BRI and the US-led Indo-Pacific s...
China in the contemporary world order: grand strategy, military modernization, and balance of power
Revista Sociedade e Cultura, 2020
The aim of this paper is to analyze the military determinants of China’s strategic posture at the beginning of the 21st century, especially after the wide-ranging military reform introduced by Xi Jinping in 2015. China has faced major challenges in combining military modernization and Peaceful Development in a strategic environment marked by the balance of power logic. In this context, this paper points out the importance of military modernization for China’s grand strategy, even if it means the risk of growing tensions with regional and global military powers.
The dynamics of current international strategic environment suggest that world politics is going to transform from uni-polarity to multi-polarity due to geo-strategic interaction among the states. Rise of China in Asia, a power house of economic activity, makes it imperative for the United States of America to take care of its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Most of the scholarly works are now a days focused upon the emergence of China as a great power and looking for the strategies about how to contain it. In this context, The White House came up with an 'Asia Pivot'/'Rebalancing Strategy' in 2011, which is focused but not limited to enhancing the US military presence in the Asia Pacific region by the end of this decade. On the other hand, China pursues an independent foreign policy based on objectives to ensure its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic development. However, Chinese response to the US Rebalancing Strategy has become a matter of quest for scholars in international politics. Some believe it to be a New Cold War between the two major powers in the 21 st century whereas others foresee the US politico-economic superiority in the long term. This paper, therefore, focuses on enquiring the Chinese response to the US Rebalancing strategy, and explores whether the two major powers are going for a risky military standoff or not.
The Chinese Balance – a new International order
This essay suggests the idea that China’s gradual rise to power would result in the advent of a bipolar International system. It challenges the claim that a rising China poses a significant threat to international security and disagrees with the claim that a security dilemma would arise. This paper concludes that through interaction and increased inter-dependence, the peaceful balance of power between the U.S and China is possible.
From the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific Expanding Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition
As a pivotal region, the Indo-Pacific has become the power center of world geopolitics. China is actively working on strengthening win-win cooperation and inter-connectivity within the region. Toward this goal, it has launched the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” from which all regional countries can benefit. From the geopolitical perspective, however, the United States has perceived growing challenge from China and is determined to maintain global supremacy by continuing to increase its military presence in the Indo-Pacific and enhancing its quadrilateral strategic cooperation with Japan, Australia and India. After the Obama administration’s “Rebalancing” efforts to sustain U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific by strengthening political, security and economic ties with regional countries, the Trump administration puts much emphasis on the security aspect of its Indo-Pacific strategy under the “America First” doctrine, and this is proving to be rather unwelcome among regional countries.
The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability
2011
Herein lies the challenge, analytical as well as political: Despite divergent interests, probable frictions, and the possibility of conflict, can an established power and a rising one credibly pledge not to threaten or strike the other in these strategic domains? If they cannot, their relationship may be defined increasingly by the dangers they pose to each other. If they can, those dangers can be tamed, and the relationship can be more constructive for both countries, for the Asia-Pacific region, and for the world. xvii Acknowledgments Of the many persons who in one way or another helped the authors conduct this study and write this book, several stand out. First and foremost is research assistant Ross Rustici, whose exceptional knowledge of both China and strategic affairs is matched by his inquisitiveness, discipline, and energy as an analyst. The best way to sum up his contribution is to say that this book would not exist without him. When Ross left us to join the U.S. Government, his place was taken by Roxanne Bannon, our indispensable research assistant for the final stage of work. We thank them both profoundly. Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Research Analyst Isaac Kardon also assisted in gathering materials, especially for chapter three. Throughout this work, we relied on our colleague and counselor Hans Binnendijk, INSS Vice President for Research and Applied Learning, for both strong encouragement and intellectual challenge, drawn from his extraordinary career as a public servant, strategic thinker, and executive. One of the keys to successful research is to engage merciless reviewers. Ours were James Mulvenon, Elaine Bunn, and Jonathan Pollack. Having worked with them before, we expected and got painstakingly thorough and tough reviews, with James concentrating especially on cyber issues, Elaine on nuclear and strategic issues generally, and Jonathan on China and Sino-American relations. The book is better because of them. We also benefited from feedback received on a December 2010 research trip to China and from comments following presentations for Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff audiences. We are also especially grateful to Dennis Blair and Terry Pudas for sharing their wisdom on one of the thornier issues we faced: how to reconcile a seemingly unstoppable extension of conventional military conflict into cyberspace with a compelling need to avoid general cyber war. While the book's ideas in this regard are ours to defend, they were influenced and improved by our exchanges with Blair and Pudas. Equally important was our access to Martin Libicki and his fertile mind. Bruce MacDonald, Michael Swaine, Dean Cheng, and Timothy Thomas were also generous with their time, informed comments, and valuable insights. xviii The Paradox of Power National Defense University provided the setting and support that made this work possible. The United States is blessed to have an official institution that makes possible diverse, dispassionate, and innovative research and analysis in the interest of national security, and we hope that this book will be a credit to it.